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Abstract
The 1992 Rio Outcome articulates what is arguably, to date, the most ambitious North –
South environmentally sound technology (EST) transfer aspirations. Yet, 26 years postRio, Africa remains at the lowest rung of the global EST deployment totem. Departing from
talking-points like the connection of EST transfer and intellectual property rights, this
research focuses on the normative underpinnings of the history, processes and dynamics of
UNFCCC’s EST transfer regime. Using a ‘reconsidered’ Third World Approach to
International Law approach and its accompanying historical research methodology, the
thesis seeks to track landmarks in UNFCCC’s EST transfer regime evolution and the
impacts of a globally commodified climate change structure on EST transfer in Africa. It
further considers how previous trends are being reproduced and reiterated in the current
regime under the Paris Agreement. It concludes by framing a five-point research agenda
for the reformation of the UNFCCC-led global EST development and transfer regime.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

Purpose and Rationale of Thesis

This thesis attempts a normative rethink of the technology transfer framework under the international
climate change regime. It seeks to critique and reimagine the structure(s), process(es), dynamics and
impact(s) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) technology
transfer regime on environmentally sound technologies (ESTs), with select African States as case
studies. The foregoing overarching research objectives mandate an understanding of not just the
current transfer structure and processes of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime, but also how it evolved
and a consideration of the nuanced differences and similarities in its diverse phases.
The causal and corrective connections between technology and the environment have long been
recognized. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration, for example, while in one breath indicting
technological advancement and industrialization as key causes of environmental degradation, in
another breath referenced technology and science as remedies thereto. 1 Similarly, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that “technology is among the central
driving forces of GHG emissions … At the same time, technology and technological change offer the
main possibilities for reducing future emissions and achieving the eventual stabilization of
atmospheric concentrations of (Greenhouse Gases) GHGs”.2 More gravely, it has been stated that
given the existential risks posed by climate change, mankind’s “survival depends on our improvement
of technology”.3 To others, however, only a radical global normative and attitudinal shift can salvage
the world from its current precipice.4 This thesis fuses these seemingly contradictory positions to argue
that climate change mandates a norm-based approach to the development, deployment and
management of ESTs.

1

See generally The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972, principles 9, 18, 20
and preamble. (Stockholm Declaration).

2

Working Group III Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 218.

3

Christiana Figueres, former Secretary General to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) quoted by Catherine Suez, “Human Survival Depends on Shared Technology, Says New UN Climate Chief”
Intellectual Property Watch (3 September 2010) online: https://www.ip-watch.org/2010/09/03/human-survival-dependson-technology-says-new-un-climate-chief/.

4

See for example: Felix Creutzig et al, “Beyond Technology: Demand-Side Solutions for Climate Change Mitigation”
(2016) 41:1 Annu Rev Environ Resour 173, online: <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-environ110615-085428>; Francesca Pongiglione & Jan Cherlet, “The Social and Behavioral Dimensions of Climate Change:
Fundamental but Disregarded?” (2015) 46:2 J Gen Philos Sci 383.

1

The centrality of technology to climate change is duly accented by the emphasis placed on it in the
first major international instrument on climate change – the 1992 UNFCCC. For instance, the
UNFCCC explicitly tied the implementation of developing countries’ commitment under the climate
regime to the level of access they have to finance and technology. 5 It is this connection between
technological access and the attainment of global climate change aspirations that informed the
assertion made by some that “technology is the quid pro quo of global solidarity on climate change”.6
Put more explicitly, the UNFCCC “…was built on a fundamental political bargain directly involving
technology transfer.”7 Indeed, this quid pro quo arrangement firmly rests on the commitment that:
The developed country parties … shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and
finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and
know-how to other parties, particularly developing country parties, to enable them to implement
the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed country parties shall support
the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing
country Parties. Other Parties and organizations in a position to do so may also assist in
facilitating the transfer of such technologies.8
The above provision is referred to in this work as ‘the technology transfer pact’.9
Africa is a ‘first-hand witness to the failure of the EST transfer pact. While contributing the least to
global emissions,10 the continent is the world’s most vulnerable continent to climate change11 and has
about the least capacity to either combat the effects of climate change or mitigate the cause.12 The
5

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 30822, art 4(7) (entered into force
21 March 1994) (UNFCCC).

6

International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Beyond Technology Transfer: Protecting Human Rights in a
Climate-Constrained World (Geneva: ICHRP, 2011) xiv.

7

Dalindyebo Shabalala, “Technology Transfer for Climate Change and Developing Country Viewpoints on Historical
Responsibility but Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” in Joshua D. Sarnoff, ed., Research Handbook on
Intellectual Property and Climate Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 172.

8

UNFCCC, art 4(5).

This pact While art. 4(5) of the UNFCCC did not explicitly mention ‘obligation to transfer technology’, it is argued that
the obligations to ‘promote, facilitate and finance’ equal an ‘obligation to transfer’. As noted elsewhere, “although the
wording in UNFCCC Article 4.5 is somewhat ambiguous, it would appear to indicate that the parties listed in the shorter
Annex 2 – at the minimum – owe the obligation to transfer technology”. See ICHRP, supra note 6 at 34.

9

10

Africa is said to contribute about 3.6% of the global GHG emissions. See Amadou Sy, “Africa: Financing Adaptation
and Mitigation in the World’s Most Vulnerable Region” (2016) online: <https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/global_20160818_cop21_africa.pdf>.

11

“United
Nations
Fact
Sheet
on
Climate
Change”
online:
<http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/factsheet_africa.pdf>; Olivia Serdeczny et al, “Climate
Change Impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa: from Physical Changes to their Social Repercussions” (2015) 15:8 Regional
Environmental Change, 1; Isabelle Niang et al, “Africa” in Christopher Field et al, eds, Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 1205.

12

Damilola Olawuyi, “From Technology Transfer to Technology Absorption: Addressing Climate Change Technology
Gaps in Africa” (2017) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, DOI: 10.1080/02646811.2017.1379667 at 6.

2

risks faced by the region have been listed to include “shifts in biome distribution, loss of coral reefs,
reduced crop productivity, adverse effects on livestock, vector- and water-borne diseases,
undernutrition, and migration”.13 Beyond these adaptation-oriented risks are the continent’s
developmental challenges. The energy deficit experienced on the continent is indicative of and
contributory to these developmental challenges. A direct correlation has been drawn between this state
of acute energy poverty and not only the underdeveloped economy of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also
the health, education and overall wellbeing of its people.14 According to the International Energy
Agency (IEA), as of 2014, about 620 million of Africa’s 915 million population are without access to
electricity and nearly 730 million depend on solid biomass for cooking.15
The dearth of ESTs in Africa, despite the dire needs of the continent, has been the subject of research
over the years. As will be shown shortly, these studies have largely focused on EST transfer as an
intellectual property rights (IPR) concern. This emphasis is not without justification. For one, the
connection between technology transfer and IPR has been one of the most drawn-out contentions
between developing and developed countries from the inception of the climate change regime.16 While
developing countries generally view IPR as inhibitory to EST transfer, developed States represent it
as facilitative.17 However, beyond the narrowness of the IPR debate, is what it denotes about the
underpinning of the global EST construct, that is, its market-centricity. This is why the IPR debate
has been reframed as being about developed countries favouring “an approach that exclusively
promotes markets through enabling environments” while developing countries favour non-market
dependent approaches.18 The inability of developing countries, particularly African States, to access
ESTs is traceable to this market-focused approach. An author made this point thus:
…where technology is held through IP, rights-holders are typically interested in selling their
knowledge and technology at a certain price in a market with sufficient purchasing power. Thus,
developing countries face a twofold problem: they do not present sufficient markets for private
13

Niang et al, supra note 11 at 1204.

14

International Energy Agency, Africa Energy Outlook:A focus on Energy Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, (2014).
online: <https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2014_AfricaEnergyOutlook.pdf>at 27

15

Ibid at 19.

16

Carlos Correa, “Intellectual Property Rights under the UNFCCC: Without Response to Developing Countries’
Concerns” in Joshua D. Sarnoff, ed., Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Climate Change (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 74.

17

Ahmed Abdel Latif, et al, “Overcoming the Impasse on Intellectual Property and Climate Change at the UNFCCC: A
Way Forward” (2011) 11 ICTSD Programme on Innovation, Technology and Intellectual Property, 2 – 3.

18

Heleen de Coninck and Ambuj Sagar, “Technology Development and Transfer (Article 10)” in Daniel Klein et al, The
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 258 at 262.

3

actors to develop technologies to serve their needs; and where technologies exist and are
protected by IP, they do not present sufficient markets for right-holders to sell or licence their
technologies.19
This thesis contends, in part, that the commodification of the global EST regime and its overall neoliberal underpinning has left developing (African) States with the shorter end of the stick. This
argument is linked to the broader theme of the dangers of the objectification and commercialization
of the climate change cause.20 It further argues that the focus on IPRs, regulatory and legal barriers in
developing countries in the EST transfer discourse, while not without merit, distracts from the core
problem of the transfer regime “which is simply a failure to systematically pursue the technology
provisions of the UNFCCC … the failure (of developed countries in particular) to produce a policy
and mechanism to facilitate technology transfer”.21
The point must be made clearly that this work’s focus on the international dimension of the global
EST transfer matrix does not detract from the need to address allied concerns like the necessity of an
enabling environment in developing States or the involvement of non-State parties in transfer
initiatives. However, it contends that the need to steer the global EST regime away from developed
States’ emphasis on a neo-liberal and market-oriented construct is a stand-alone problem that must be
addressed. Host-State initiatives are inherently assimilative; they are meant to facilitate effective local
diffusion of effectively transferred technologies. Logically, if technologies are not transferred, an
assimilation phase will be needless. While the focus of this research is on African States, its
implications are global. The underlying objectives and contentions of this research speak to the
daunting existential demands of climate change and the consequential imperatives of de-prioritizing
economic considerations in the international EST transfer framework for the (global) public good.
1.2

Research Questions

Existing studies have approached the subject of EST transfer regime’s ineffectiveness from diverse
perspectives. These viewpoints can be broadly grouped into market-oriented and normative research,

19

Shabalala, supra note 7 at 174.

20

B.S. Chimni, “The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach” (2007) 8
Melbourne Journal of International Law 499 at 504. Also see generally Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism
and Climate Change Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013)

21

ICHRP, supra note 6 at xiv, 60.

4

with most scholarly works under the former.22 While also focused on the interrogation of the reasons
for the ineffectiveness of the EST transfer framework under the UNFCCC regime, the questions
sought to be answered in this research align more with the normative genre of studies on the subject.
The questions include:
i.
How has the UNFCCC-coordinated EST transfer regime evolved?
ii.
How has the resistance of developing States to the neo-liberally structured global EST
framework evolved?
iii.
How has the UNFCCC institutional design, policy framework and transfer initiatives impacted
developing countries’ access to ESTs?
iv.
To what extent does the extant EST transfer framework under the Paris Agreement reproduce
past trends and what are the prospective impacts of such iterations?
v.
How can the international EST framework be reformed into an effective, efficient and
equitable regime?
The questions, approaches, and claims engaged in this thesis are informed by the theoretical outlook
provided by Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), a theory which aptly grounds
the presumptions, contentions and recommendations contained in this work. There is no research
known to this writer which has studied the global EST transfer regime in the light of the above
questions. Neither is there any known work where the subject of EST transfer has been considered
from a TWAIL perspective.
1.3

Research Methodology: Approaches and Method

It is not commonplace for scholarly works on climate change law to contain segments or chapters
explicitly laying out a methodological framework. A cursory review of two recent climate change
law/policy related texts entailing a compilation of articles from various authors exemplify this point.23
None of the 56 chapters in both publications made either a deliberate or an overt attempt to make bare
their methodological constructs.24 Although an interrogation of this trend is outside the scope of this
22

Research on IPRs and patents, endogenous capacity building, public-private partnerships, non-state party initiatives,
etc., are generally subsumed under the market-oriented category, while studies on human rights and technology transfer,
theoretical underpinnings of EST transfer, etc., are categorised as non-market based.

23

Daniel Klein, et al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017) and Cinnamon Carlarne, et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

24

This point is only illustrative and does not imply that the referenced well researched works do not to varying levels
have ingrained in them some methodological themes. It only illustrates the absence of clearly delineated methodological
segment clearly and comprehensively spelling out the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the works. Making methodological choices,
explicit, is necessary for “self- and peer – scrutiny” for the legitimization of intellectual endeavours and demonstration of
“challenging scholarly choices that we confront and make”. See Elizabeth Fisher et al, eds., “Maturity and Methodology:
Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship” (2009) 21:2 Journal of Environmental Law 213 at 244.

5

work, it is necessary to note that this seems to be the general inclination in environmental law. Since
climate change law is essentially a sub-set of environmental law,25 the criticism that environmental
law scholarship is generally perceived as immature and less of an intellectual discipline due to “lack
of explicit and widespread discussion about methodology” is apt. 26 Methodology has been variously
defined as “a systematic procedure that a scholar applies as part of an intellectual enterprise” and “a
way to systematically solve (a) research problem … various steps … adopted by a researcher in
studying his research problem along with the logic behind them”.27 According to Fisher et al, while
methodology is informed by the research questions asked, the questions are also informed by “implicit
or explicit methodological perspectives”.28
Some of the central hypotheses of this work include: (1) the most debilitating flaw of the global EST
transfer regime is the prioritization of monetarism29 over environmentalism30 and humanism; (2) the
UNFCCC EST transfer set-up and policies are more symbolical than functional; and (3) except ‘de-

25

Although this view is a subject of ongoing scholarly contentions, the position taken in this work aligns more with Chris
Hilson’s concept of ‘climate unexceptionalism’, that is, that ‘core’ similarities between climate change law and
environmental law, blur absolute demarcations between both fields. See Chris Hilson, “It’s All About Climate Change,
Stupid! Exploring the Relationship Between Environmental Law and Climate Law” (2013) 25:3 Journal of Environmental
Law 359 at 362.

26

Fisher et al, eds., Supra note 24 at 214, 218. Some of the challenges of environmental law researchers giving rise to
this state of affairs include: the speed and scale of regulatory change, the interdisciplinary nature of the subject, heavy
reliance on “a diverse range of governance arrangements” and “tackling the multijurisdictional nature of the subject”. The
writers further identified “the intellectual incoherence of environmental law as a subject, the perceived marginality of
environmental law scholarship in the legal academy, the poor quality of some environmental law scholarship and the
sheer difficulty of carrying out environmental law scholarship” as reasons for the persistence of the “immature image of
environmental”. Supra note 24 at 215, 219.
27

Fisher et al, supra note 24 at 226 and C.R. Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques, 2 nd edn (New
Delhi: New Age, 2004) 8. Again, methodology has been used in different contexts, while some have differentiated
between methodology, methods, theory and approach, others have inferred their synonymousness. See Robert Cryer, et
al, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oxford: HART Publishing, 2011) 5. In this work, a distinction
is recognized between methodology as a collective term for methods, approaches and theories. While methods largely
engage ‘empirical’ tools and with more specific research implications (e.g. quantitative or qualitative research), approach
is construed as a broader perspectival research frame informing the direction of a research (e.g. historical, comparative,
interdisciplinary or doctrinal approach), and theory deals with “underlying presumptions … definitional boundaries …
and preferred justifications (for an) intellectual phenomenon”. See Richard Devlin, “The Charter and Anglophone Legal
Theory” (1997 - 1998) 4:1 Rev of Const Stud 19 at 22.

28

Fisher et al, supra note 24 at 244.

29

While ‘monetarism’ has a technical meaning as prognosticated by Milton Friedman, it is used in this work to mean the
emphasis placed on return on investment as the chief determinant on policies and/or initiatives in respect of EST transfer.

30

As against being descriptive of actions of a defined set of environmental activists, environmentalism here is used as a
worldview which puts premium on the environment over profiteering in the transfer of ESTs. It fits more with what has
been classified as “the first wave of environmentalism” with its strong normative underpinning, than with the second or
third waves which focus on ‘regulation’ or ‘investment’. See Michael Shellinberger & Ted Nordhaus, “The Death of
Environmentalism: Global Warming Politics in a Post-Environmental World” (2004) online: <
https://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf>.

6

monetized’ and ‘un-neo-liberalised’, the UNFCCC will remain ineffective in the bid to transfer ESTs
to developing States.
The above hypotheses stem from the view that there is a need to shift the climate discourse from the
current market frame to a more normative context. While conversations around climate change have
largely centred on ‘emission reduction targets’, ‘climate policies’, and ‘mannequin’ principles like
CBDR, the more vital questions on necessary normative paradigm shifts have barely been asked. As
put elsewhere, we skipped “the stages of debate over fundamentals …” and “went directly to the
important, but narrower, question about the merits of the suite of policy instruments”. 31 These
hypotheses will be subsequently tested in this thesis.
Consistent with the first and second research questions (on page 5) on the evolution of the global EST
structure and third world resistance thereto, this work draws heavily on the historical approach to legal
research. In discussing legal history, a line has often been drawn between internal and external history,
with the former focused on the “the study of legal doctrines and institutions isolated from social
context”, and the latter taking into account how the socio-political, cultural and economic milieu have
impacted the evolution of law.32 The point is worth making that while the historical approach is not
very popular in climate change law discourse, perhaps because of its relatively recent emergence,
existing historical works are largely internal.33 It is safe to assert that this research is premised on the
latter classification than the former. Thus, it seeks to show the contingent nature of the international
EST transfer structure and refutes the assumption that the same is neutral, ahistorical or can be
sequestered in a vacuum.34 ‘History’ in this work has not been conducted for ‘history’s sake’.35 Rather,
31

A. Dan Tarlock, “Is There a There There in Environmental Law” (2004) 19 J Land Use & Envl L 213 at 217.

32

R. Blake Brown, “A Taxonomy of Methodological Approaches in Recent Canadian History”, (2004) 34:1 Acadiensis
145.
33

See for examples, Jane Bulmer, Meinhard Doelle & Daniel Klein, “Negotiating History of the Paris Agreement” in
Daniel Klein et al, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017) 50 – 73; and Lavanya Rajamani & Emmanuel Guerin, “Central Concepts in the Paris Agreement and How
they Evolved” in Daniel Klein et al, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017) 74 – 90.
34

Jim Phillips identified ‘the contingency of the law’, relative autonomy of law, its liberating potential and the alternative
vision it provides as the reasons legal history matters. On the law’s contingency, he noted that law “is formed by, and
exists within, human societies, and its forms and principles, and changes to them, are rationally connected to those
particular societies”. Jim Phillips, “Why Legal History Matters” (2010) 41 Victoria University Wellington Law Review
293 at 295.
35

Valentina Vadi distinguished between two cultures of international legal history – historians’ history and jurists’ history.
While the first considers the past for its own sake, the second puts legal history in context. She concluded the piece by
arguing for a crosscutting blend whereat the “boundaries between international law and history, as well as those between
past and present” are broken down. This, she argued “does not aim to explain ‘history for the sake of history’; rather, it

7

it is intended that in reviewing the past, the present can be put in context, recycled errors can be
identified and, perhaps, corrected.36
The comparative approach has also been engaged in this work. This again bears direct correlation with
the questions sought to be answered here, particularly the ‘impact analysis’ component of this research
in chapter three. Worthy of note, however, is the distinction between the comparative approach
engaged here and the conventional comparative legal approach. This traditional frame was described
elsewhere as providing “insight into another country’s law, our own law … perceptions and intuitions
– a self-reflection that can often yield insight into our view of the law”.37 Rather than comparing laws,
this research considers the performance of a global (legal) structure in select national contexts. Hence,
comparative methodology is used not as an instrument of improvement, but a tool of discovery.38
Although framing this comparative endeavour in the ‘discovery context’ shields this work from the
traditional complexities of conventional comparative research (e.g. the need for an understanding of
the local language of a comparator39), it opens other challenges. One of such is the difficulty of
disconnecting an international framework from the local context within which it operates. For
example, the Clean Development Mechanism’s impact in aiding technology transfer to an African
State cannot be disconnected from the local dynamics of the State where a project is implemented.
One way around the challenge just noted is to employ a comparative case study method. This method
is said to be particularly useful when research questions border on the effectiveness of policies and
the context influencing the performance of initiatives.40

aims at “understand[ing] law as history/history as law””. See Valentina Vadi, “International Law and Its Histories:
Methodological Risks and Opportunities” online: <http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/84947/1/Histories_Harvard_Vadi.pdf> 2,
34.
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While noting that history does not provide “correct” contemporary answers, Jim Phillips noted that it may “admonish
us against repeating the mistakes of the past…” Supra note 34 at 306.
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Further worth commenting on is the doctrinal nature of this research. The doctrinal approach is said
to be foundational to any legal research.41 Although this is not a purely doctrinal research, an extensive
review of MEAs, particularly the 1992 UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, COP
Decisions and debates leading to these instruments are crucial to this work. However, the review is
more focused on how the EST related provisions in the MEAs evolved through the years (1992 2017), and how they were implemented, than on a substantive analysis of the provisions themselves.
One of the limitations of this work is the unavailability of data on transferred ESTs in general, and
particularly, transfer to Africa. Reliance will, therefore, largely be placed on empirical studies in
literature, particularly commissioned studies by the UNFCCC and the UNEP.
1.4
Environmentally Sound Technology Transfer in International Climate Change Law: A
Literature Review
The broadness of the subject of EST transfer and the sheer volume of literature on it, make a
comprehensive review almost impossible. An attempt is, however, made to appraise scholarly works
by themes central to the research questions posed above. To facilitate this, select literature relatively
representative of these themes, is critiqued in two sub-sections. While the first sub-section reviews
scholarly works on the meaning of ESTs and technology transfer, the second sub-section appraises
existing works on EST transfer both from the economic and normative perspectives.
1.4.1 Conceptual Analysis: Environmentally Sound Technologies and Technology Transfer
As extensive as are the implications of climate change, so are the ESTs necessary to respond to them.
This means that ESTs do not refer to a single class of technologies. Rather, the term is a loose one
used to describe a collection of technologies with differences not just in their external make-up but
their complexity for use and the different conditions which must exist for them to operate. This
complexity is reflected in the various definitions which have been proffered for ESTs.42 For example,
the term has been defined as:
…technologies that have the potential for significantly improved environmental performance
relative to other technologies … total systems that include know-how, procedures, goods and

41

Fisher et al, supra note 24 at 231 – 232.

42
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services, and equipment, as well as organisational and managerial procedures for promoting
environmental sustainability.43
Drawing from Agenda 21’s description of ESTs,44 UNEP’s 2003 study suggested that ESTs should
protect the environment, pollute less, use resources sustainably, recycle wastes and products and
handle residual wastes more acceptably than technologies being substituted.45 While the above
definition is no doubt wide-ranging, it does not recognize the two broad classifications of ESTs. Its
emphasis on ‘improved environmental performance’ and promotion of environmental sustainability
shows a focus on mitigation ESTs, while adaptation technologies are not covered. The comparative
dimension of the above definition is also worth noting. The definition makes it clear that it “covers
the full spectrum of production and consumption technologies that are more environmentally sound
than the technologies for which they are substitutes”.46 No doubt, this definition does not only blur
the boundary, but admits of unsustainable technologies eligible only because they pollute less than
another technology.47
Rather than explicitly defining ‘ESTs’, studies have generally simply identified the various categories
of ESTs. An example of such work is a 2008 study which stated that “technologies to address climate
change can be grouped into the two major areas for which these technologies can be utilized –
mitigation and adaptation”.48 The study proceeded to define mitigation ESTs as technologies
“required to reduce GHG emissions and to enhance sinks aimed at reducing the extent of global
warming”.49 Although the study failed to expressly define adaptation ESTs, it generally classified
adaptation ESTs into hardware and software.50 It noted that these adaptation ESTs can be implemented
in five areas – “regional and local climate modelling and early warning, coastal zone management,
43
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water resources, agriculture and public health”.51 Adaptation ESTs are also classified according to
actions they are used for, whether anticipatory (e.g. sensors) and/or reactive (e.g. water desalination
technologies).52
Apart from broadly classifying ESTs along the lines of mitigation and adaptation, other classifications
have been employed. Nygaard & Hansen generally categorised ESTs into hardware, software and
orgware.53 While hardware refers to tangible technologies, software and orgware relate to “processes
associated with the production and use of the hardware” and “the institutional framework, or
organisation involved in the adoption and diffusion process of a technology”. 54 The relevance of this
classification will be shown further in this work, particularly as regards conclusions reached in various
studies on the transfer of technologies to Africa. Nygaard & Hansen also categorised ESTs as market
and non-market goods.55 Market goods include consumer goods (with mass market and wide supply
chain) and capital goods (restricted to markets with few buyers (industry and utilities)).56 Non-market
goods, however, entail publicly provided goods (“procured and diffused by public entities”) and other
non-market goods (primarily software and orgware).57 The relevance of this classification is its
assistance to appreciate various dimensions of the barriers to technology transfer, some of which will
be considered shortly.58
Elsewhere, ESTs have been classified according to their level of development: existing technologies
(near term); state of the art technologies (medium term) and technologies under development (long
term).59 While near term technologies are expected to have achieved significant global adoption by
2030, medium term and long term ESTs are projected to be ripe for adoption by 2030 – 2050 and
51
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2050 – 2100 respectively.60 Again, this classification helps to spotlight another flaw in existing studies
on the transfer of ESTs to developing countries. For example, in concluding that market factors like
patent and cost are not barriers to EST transfer, studies often focus on near term ESTs, like solar PVs
and wind turbines.61 When a less tunnel-like analysis is done in the context of medium and long-term
technologies, the potential grave effect of the status quo on developing States becomes more evident.
It is interesting to note that the ESTs with the highest mitigation potential are all primarily
characterised by cost barriers.62 However, ‘ownership’, as a classificatory factor for ESTs appear to
be missing from existing literature. Cognizing ‘ownership’ gives rise to another categorization of
ESTs into publicly-owned, privately-owned ESTs and co-owned ESTs. While the first refers to ESTs
wholly funded and controlled by governments, the second includes ESTs funded and owned by nongovernmental corporate entities, and the third pertains to ESTs jointly funded and controlled by both
public and private entities. This classification is key to arguments that will be canvassed elsewhere in
this work.
John Barton’s work on EST access to developing States gives a high-level analysis of the global PV,
biomass and wind energy industry.63 While these sectors are by no means representative of the diverse
mitigation and adaptation ESTs, they bring to the surface some of the intricacies and trends of the
global EST market. Of relevance to this work is the study’s finding on the source of funding for EST
research and development (R & D). Citing the United States and European Union as examples, two
jurisdictions with the highest number of EST innovations, the study notes EST R&D are largely
financed by governments in developed countries.64 In the European Union, for example, over 50% of
the investment in EST R&D were publicly funded.65 As will be elaborated later, this finding throws a
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shade on long-standing developed States’ argument as to their inability to facilitate EST transfer
because of their ownership by private entities. Analysing the solar PV industry, Barton notes the
decentralised industrial structure detailing the location of the leading firms in Europe, Japan, United
States, China and India, and their shipments.66 As at 2005, however, five firms – Sharp, Kyocera,
Shell Solar, BP Solar and Schott Solar control about 60% of the global market. 67 Even more
concentration was noted in the (solar) inverter industry, where three leading companies that hold about
73% of the market are based in the United States.68 The study noted the increasing involvement of
China and India in the solar PV global industry, primarily through joint ventures with or by out-right
purchase of existing firms.69 Unlike the seemingly decentralized structure of the solar industry, Barton
referenced the wind industry as more concentrated with four firms controlling three-quarters of the
global market.70 Also noticeable is the increasing break-in of China and India into this industry. China
and India’s increasing dominance in the global EST industry brings another dimension to this research.
This is more so as both countries have in the past led the clamour for the removal of market barriers
to EST access. Their fidelity to this advocacy will be considered in a latter part of this research.
Like ESTs, the concept of ‘technology transfer’ (TT) is not easily definable. Shabalala, in a recent
work, reviewed diverse definitions of technology transfer in an EST context.71 He referenced
paragraph 1.2 of the 1985 draft International Code of Conduct for Technology Transfer (ICCTT),
where TT was defined as “the transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for
the application of a process or for the rendering of a service and does not extend to the transactions
involving the mere sale or mere lease of goods”.72 Shabalala described this definition as “perhaps the
clearest definition”. He further referred to chapter 34 of Agenda 21 as “the best articulated technology
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transfer definition in a MEA”.73 These two value-appraisals by Shabalala are highly contestable. One,
while the ICCTT definition is extensive, it seems to focus mainly on the transfer of ‘software’, leaving
out the transfer of hardware and orgware. Two, Chapter 34 of Agenda 21 does not contain any explicit
definition of TT. At best, it contains an agenda which should inform the transfer of publicly and
privately-owned ESTs. The third definition referenced by Shabalala is contained in IPCC’s 2000
report, where TT was defined as:
A broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for
mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments,
private sector entities, financial institutions, NGOs and research/education institutions … (it)
encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology cooperation across and within countries
… It comprises the process of learning to understand, utilise and replicate the technology,
including the capacity to choose it and adapt it to local conditions and integrate it with
indigenous technologies.74
Apart from providing one of the most comprehensive TT definitions, the 2000 IPCC report is also one
of the most insightful studies on EST transfer to date. The above definition is adopted as the working
definition for TT in this work.
Importantly, the IPCC study provided a sketch guideline on how to appraise effective technology
transfer. It categorised the assessment criteria into: GHG and environmentally related; economic and
socially related; administrative, institutional and politically related, and process-related.75 These
criteria and some of the components listed above will be developed into a grading rubric for the
appraisal of UNFCCC’s policy and institutional framework in a later chapter.
1.4.2 A Review of Research Trends: Market-based and Normative Studies76
Existing works on EST transfer can be broadly classified as patent oriented and non-patent related
research, with the former having the larger percentage of scholarly attention. Researchers’ focus on
IPRs/patent viz-a-viz technology transfer is not unjustified, as the subject remains one of the most
drawn-out issues in global climate change discourse. Literature reviewed here has, however, been
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classified as market-based and normative. The market-based classification recognises other pockets
of EST transfer studies which are disconnected from the patent argument but are predicated on market
performance. Studies under the normative category entail a growing body of literature that seek to deemphasise the distracting prominence of market considerations in EST transfer discourse. Leading the
pack in this regard is a 2011 study commissioned by the International Council on Human Rights Policy
(ICHRP), which drew on six earlier commissioned papers by John Barton, Simon Caney, Marcos
Orellana, et al.77 Under the market-based category, this review focuses on claims and counter-claims
on the issues of: the facilitative or inhibitive role of IPRs/patent to EST transfer to developing
countries; the absorptive capacity of host States as the primary limiting factor of EST transfer; and the
involvement of non-State parties in EST transfer.
Over and beyond any other issue, the IPRs/patent debate represents the most gaping divide between
developed and developing States under the climate change framework. In summary, the case of
developing countries is that IPRs and patents are constraints to effective transfer. 78 On the flipside,
developed countries have argued that IPRs are enablers and that constraining them will disincentivize
innovation. The point has, however, been made that the arguments on both sides lack empirical
support to connect the state of EST diffusion in developing countries to intellectual property rights.79
It is in this regard that a flurry of empirical studies was conducted between 2007 and 2013 on IPR’s
role in EST transfer. Pioneering this research area was Stanford Law School’s John Barton’s work on
IPR and the transfer of solar, biofuel and wind technologies to developing countries.80 Focusing on
advanced developing countries (China, India and Brazil), the report concluded that “with respect to
access to the benefits of the technology … there seem unlikely to be significant IP barriers to
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developing nation access”.81 This report and similar studies thereafter82 are, however, limited by their
focus on BASIC States and narrowly scoped conception of technology transfer.83
Researchers are in no way ad idem on the position that IPR is not a barrier to the transfer of ESTs.
Cameron Hutchison, for example, concludes that “strong patent protection rights increase the cost of
technological acquisition while having no positive bearing on increased foreign direct investment in,
or technology trade to, many developing countries”, and that “TRIPS forecloses an effective remedy
of international compulsory licensing in cases where developed country “patent holders refuse to
license technologies to developing country firms”.84 Hutchinson’s research can be critiqued for not
being anchored on empirical proof for the conclusions he reached. Nevertheless, as confirmed by a
2013 UNEP study, empirical studies carried out over the years have arrived at different findings,
“some contradictory”.85 Despite these disparate findings, the said UNEP report concluded that with
less than 1% of all applications for mitigation and adaptation worldwide filed in Africa, “patent rights
are unlikely to be a major consideration in any decision to exploit CETs in Africa”.86 It added that
“the main factors impeding technology transfer are access to real know-how from the source
companies (including access to trade secrets), access to suitably skilled staff, scientific infrastructure
and favourable conditions”.87 Rather than support the claim that IPRs do not constrict EST transfer,
the UNEP report appears to do otherwise. As shown earlier, accessing software and orgware are
central to EST transfer; it transcends the transfer of hardware. Typical of previous studies, the UNEP
report also focused on a survey of patent filings to reach its conclusions. Shabalala, in his critique of
this kind of quantitative research, noted:
To date several quantitative analyses have been attempted, but many suffer from serious
methodological flaws in that they equate equipment flows with technology transfer and do not

81

Ibid at 18.

82

See generally David Ockwell et al, “Intellectual Property Rights and Low Carbon Technology Transfer: Conflicting
Discourses of Diffusion and Development” (2010) 20 Global Environmental Change 729 and Ian Harvey, “Intellectual
Property Rights: The Catalyst to Deliver Low Carbon Technologies” (2008) Breaking the Climate Deadlock Briefing
Paper.

83

Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property & the Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies, (Global Challenges
Report, WIPO: Geneva, 2011) 14, 15.

84
Cameron Hutchinson, “Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology Transfer into Developing
Countries?” (2006) 3 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, 1.
85

UNEP, Patents and Clean Energy Technologies in Africa (UNEP, 2013) 18.

86

Ibid at 61.

87

Ibid at 60.

16

measure flows of know-how, information and licensing levels that occur. In addition, the
analyses measure the technology transfer claims rather than project evaluations and outcomes.88
Rather than taking either side of the patent debate, other studies on this subject have been more
nuanced, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of both sides and suggesting ways in which the
concerns of parties can be integrated into an effective EST transfer framework. 89 Keith Maskus &
Ruth Okediji’s work in this respect deserves mention.90 In developing what they described as “a third,
more nuanced approach” to EST transfer,91 Maskus & Okediji classified ESTs as public goods.92 This
approach proposes “tailored and discrete government measures, combined with IPRs, to provide a
meaningful array of incentives to develop and disseminate ESTs.”93 While cautioning against
generalized IPR reforms, they recommend alternative EST R&D investment models to offset private
firms’ R&D costs and alternative incentive models to address challenges like “differentiated
adaptation costs” in developing countries and sustainable long-term investments.94 These initiatives
will be funded through an expanded Global Environment Facility under the World Bank, grants from
developed countries or through the establishment of a Global Emissions Reduction Fund (GERF).95
Focusing more on the role of African countries in the global EST transfer construct, Damilola Olawuyi
in a recent work, contends that “the key barrier to climate technology diffusion across Africa is
arguably not the lack of technology inflow to Africa; rather, it is the perennial inability of African
States to absorb and assimilate transferred technology.”96 In attempting to justify this position, he
conducted a comparative review and survey of select African countries and identified inadequate
information, weak legal protection, lack of technical and institutional capacity, weak investment
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environment and inadequate/lack of climate change laws as key barriers. Olawuyi’s argument mirrors
another common trend in global EST transfer discourse: the view that the absence of pull factors
(conducive investment, legal and regulatory climate) in developing States is primarily responsible for
the ineffective EST transfer regime. This has consequently led to the emphasis on technology needs
assessment in developing States to identify technology needs and implementation action plans.
Shalababa tracks and critiques this position thus:
…Industrialized countries have generally focused on non-regulatory and market mechanisms
as the prime vector for technology transfer, and have pointed to weaknesses in developing
countries that prevent market mechanisms from working … Industrialized countries thus focus
on so-called ‘host country measures’, rather than on their own obligations and on ‘home
country’ measures.97
The involvement of non-State parties is another theme on which scholarship on EST Transfer has
developed in recent years. Looking beyond the IPR debate, Anna Davies focused on collaborative
ventures outside mainstream market structures for the transfer of ESTs.98 Hence, she referenced ForProfit organizations (e.g. Innovation Exchange Inc) and Not-For-Profit establishments (e.g. Potential
Energy and Eurofit) which have through “open source innovation, crowdsourcing and innovation
contests” facilitated the development, transfer and diffusion of ESTs.99 Srinivas, on the other hand,
argued for a move beyond the North – South technology transfer structure into a more inclusive
construct entailing: South – South, South-North and North-South transfer.100 This proposed structure
aligns with the United Nations South-South and Triangular Cooperation programme (SSTC).101
As will be considered in more details in chapter five, three studies by the ICHRP, Oche Onazi and
Baskut Tuncak between 2011 and 2013 are emblematic of increasing scholarly attention to a more
normative approach to EST transfer. The ICHRP study, in the main, argues that rather than
97
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emphasising the “tired opposition between state and market”, human rights as a provider of “language
on which broad agreement already exists over minimal standards for action” should be the premise on
which the global EST transfer negotiation is held.102 While admitting that human rights does not have
all the answers for the various disputes bedevilling EST transfer, it contends that they can “help
identify the core areas of agreement: a basis for urgent, if minimal, actions in the face of climate
imperatives that may help overcome the deadlock”.103
These works provide a snapshot of the core issues in EST transfer discourse and how they have been
approached. Worth noting is the dominance of empirical studies and comparative analyses of how
ESTs have percolated over time. While empirical study of EST transfer trends is necessary, it is not
an adequate tool by which to assess reasons for the low level of EST transfer and diffusion in Africa.
Statistics on the number of patents registered and where they were registered are limited in explaining
normative constructs, presumptions, historical and sociological factors which inform the present
global IPR system. I am not aware of any scholarly work which has comprehensively assessed and
critiqued UNFCCC technology transfer mechanisms over the years, how they evolved, and the
implications of the transition for Africa.104 While the reviewed research on the intersect between
human rights and EST transfer are of immense relevance to this thesis, they have also left questions
raised in this thesis unanswered. The gaps have led to the iteration of concepts, programmes and
structures, different in nomenclature but similar in substance under the UNFCCC regime. The EST
transfer structure under the UNFCCC has largely mutated through five phases over the years: The preUNFCCC, Pre - Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT); EGTT; Poznan; and technology
mechanism phases. What informed these transitions? What are the similarities and differences in these
phases? How did African countries fare under each phase? To what extent can the lessons gleaned
from the past phases impact a reformation of the current structure? TWAIL provides both theoretical
and analytical instruments to engage these questions. To this theory I now turn.
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1.5
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), International Climate Change
Law and Technology Transfer
A comprehensive analysis of what TWAIL means and what its implications are, are outside the scope
of this work. What is intended, however, is to succinctly review what TWAIL means as a theoretical
framework and methodology, its presumptions and weaknesses. It will be highlighted that while
TWAIL, as originally construed, might fall short as an analytical instrument for this work, retrofitting
it as a normative theory makes it a relevant tool to track the evolution of the global EST regime,
unmask its assumptions and evolve an effective and equitable reform agenda. Further, as will be
shown, a retrofitted TWAIL helps understand the emergence of developed-developing States (BASIC
States) impact on the North-South EST transfer discourse and the roles these States can play in moving
the discussion forward.
1.5.1 What is TWAIL?
Different from conventional theoretical frameworks, TWAIL has no defined or generally accepted
methodology, approach or argument.105 It is noted elsewhere that as against being a “monolithic
collegium”,106 TWAIL is more like “a chorus of voices that blend though not always harmoniously,
in attempting to make heard a common set of concerns”.107 These ‘common set of concerns’ form the
core of TWAIL as a theoretical tradition and the band, however how elastic, that links its proponents.
While not exhaustive, the following represent the commonalities that characterize TWAIL
scholarship,108 particularly in the international environmental/climate change law context:
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International Law 77
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i.
History is TWAIL’s most fundamental approach;109 the history of international law
scholarship which “participated in, and legitimated global processes of marginalization and
domination”.110 An approach “marked by an insistence on ...continuity; the links of processes of
colonial expansion and domination”.111
ii.
TWAIL seeks to deconstruct the “history, structure and process of international law” from a
third world perspective and “gives meaning to international law in the context of the lived experiences
of the ordinary peoples of the third world in order to transform it into an international law of
emancipation”.112
iii.
International (Environmental) Law is Eurocentric, not global; the imposition of the powerful
minority (North) on the immiserated majority (South).113 Particularly, international environmental law
reflects a western eco-imperialistic agenda.114
Evident from the foregoing is TWAIL’s recourse to the past to unmask a pro-North international
system and its effort at the re-creation of a just, fair and equitable system.115 Hence, TWAIL has been
described as a blend of resistance and reformation.116 Indeed, Makau Mutua described TWAIL as both
“reactive in the sense that it responds to international law as an imperial project … but it is proactive
because it seeks the internal transformation of conditions in the Third World”.117 One will be remiss
in conceptualising TWAIL without referencing its evolution from what has been tagged TWAIL I to
TWAIL II, as this has crucial implications for this research.118 While TWAIL I and II are both antihegemonic and crusade a third world equity agenda, there are some marked differences. 119 Some of
phenomenon to the third world. See Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 American Society of International Law
Proceedings 31 at 36.
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the differences include: TWAIL II’s focus on third world people as against third world States, its
emphasis on the centrality of colonialism and “the politics of knowledge” – domination of northern
scholarship and narrative.120
1.5.2 Reframing the TWAIL Narrative
TWAIL’s transition from ‘I’ to ‘II’ was compelled by the need for continued relevance.121 This is
more so as many contended that with the end of the Cold War, the distinction between the ‘first world’
and ‘third world’ was obviated.122 This transition has, however, not purged TWAIL of its constricting
features, which have, arguably, made it more of an antagonistic tool than a reformatory implement.
Relevant to this work are two of such features, broadly described as definitional and normative.
What does ‘third world’ mean or how can the ‘global south’ be defined? The concept of a ‘third world’
has, overtime, eluded clear definition. In attempting to capture the varying definitions, Rajagopal
considered the term under four classificatory groups – the ideological; geopolitical; historical
deterministic and popular representation models.123 While the first model is framed around the
alignment and non-alignment movement, the second model is construed “in terms of political and
economic organization”. The third is defined in terms of “countries which had suffered the experience
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of colonialism and imperialism”, and the fourth is representative of “poverty, squalor, corruption,
violence, calamities … or simple lack of modernity”.124 According to Rajagopal, a common thread
that runs through the first three models is the colonial experience of nations.125
As earlier noted, TWAIL II heralded a shift from a State based definition of the ‘third world’ to a
people-based definition. However, I argue that despite this supposed transition, ‘State’ as a bounded
geographical enclave still constitutes the core of mainstream TWAIL scholarship. The reference to
‘people’ in the relevant works invariably connotes ‘people’ in a specific ‘nation-state’ in Africa, Asia
or Latin America. Anghie & Chimni, for example, stated that TWAIL scholars are concerned about
identifying and giving “voice to the people within third world States … who had been excluded from
consideration by TWAIL I scholarship”.126 Such a contention is evidently still locked in, and
potentially inhibited by what Rajagopal has described as the “national allegory”. Again, the contention
is not helpful to the quest to delineate the third world, however loosely. Are the people being referred
to within a ‘third world’ that is historically, geopolitically or economically defined? This definitional
challenge is particularly relevant to understanding the role of the BASIC State in the climate change
discourse.127 It is also relevant because of its ‘exclusive’ characteristic. Descriptively, if historically
defined, ‘uncolonized’ Ethiopia is excluded; if geopolitically defined, then Europe’s Moldova
becomes excluded; and if economically defined, the BASIC States are on the ‘verge’ of exclusion.
Given these complexities, it has been asserted that the ‘third world’ is obsolete, “as there is a first
world in every third world, and a third in the first…”128
More fundamentally limiting is TWAIL’s ‘inoculative’ approach to reforming International Law. John
Haskell made this critique pointedly: “…the TWAIL movement suffers from the paradox that its
argumentative logic ultimately relies on the same underlying assumptions of the system it sought to
transcend”.129 Neo-liberalism and its attendant features of capitalism, consumerism and
commodification are at the core of (western) international (environmental) law, and by extension, the
UNFCCC EST transfer regime. However, TWAIL as popularly operationalized, runs on these same
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concepts. Describing this normative failing, Rajagopal noted that the third world remains “mired in
the Eurocentrism of (the) metanarratives of capitalism and communism/socialism” and has failed to
develop an “internal alternative”.130 More descriptively, referencing the botched attempt to establish
a New International Economic Order (NIEO), it has been inferred that the ‘economic catch-up’ has
become the teleological narrative of the “spatial relationship between the North and the South”.131
While not laying claim to solving TWAIL’s definitional and normative conundrums, a normative
descriptive approach is adopted in this work. This approach draws from the works of Rajagopal and
Mickelson. Here, ‘third world’ or ‘global south’, and by extension, TWAIL, is engaged as a counter
hegemonic worldview which provides an alternative narrative to Eurocentrism and its capitalist
priorities. In Mickelson’s words:
…a historically constituted, alternative and oppositional stance within the international system
… (involving) not merely a more equitable distribution of resources, or a reshuffling of existing
power relations … (capturing) … (a) revolutionary nature of the alternative sought: a
fundamental rethinking of international relations.132
Rajagopal similarly argued that ‘third world’ “should be reimagined as a counter-hegemonic
discursive tool that allows us to interrogate and contest the various ways in which power is used”.133
This normative approach helps in the “search for alternatives in international law … by critiquing …
foundational assumptions, which permeate the legal order that defends development and
globalization”.134 While preserving the historical methodology of TWAIL, this approach at once
expands and constricts the third world boundaries. Large enough to embrace ‘non-State’ and ‘State’
entities alike, and narrow enough to exclude ‘non-State’ and ‘State’ entities with capitalistic and
monetarist ideologies. It is in this sense that TWAIL breaks away from its “geographic ‘national’
moorings”135 or even economic standing. Hence, BASIC countries are not automatically ‘Southern’
by reason of their geographical location, history or economic status.136 The decisive question is: have
BASIC States kept faith with the alternative agenda of the South or are they reproducing and
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reinforcing the hegemonic and imperialistic agenda of the North? This approach, while still potentially
qualifying entities in TWAIL’s traditional domains (Africa, Asia and Latin America) as ‘third world’,
also allows for the bolstering of third world ranks either through the inclusion of entities in the
‘traditional north’ or exclusion of ‘backsliding’ States in the ‘traditional South’.
The counter-hegemonic and alternative narrative spoken of here should not be mistaken for singleness
of position, but rather diverse positions unified by a non-commercialistic and non-imperialistic
paradigm. An attempt at operationalizing this narrative is made in chapter five. While this thesis
concludes with a nuanced re-consideration of the responsibilities of State and non-State parties, it
proceeds from a traditional understanding of these responsibilities qua developed – developing States
categorisation as enshrined in the 1992 Convention and 1997 Kyoto Protocol. In doing this, there is a
recognition of emerging economies like the BRICS States, particularly China and India, and this is
considered in chapter three of this work. It should further be noted that the State-centricity of this
work does not detract from the importance of non-State entities, particularly business corporations, in
the global EST scheme. The page and time limits of this work, however, compel a restriction of the
analysis to States.137
1.6

Structure of Thesis

Having considered the research problem, questions, methodological and theoretical framework of this
research in this chapter, Chapter two applies the broad themes conceptualised here to trace how the
UNFCCC EST framework has evolved and what informed the evolution. Chapter three then proceeds
to consider the impact of the evolution in African countries, taking specific look at select initiatives
like the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol and the Poznan Strategy. This
chapter also considers the involvement of BASIC States in facilitating EST transfer to developing
(African) States in a South – South transfer context by comparing their present actions to their past
rhetoric. Chapter four focuses on the current climate regime viz-a-viz its EST transfer framework, the
degree to which the current regime reproduces past structures and the impact of such iteration. The
work concludes in chapter five with a proposed reform agenda for the EST transfer regime.
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CHAPTER 2: THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER REGIME: A
TWAIL NARRATIVE
As noted in chapter one, this thesis considers the history, impact and prospects of the technology
transfer regime under the international climate change framework, particularly, the UNFCCC. This
chapter focuses on the evolution of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime. In the main, it contends that
whereas the climate regime has witnessed multiple phases in its negotiation and development of
transfer policies, similar trends characterise the various phases. The chapter begins by re-considering
the ‘basis’ of south – north engagement in respect of EST transfer as represented by the
‘differentiation’ concept, appraises the different phases of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime, reviews
the central points of divergence between developing and developed States, and concludes by drawing
lessons from distilled historical trends.
2.1 Rights, Responsibilities and Technology Transfer in Climate Change Discourse
The borderless nature of climate change defies the artificiality of State borders and calls to task the
traditional concepts of sovereignty and territoriality.1 Subsumed in this commonness, however, are
various shades of individuality. For instance, while the consequences of climate change are global, its
causes are largely attributable to a few States.2 On the converse, despite the ubiquity of climate change,
States bear the brunt of its implications differently, with some of the least responsible suffering the
most.3 Importantly, while this collective problem demands actions across the world, only a few States
which tend to be the most responsible for climate change, have the most capacity to combat it. It is
this interplay of globality and individuality that has, in part, earned climate change the descriptor of a
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As noted by the former United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, “climate change does not respect national
borders; developing countries or developed countries…”. See UNFCCC, ““Climate Change does not respect national
borders”, UN chief Ban Ki-moon”, (29 November 2015), online: <https://unfccc.int/news/video-climate-change-does-notrespect-national-borders-un-chief-ban-ki-moon>
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37.5% increase in global temperature in 2100. See Marcia Rocha et al, “Historical Responsibility for Climate Change –
From Countries Emissions to Contribution to Temperature Increase” (November 2015) Climate Analytics 8, 12.
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A recent report notes that nine of the ten countries most affected by climate change induced extreme weather events
between 1996 – 2015 were developing countries. Sonke Kreft, et al, Global Climate Risk Index 2017: Who Suffers Most
From Extreme Weather Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2015 and 1996 to 2015 (Bonn: Germanwatch e.V., 2017)
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“super wicked problem”.4 More so, it is this interplay that founds the perceptions and positions of
States as to how climate change should be approached, and how roles are to be ascribed.
2.1.1 Differentiation, Climate Change and Technology Transfer
Should all States bear the same level of responsibilities in the fight against climate change? If
responsibilities should differ, what are the justifications for different allocations? To what extent
should responsibilities differ? Within what sphere should the different responsibilities be performed,
intra-State or inter-State, and on what basis should one State bear responsibilities for actions that will
be taken in another? While the first question is fairly settled, as developed States, generally, do not
contend that all States should bear the same level of responsibilities, the remaining questions have
blighted the climate change regime for years. These questions, although relevant to all aspects of the
climate change discourse, apply even more particularly to EST development and transfer. As will be
pointed out shortly, while the case of developing States for the transfer of ESTs has been framed as
‘of right’, developed States have resisted such claims, proposing transfer initiatives as ‘gratuitous
offerings’.
Noting the implications of these disparate positions, Rajamani noted that while the ‘as of right’
argument is “rooted in obligation and liability”, the “gratuitous offerings” position is “rooted in
morality, humanity and goodwill”.5 This argument has been framed around the concept of
differentiation and the UNFCCC EST transfer policies and institutions have substantially been
impacted by it.6 As the rationale, operation and implications of differentiation7 have been the subjects
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of various scholarly commentaries,8 it will not be considered in-depth in this chapter. Instead, an
attempt will be made to trace how the concept, as reflected in the common but differentiated
responsibilities principle (CBDR) evolved within the climate change qua EST transfer regime. The
often-missed distinct implications of the CBDR principle in the EST transfer context make it
necessary to consider the concept via this narrow prism. It is worth asking if the arguments on
differentiation are relevant to EST transfer under the current climate change regime. Put differently,
what effect do the entrenched positions of developing and developed States on differentiation have on
the EST transfer agenda?9
Developing States’ stance on differentiation can be captured under two broad categories: the
ecological space and the historical reparation arguments.10 The ecological space argument is centred
around the historical and present emissions of industrial countries vis-à-vis the ‘essential’ emissions
needed for developing countries to develop. Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain described these two
forms of emissions as ‘luxury emissions’ and ‘survival emissions’.11 In a more recent sequel, Narain
argued that:

7

Also referred to as ‘differential treatment’, differentiation is said to refer “to instances where, because of pervasive
differences or inequalities among states, the principle of sovereign equality is sidelined to accommodate extraneous
factors, such as divergences in levels of economic development or unequal capacities to tackle a given problem”. See
Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge,
2016) 15. Missing from this description of differentiation, is the historical perspective of developing States. To developing
States, differentiation is not a sidelining of “the principle of sovereign equality”, rather it is an expression of their
sovereignty and equality. For example, vital to the argument of developing States is that all States have equal right to the
ecological space; and given the historical emissions of developed countries, have a right to a larger portion of the global
carbon budget. Hence, Rajamani’s conceptualization of differentiation either in the compensatory/inherent or instrumental
senses better captures what the term denotes. See supra note 5 at 8 – 9.
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The rich must reduce so that the poor can grow. Create ecological space … If the rich emitted
yesterday, the emerging rich world will do today. Cooperation demands equity and fairness.
It is a pre-requisite for an effective climate agreement.12
Describing the ecological space argument in terms of ‘contraction and convergence’, its proponents
have contended that “the North would have to undertake changes to reduce its environmental impacts
… the South would undertake a development path that would enable it to meet the aspirations of its
peoples”.13 At the risk of simplicity, this argument, in essence, clamours for the right of developing
countries to emit as much as their fledgling economies demand. For example, this entails the right to
keep generating power from fossil fuel sources and continued involvement in the fossil fuel industry.14
The ecological space argument is the dominant historical position taken by developing countries in
the international environmental sphere. For example, Indira Ghandi has been quoted to have argued
at the 1972 Stockholm Conference thus:
The rich countries may look upon development as the cause of the environmental
destruction, but to us it is one of the primary means of improving the environment of living,
of providing food, water, sanitation and shelter, of making the deserts green and the
mountains habitable.15
It is, therefore, not surprising that multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) from the 1972
Stockholm Convention to the 2015 Paris Agreement (PA) reflect this argument in different forms.16
The historical reparation argument has less popularity in environmental/climate change. There are two
perspectives to the historical reparation argument. The first perspective, which is similar to the
ecological space argument, builds on the polluter pays principle; that is, countries historically and
currently responsible for global warming should bear the cost of mitigation, adaptation, and loss and
damages. It has been argued that this principle is a variant of the customary international law principle
that States “should ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment
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of other States or areas beyond national control”.17 More directly, the Trail Smelter decision, where
the Tribunal did not only make a transnational finding of liability but pronounced that damages be
paid, lends support to this dimension of the historical reparation argument.18 Proponents of this
historical reparation perspective have evolved the concept of “carbon or ecological debt”.19 Mickelson
classified carbon debt into ‘damage costs’ – “costs associated with future losses to climate change”
and ‘abatement cost’ – “costs associated with reducing current emissions to levels consistent with the
scientific estimates of what is required to avoid interference with the global climate”.20 The UNFCCC
considerably mirrors the carbon debt argument by providing that “the developed country parties …
shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by
developing country Parties in complying with their obligations”.21
The second perspective to the historical reparation argument is tied to the history of slavery and
colonialism perpetrated by western countries in the South. As stated by Rajamani, here developing
countries lay claim to the “right to development in the context of the history of colonialism, and
economic and environmental exploitation perpetrated by industrial countries against developing
countries, and believe that developing countries are entitled to international support…”22 It is worth
noting that this argument was a central rallying cry of the Third World inspired New International
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Economic Order (NIEO) movement of the 1970s.23 In the climate change context, the underlying
sentiment of this school of thought was well articulated by the ex-Prime Minister of Malaysia who
famously stated in Rio that:
The poor are not asking for charity. When the rich chopped down their own forests, built their
poison-belching factories and scoured the world for cheap resources, the poor said nothing.
Indeed they paid for the development of the rich. Now the rich claim a right to regulate the
development of the poor countries. And yet any suggestion that the rich compensate the poor
adequately is regarded as outrageous. As colonies we were exploited. Now as independent
nations we are to be equally exploited.24
Contrary to the foregoing, developed countries, typified by the position of the United States of
America (USA), have emphatically rejected the allegation that they are historically culpable for global
emissions.25 Instead, they have contended that climate treaties which fail to impose obligations on
developing States, “who will be the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases”, will not result “in
a meaningful reduction in greenhouse gases”.26 In rejecting historical culpability, developed countries
have premised their provision of ‘assistance’ to developing countries on their financial and
technological capacity. The United States’ special envoy to COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark, Todd
Stern, was reported to have stated that while his country will “contribute to a fund to help fund
countries deal with the effects of climate change”, and that the US recognizes its “role in putting
emissions in the atmosphere”, he ‘categorically’ rejects “the sense of guilt or culpability or
reparations”.27 It is on the basis of this position that developed countries, in 1992, pledged 0.7% of
their Gross National Product (GNP) for Official Development Assistance (ODA), and “agree to
augment their aid programmes … to ensure prompt and effective implementation of Agenda 21”.28
As eminently evidenced by the position of developed States at the negotiations leading to the Paris
Agreement, particularly in respect of the proposition of developing States on loss and damages, this
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culpability refuting stance of the developed States persists.29 This position, as rightly described by
Rajamani, is ahistorical, and “it seeks to wipe the colonial past from our collective memories, and
start afresh, as if past patterns of exploitation have little bearing on current inequities, and the efforts
of developing countries to raise them time and again are no more than special pleading”.30
Prior to the PA, the global climate regime was based on a concept of differentiation which was largely
a product of developing countries’ ‘ecological space’ argument and developed States’ ‘capacity’
position; hence, the nomenclature ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacity’
(CBDR/RC).31 The PA has however qualified CBDR/RC with the clause “in the light of different
national circumstances” (CBDR/RC/NC).32 CBDRRC/NC has led to a new strain of differentiation –
self differentiation.33 Worth noting is that CBDRRC/NC is less a global consensus, being an
agreement between the United States and China.34 Although Rajamani & Guerin have suggested that
this new qualifier implies a new form of differentiation in the areas of mitigation, transparency,
finance and compliance,35 it is arguable that given the context in which it was made, its relevance is
largely limited to mitigation.36 This is reflected in what arguably is one of the PA’s most distinct
features, the requirement of “all Parties … to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts … with
the view of achieving the purpose of” the Agreement.37 This provision effectively raises the bar as
regards the responsibilities of developing States. But, the Agreement does not contain a similar
increase in the expectation placed on developed States to substantially bear the cost of this heightened
responsibility. This becomes more apparent if Article 4(5) of the Paris Agreement is compared to
Article 4(3) of the UNFCCC. Whereas the former blandly provides that “support shall be provided to
developing country Parties … in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11…”, without attaching the
29
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responsibility to developed States, the latter explicitly did. This is of immense importance to EST
transfer, as Article 10 of the Agreement which covers technology transfer also failed to expressly
attach responsibility to developed States.
To be clear, the argument, here, is not for a blind transplant of the UNFCCC’s Annex and non-Annex
classification, but a clear allocation of responsibilities, even if it will mean that a mid-zone for
emerging economies, like the BRICS States, will be recognized. Such approach to differentiation
should both be historical and contemporaneous. Hence, the terms ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ are
employed in this nuanced context. As this chapter is focused on the evolution of the EST transfer
regime, which entails a period (in the past) where the South – North dichotomy was more clear-cut,
reference to ‘developing’ States in this chapter, except where otherwise stated, includes the BRICS
States.38 In subsequent chapters, however, ‘differentiation’ is approached in a more nuanced manner.
2.1.2 The Transfer Pact: Extant or Expunged?
It was argued in chapter one that article 4(3) and (5) of the Convention establish a ‘transfer pact’.
While the implications of the PA will be considered more closely later in this work, an interesting
legal question is whether in the light of seemingly conflicting provisions under the PA, the transfer
pact is expunged or extant? It should be recalled that when there are treaties on the same subjectmatter, “the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the
later treaty”.39 It is a given that the PA qualifies as a binding treaty under international law. 40 Does
this then mean that Article 4(3) and (5) of the 1992 Convention being earlier than Article 10 of the
Paris Agreement, is deemed expunged if the provisions are considered conflicting?
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For the purposes of this work, the relevant question is whether Article 4(3) and (5) of the UNFCCC
is compatible with Articles 4(5) and 10 of the PA. The answer to this question largely depends on
what ‘compatible’ means. Although the Vienna Convention is silent on this, it suggests elsewhere that
the provisions of an earlier treaty will only be deemed incompatible if “the two treaties are not capable
of being applied at the same time”.41 Are the above provisions capable of being “applied at the same
time”? I argue in the affirmative. Take Article 4(3) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(5) of the PA for
examples. The absence of specifically ascribed responsibility to developed countries in the latter does
not conflict with such provision in the former. In as much as the latter does not contain a positive
statement absolving developed countries of responsibility, it cannot be said to conflict with the former.
The position applies also to Articles 4(5) and 10 of the UNFCCC and PA, respectively. This position
is again supported by Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention which provides that a treaty will be
interpreted in its context, taking into account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties”. The International Court of Justice has also held that an instrument
should be “interpreted as producing and intended to produce effects in accordance with existing law
and not in violation of it”.42 In its seminal work on ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, the
International Law Commission (ILC), relying on Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention has
proposed ‘the principle of systematic integration’ in construing and interpreting seemingly conflicting
treaties.43 The principle calls for the consideration of the ‘normative environment’ – other treaties
relevant to the subject matter – in interpreting a treaty provision.44 Explaining the principle, they noted
that:
All treaty provisions receive their force and validity from general law, and set up rights and
obligations that exist alongside rights and obligation established by other treaty provisions
and rules of customary international law. None of such rights or obligations has any intrinsic
priority against the others. The question of their relationship can only be approached
through a process of reasoning that makes them appear as parts of some coherent and
meaningful whole … In the era of framework treaties and implementation treaties, this
seems self-evident. The doctrine of “treaty parallelism” addresses precisely the need to
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coordinate the reading of particular instruments or to see them in a “mutually supportive”
light.45
The above analysis supports the assertion that Articles 4(3) and (5) of the UNFCCC, grounding what
has been referred to in chapter one as the EST transfer pact, subsists, and developed States are still
peremptorily obligated to “facilitate and finance … the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound
technologies to … developing country parties”.46 This assertion, however, does not answer the
questions of the distinct implications of the various arguments of States, particularly, developing
States on EST transfer and whether the South – North dichotomy has any relevance to the transfer
regime.
It is argued here that the ecological space argument of developing States is incompatible with the EST
transfer case. Both positions have asymmetrical ends. As noted earlier, the thrust of the ecological
space argument is that, considering that developed States have emitted the most, developing States
should have a higher share of the global carbon budget. On the flipside, the clamour for EST transfer
is for technologies that will make emitting needless. There is near consensus that the future of the
world is closely linked to ESTs.47 From energy to transportation, agriculture to buildings, ESTs will
ever increasingly redefine the meaning of development and impact the wellbeing of people. It will not
be farfetched to submit that a carbon economy will in no distant future become a marker between
developed and undeveloped States. Hence, a claim to ‘ecological space’ latches the development of
the South to a carbon-driven economic model, a model which is not only becoming increasingly
outdated, but also environmentally and economically unsustainable. This invariably fosters the North
- South ‘wealth gap’.
The argument against the current CBDRRC/NC in this thesis, therefore, is not that developing States
should not contribute to the global quest to reduce emissions. Rather, the argument is that there should
be a concurrent concretization of the responsibility of the global North, not merely on the basis of
their capacity, but also by taking cognizance of their past and current liability.48 After all, the polluter
45
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pays principle has, arguably, evolved into a general principle of international environmental law.49 It
is only equitable and just that even as developing States shift from their previous entrenched position,
developed States do as well. Beyond the substantive provisions, CBDR is more about the principles
of equity and justice.50 It is in this regard that the South–North dichotomy remains relevant.51 Equity
becomes a bland concept without such dichotomy. And without equity, the climate regime will,
invariably, translate into an unchecked tool of hegemony, neo-colonialism and imperialism. The
polluter pays principle will be revisited in more details in chapter five of this work.
The different perspectives of the historical reparation argument, earlier considered, apply aptly in an
EST transfer context. The ‘capacity’ based financial and technology transfer frameworks of the
international climate regime have, over time, informed a lackadaisical approach by developed States
to ‘obligations’ under the climate regime. This is not unconnected to the ‘aid context’ in which these
support instruments have been situated. The very nature of ‘aids’ puts the grantors in the driving seat
and the grantee at their mercy. Hence, developed States attach conditions before developing States
can access the ‘assistance’ provided.52 It is important to note that as much as the argument might be
made that the South-North differentiation is no more valid and, as much as the concept of
differentiation is reworked to suit the interest of developed States, the reality of the liability of
developed States cannot be wished away. The realities of the evil of colonialism, slavery, the
exploitation of the global South, and the atrocities of transnational companies (TNCs) remain. The
knowledge of the climate change effect of past emissions at the time it was done, (See Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan
Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 747 - 775), others
have argued that ignorance does not matter. See Lukas Meyer & Pranay Sanklecha, eds, Ibid at 46 at 58 – 59, and Daniel
Butt, Historical Emissions: Does Ignorance Matter? Ibid at 61 – 79. The latter view is adopted in this work.
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fact that the current affluence enjoyed by the global north is at the detriment of the global south
remains as valid today as it was in 1992 when the UNFCCC was negotiated and Article 4(3) and (5)
were agreed to by States. As extensively argued earlier, these provisions remain extant. The
affirmation of the culpability of developed states in the preamble to the 1992 UNFCCC remains valid.
It is contended that an equitable and effective EST transfer regime begins, not with the downplaying
of these realities as the Paris Agreement has done, but with their acceptance and operationalization. It
is with this background that the evolution of the climate regime on EST transfer is considered below.
2.2 The History of the UNFCCC Technology Transfer Regime
2.2.1 The Pre-1992 UNFCCC Phase
The relevance of considering the history of the EST transfer regime under the UNFCCC is aptly
captured by B.S. Chimni. He said: “the road to the future … winds its way through the past”.53 It is
worth repeating that history is TWAIL’s key methodological approach.54 This is to enable the
unravelling of how historical trends have subsisted till date despite surface representations of
change.55 This unmasking is crucial in climate change scholarship. Attempts to narrate the history of
the climate regime often divorce the regimes from their larger socio-political context. Such historical
accounts take, as their starting point, either the 1972 Stockholm Convention or the 1992 UNCED.56
This trend is, however, not unique to climate change scholarship, as other areas of international law
have been criticized for ‘cherry-picking’ history, divorcing them from their broader contexts and
equating western history to global history.57
This is why TWAIL set out to re-examine “the historical foundations of international law”.58 As
pointed out by Gatthii, “TWAIL scholarship has not only rethought international law’s relationship to
the colonial encounter, but has also challenged the complacency in international law to treat the
colonial legacy as dead letter, overcome by the process of decolonization”.59 As noted in the preceding
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chapter of this work, crucial to the TWAIL agenda is the unmasking of presumptions and
representations that underpin the global governance structure – in this case, the UNFCCC EST transfer
regime. This, however, cannot be done by simply choosing 1992 as its historical reference point. It is
contended that the UNFCCC EST transfer regime cannot be discussed outside the frames of two
historical occurrences: the ‘oil weapon’ saga and the failed attempt to enact an International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (ICCTT). These two events occurred between the 1960s and
1980s, a period marked by the ‘independence’ of colonized States and a gradual sensitization of the
world to the consequences of North-induced global environmental degradation. The argument is made
below that the features of these two events have, to varying extents, characterised the various phases
of the EST transfer regime, including the current framework.
Attending the independence of colonized States in the 1960s was their realization of the need to have
control over the natural resources within their territories, particularly, oil and gas. Prior to this,
developed States, through multinational oil companies (MNOCs), dominated these industries.60 This
led to the forming of alliances by developing States, the most prominent being in the energy sector,
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).61 Two years after the formation of
OPEC, Resolution 1803(XVII) on the “Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources” was passed
by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).62 Apart from affirming that “peoples and nations”
have “permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources”, Resolution 1803 recognises
the power of States to nationalize, expropriate or requisition private interests in resource ventures for
reasons of “public utility, security or the national interest”.63 Developing States took advantage of this
broad allowance to nationalize various MNOCs between 1960 and 1980.64 These developments, along
with the heavy dependence of the North on fossil fuel from developing States, set the stage for these
States to leverage their control over oil and gas supply as a tool of political persuasion of the North.
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This has been referred to as the ‘oil weapon’.65 Developing countries, at various times, including 1956,
1967 and 1973, employed the ‘oil weapon’.66 The implications of these actions and the eventual
influence they had on the North, can be better appreciated when the effects of the 1973 oil embargo
are considered. One writer described the implications thus:
Oil import prices quadrupled. The posted price of Arabian light crude increased from $3 per
barrel in early October 1973 to $11.65 per barrel in January 1974. Sudden inflation and
economic recession ensued, leading to unemployment, the closing down of schools and
offices and cuts in the production of major factories. This fact caused some to believe that ‘a
staggering disequilibrium in the global balance of payment will occur that will place strains
on the monetary system far in excess of any that have been experienced since the war’. The
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt explained the situation as an extraordinarily unstable
one, which revealed the fragility of the elaborate system of economic relations among the
nations of the world.67
The effectiveness of the actions of developing States led developed States to realise how exposed they
were. This led to the establishment of the Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) under the umbrella of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1974.68 The ECG’s central
mandate was “…(the) shift from a seller’s market to a buyer’s market by the enforcement of oil-saving
measures and the switch to other energy sources”.69 As reiterated in the enabling instrument of the
IEA (which replaced the ECG), OECD countries agreed to undertake “long-term cooperative efforts
on conservation of energy, on accelerated development of alternative sources of energy, on research
and development in the energy field…”70 Evident from the foregoing are what has been rebranded
‘renewable energy’ and ‘energy efficiency’, two of the most prominent categories of ESTs.
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The above, in part, qualifies for a critical piece of the history of how renewable energy gained its
prominence in the North, and invariably, the world.71 Economic imperatives actuated the actions of
the West in respect to sustainable technologies, not environmental concerns. The need for energy
security drove the recourse to renewable energy and efficiency practices. 72 To claim ‘environmental
leadership’ because of early leads on adopting ‘clean technology’ is, therefore, hypocritical, at best.
While Northern States hide behind the more altruistic rhetoric of environmental sustainability in
international climate negotiations, the priority they place on the economic benefits from ESTs over
and beyond environmental concerns is difficult to hide. Take, for example, Germany’s energy
transition programme – energiewende – of the six reasons given for the transition, five pertained to
the German economy.73 On green economy, the publication on the programme notes that “Germany
… is positioning itself as an innovator in green technologies … exports made up for 65 percent of
German PV production in 2013 … and the target is 80 percent in 2020”. 74 On energy security, the
publication states “… the world saw in the 1970s when OPEC restricted its oil supply to certain
countries, energy imports can dry up for political reasons overnight … the more energy a country gets
from within its own borders, the less vulnerable it is”.75
The point is not that the economy cannot benefit from sustainable energy, but that if the economy is
given a ‘first-line-charge’ right, the environment will end up holding the shorter end. To frame the
development and management of ESTs in the context of economic dominance and GDP growth
invariably impacts how such technologies are dealt with.76 The stronger the economic objective, the
lesser the willingness to have a non-market-oriented transfer structure. As will be shown shortly, the
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failure of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, despite envisioning an ideal EST transfer system, is
attributed to this blight.
A second development that marked the ‘independence’ of Southern States in the 1960s is the
formation of the ‘Group of 77’ (G77) in 1962.77 At ‘independence’, colonised States realised that
political autonomy in itself does not translate into development.78 They indicted the North-centric
international order which had been designed, without the input of the South, to advance the interest
of the North.79 This is why they called for a reformed international order which guarantees the South’s
right to development.80 According to Doudou Thiam, this right mandates the tearing down of practices,
institutions and rules on “which international economic relations are based, in so far as these practices,
institutions and rules sanction injustice and exploitation and maintain the unjustified domination of a
minority over a majority of men”.81 These agitations gave rise to a series of meetings and resolutions
by developing States, eventually culminating in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974.82 Central to the NIEO was the subject of technology
transfer. It thus provides, inter alia, that the Order should be founded on:
…Giving to the developing countries access to the achievements of modern science and
technology, and promoting the transfer of technology and the creation of indigenous
technology for the benefit of the developing countries in forms and in accordance with
procedures which are suited to their economies…83
To operationalize the NIEO Declaration, the UNGA adopted a programme of action alongside the
Declaration.84 Item IV of the Programme requires that “all efforts should be made: a. to formulate an
international code of conduct for the transfer of technology corresponding to needs and conditions
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prevalent in developing countries…”85 This, alongside similar prior events, led to the Pugwash
Conferences, and subsequently a draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology
(ICCTT).86 While a detailed review of the ICCTT is outside the scope of this work, certain features
which characterised its negotiations and eventual failure and their iterations in the evolution and
current state of the EST transfer framework are worth noting.
To start with, the ICCTT negotiations was conducted in a siloed setting. While the G77 was proposing
a mandatorily couched code which covers “all forms of technology transfer transactions, irrespective
of whether the parties involved were private, public, regional or international…”, the US-led
developed States proposed a non-binding instrument with “a clear distinction between … the parties
involved”.87 Again, there was an all-out contradiction in the normative basis of both groups’
negotiating positions. While the “North sought to preserve a regime based on liberal economic
principles … the South considered technology as the common heritage of all mankind and hoped to
redistribute wealth from North to South”.88 The position on intellectual property rights (IPRs) is also
telling. While the South contended stridently that IPRs are constricting development and technology
transfer, the North took the position that IPRs and the monopolies they engender are “necessary evil
to foster invention”.89 The attempt of the South to negotiate technology transfer outside the aegis of
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was also resisted by the North.90 Importantly,
although in one breath calling in aid the autonomy of TNCs vis-à-vis the right to transfer technologies,
developed States, in the negotiations, represented the interests of the TNCs.91 Another feature is the
extensive qualification of the North’s proposed code with words like ‘unreasonably’, ‘unjustifiably’.92
And finally, although it failed, the final draft of the ICCTT represented, in the main, the position of
developed States, with developing States either having to forego their positions or water them down
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to satisfy developed countries.93 However, even the compromises made by developing States had to
be pro-economy before they could be accepted.94
The above features substantially characterise the EST transfer regime. This is not surprising, as the
same normative bearings of States informed the positions taken at the negotiation of the climate
regime. This reinforces the argument earlier made that developed States’ climate initiatives are
primarily economy-driven. This conclusion would have been different if the existential implications
of climate change had influenced a position different from the one taken by developed States in the
more generic ICCTT negotiation. Put together, the two pre-1992 events considered above form the
foundation of the subsequent phases of the global EST transfer regime. A position well explained by
the Derrick Bell’s Interest Convergence Dilemma Theory.95 Although proffered in a context of the
critical race movement, the theory can be aptly applied to the climate change discourse. Re-rendered
simply, the theory posits that until the North’s economic and hegemonic agenda is served, it generally
lacks the will to contribute to non-economic and non-hegemonic causes. While developed States are
willing to accept that climate change calls for a global paradigm shift, they only support such a shift
to the extent that it will not disrupt the neo-liberal and capitalist foundations of their societies.96 The
stories told above provide factual context for arguing that, at its root, the global climate regime is
hugely marked by the interest convergence dilemma.
2.2.2 1992 – 2000 Pre-Expert Group on Technology Transfer
The UNFCCC EST regime is founded on the tripod of the 1992 UNFCCC, the Rio Declaration and
Agenda 21. These instruments, read together, provide the ‘gold standard’ for global EST transfer, a
standard which the world has increasingly fallen short of. Before these provisions and the various
attempts to actualise them between 1992 – 2000 are considered, it is necessary to point out that the
concept of differentiation was most evident in this era. The UNFCCC, and subsequently, the Kyoto
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Protocol, generally delineated party states into Annex I, Annex II and non-annex States.97 While
Annex I included developed States and other countries described as economies-in-transition (EIT),
annex II was primarily made up of developed States.98 In the EST transfer context, this distinction is
important, as it helps to understand the obligations agreed to by States under the climate framework.
Art. 4(1)(c) of the Convention started by mandating all States to “promote and cooperate in the
development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes
that control, reduce or prevent … emissions”. More specifically, however, Art. 4 (5) provides that
“the developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take all
practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to
(ESTs)”.
What is unclear is whether this provision refers only to Annex II States or all developed States
contained in Annex I. To argue in support of the former suggests that the preface “the developed
country parties…” is superfluous. But it is also difficult to affirm that the generic reference to
‘developed country parties’ automatically means all annex I country States. This is more so as the
Convention has been clear elsewhere in conferring specific responsibilities on annex I States.99 One
way of interpreting this provision is that the phrase “…the developed country parties” allows for the
inclusion of other States which experience improved economies over time to take up responsibilities
under Art 4(5). Hence, a technologically and economically advanced country like South Korea, and
an emerging economy like China, which are not in the Annexes, can be deemed obligated under the
regime. For such countries, however, the normative basis for action will not be ‘responsibility’ but
‘capacity’. A few other points worth noting in the UNFCCC are: the clear linkage between EST
transfer and finance; the extensive use of vague qualifiers (e.g. ‘practicable steps’, ‘as appropriate’);
and the explicit connection of the effective implementation of developing States’ commitments under
the Convention to the “effective implementation of developed country parties of their commitments
… related to financial resources and transfer of technology”.100 Necessary to point out is that Art. 4(3)
and (5) and, indeed, the entirety of the UNFCCC, is the product of the same conflicting positions
between developing and developed States which marked the ICCTT.
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The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 are not binding instruments. However, they provide clarity to the
otherwise vague commitments of parties in the UNFCCC on EST transfer.101 Principle 9 of the Rio
Declaration notes that “States should co-operate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building … by
improving scientific understanding through exchanges … and by enhancing the development … and
transfer of technologies…” Chapter 34 of Agenda 21 provides the most comprehensive guide as to
the details of the understanding of party States on EST transfer in Rio.102 The difficult and tactful
melding of different positions of developing and developed States is evident in various paragraphs of
Chapter 34. Take for example paragraph 34.14 which states that the Chapter’s objectives include:
To promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the access to and the transfer of
environmentally sound technologies and corresponding know-how, in particular to
developing countries, on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential
terms, as mutually agreed, taking into account the need to protect intellectual property rights
as well as the special needs of developing countries for the implementation of Agenda 21.
The above embraces the insistence of developing States on “concessional and preferential terms”,103
even as developed States pressed for the protection of IPRs.104 Agenda 21 attempted to provide
workable solutions in response to these seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two sides.
Some of the proposed initiatives are:
i. The development and linkage of international information networks “through regional clearinghouses”. Such linked systems will produce “reports on state-of-the-art technology” and will
101
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“operate on an information-demand basis and focus on the information needs of the endusers”.105
ii. Provision of incentives by developed countries to companies; “purchase of patents and licences
on commercial terms for their transfer to developing countries on non-commercial terms…”;
and “undertaking of measures to prevent the abuse of (IPRs)” in respect of privately owned
technologies.106
iii. Establishment of “a collaborative network of national, sub-regional, regional and international
research centres on (ESTs) … to enhance the access to and development, management and
transfer of (ESTs)”.107
iv. The promotion of “joint ventures between suppliers and recipients of technologies; taking into
account developing countries’ policy priorities and objectives”.108
It was projected that between $450 million and $600 million will be needed between 1993 – 2000 to
achieve the initiatives under chapter 34.109 Given the lethargy with which developed States attended
to their financial commitments under Agenda 21, it is not unlikely that the projected sum was not
provided.110 The non-actualization of the lofty aspirations of Chapter 34 cannot be divorced from the
friction between developed and developing States on the principles that should underpin EST transfer.
For example, while developing States at UNCED emphasised the relationship between development
and environment and the responsibility of the north to do away with policies which constrict transfer
of ESTs, western countries emphasised market policies, with Germany and the United Kingdom
particularly referencing the then ongoing negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and subtly tying aid to “policies which encourage inward investment, including …the
principles of good government”.111 It was in the light of this unresolved conflict that the SecretaryGeneral of UNCED, Maurice Strong, noted that:
On technology transfer, we have agreement. But the degree of full commitment to the basic
principles of that agreement is still evolving and we cannot yet measure how deep that
commitment is.112
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Indeed, after the coming into force of the UNFCCC in 1994, the unreadiness of party States,
particularly developed States, to implement the agreement, principles and action plan on EST transfer
became apparent. This is clear from the proceedings and resolutions at the Conference of the Parties
(COP) held between 1995 (COP 1 in Berlin) and 2000 (COP 6 in The Hague), and the reports of the
Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) within the same period.113 It is
worth noting that in the phase under consideration, the SBSTA was the body overseeing EST transfer
initiatives. This is instructive, as the SBSTA is only advisory, not implementational. Thus, the focus
of the UNFCCC in this phase was essentially consultation. Issues that recurred in the various COP
Decisions on EST transfer were the need for Annex II countries to “include in their national
communications the measures taken for the transfer of technology”; the need for technology needs
assessment (TNA) of developing countries; the need for the development of international technology
information centres (clearing houses); and the central role of the private sector in facilitating
transfer.114 There was, however, a subtle shift from emphasising provision of information by home
and host States to the development of the local absorptive capacity of the host state at COP 4 in Buenos
Aires.115 COP 4 led to the development of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action and the establishment of a
consultative process under the SBSTA.116
Despite these activities, little was done as regards implementation. This can be gleaned from SBSTA’s
compilation of parties’ submissions in 1999117 and report on the status of the consultative process
(submissions from parties) in 2000.118 For example, the position paper of the G77 mirrored,
substantially, where developing countries were in 1992.119 Developing countries were still clamouring
for inventories of ESTs from developed States, establishment of a technology transfer clearinghouse,
provision of financial assistance, the initiation of pilot projects and the establishment of a dedicated
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fund within the financial mechanism to aid capacity building and effective transfer.120 While the Kyoto
Protocol which was signed in 1997 and came into force in 2005 will be looked at in a later chapter of
this work, it is important to note that in their 2000 communication, the G77 noted that the “CDM shall
not be seen as a mechanism to implement Article 4.5 of the Convention”.121 On the contrary, the
United States sees the CDM as providing “important incentives to enhance the transfer of ESTs and
the implementation of Article 4.5”.122 Particularly, the G77 demanded the establishment of a Transfer
of Technology Mechanism with institutional and funding sub-mechanisms.123 As noted earlier, one of
the emphases of the COP decisions between 1995 – 2000 was the conduct of TNAs in developing
States. There are, however, no commensurate initiatives to meet assessed needs. For example, in 1998,
the SBSTA conducted a survey of technology needs with an extensive participation by developing
States.124 The survey highlighted energy, transportation, agriculture, forestry and coastal zone
management as the key areas of needs of surveyed countries.125 There is no proof that anything was
done about these identified needs. Rather, similar assessments have been conducted repeatedly over
the years, but without commensurate implementation.
2.2.3 2001 – 2007 Expert Group on Technology Transfer
COP 7 which was held in Marrakesh in 2001 is generally believed to be another landmark in the
international climate regime. The Marrakesh Accords, which included extensive decisions on capacity
building and EST transfer, were some of the stand-out features of the Conference. More importantly,
however, is the establishment of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) and adoption of
the Framework for Meaningful and Effective Actions to enhance the Implementation of Article 4(5)
of the Convention (Framework).126 The terms of reference of the EGTT included analysing and
identifying “ways to facilitate and advance technology transfer activities”.127 The Expert Group was
to report to the SBSTA, and its progress and continued relevance were to be appraised after five years
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(COP 12).128 Arguably, the framework established under COP 7 marked the clearest transition in what
should be the focus of the global EST transfer project. It is worth recalling that under the UNFCCC
and Rio 21, there was a recognition that while developing countries must develop absorptive capacities
and enabling environment, a greater responsibility lies on developed States to ensure access to and
availability of ESTs. Under the COP 7 Technology Transfer Framework, however, it was stated under
the header “Overall Approach”, that “the successful development and transfer of ESTs and know-how
requires a country-driven, integrated approach, at a national and sectoral level”.129 Consistent with
this focus, the Framework emphasised TNA, technology information, enabling environments,
capacity building and mechanisms for technology transfer, as its five components.130
The argument here is not as to the inappropriateness of the identified components, but more on the
reversal of roles. Indeed, while reference was, no doubt, made to the ‘supportive’ role to be played by
developed countries, these roles were, at best, only passively framed.131 Although the Framework
nibbled at various provisions in Chapter 34 of Agenda 21, it marked a substantial move away from
Agenda 21’s lofty aspirations. For instance, it was silent on the initiatives to be taken by developed
States to get around the patent barrier which Chapter 34 clearly articulated. Worth noting also is that
while financial support was referenced under different components, it was not made a stand-alone
component. When it is appreciated that when the G77 proposed the technology transfer mechanism
in 2000, it identified funding as one of two sub-components,132 the ancillary role given to it under the
Framework becomes more suspect. Despite the foregoing, the EGTT phase signaled a step away from
the inertia of the pre-EGTT phase. Significantly, in attempting to meet Chapter 34’s recommendation
of the establishment of an information clearinghouse, an online platform - TT: CLEAR – was
developed in 2001. Like the Framework, however, TT: CLEAR is another example of the watering
down of the intentions of Chapter 34. The platform contains more information on the institutional
working of the UNFCCC and its specialized bodies, than it does on information on “available

128

Ibid.

129

“Framework for Meaningful and Effective Actions to Enhance the Implementation of Article 4, Paragraph 5, of the
Convention”, Annex to Decision 4/CP.7, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, para. 2.

130

Ibid, paras. 3 – 22.

131

For example, the Framework stated that “…developing country Parties, are encouraged to undertake assessments of
country-specific technology needs, subject to the provision of resources, as appropriate to country-specific circumstances,
from developed country parties… Developed country parties … are urged to facilitate and support the needs assessment
process, recognising the special circumstances of least developed countries”. Ibid, para 5 & 6.

132

Supra note 118.
49

technologies, their sources, their environmental risks, and the broader terms under which they may be
acquired”.133
The EGTT’s most substantial achievement is, perhaps, the standardization of the TNA process for
developing countries.134 Further to this, the first synthesis report on the technology needs of
developing States was published in 2006.135 It is necessary to point out the similarities in the findings
reached in the 1998 TNA survey and 2006 synthesis report. For example, both inquiries indicated
energy, transportation, industry, agriculture and forestry as the primary mitigation sectors identified
by developing countries.136 Again, finance and information were ranked as the major barriers in both
reports.137 The second and third synthesis reports compiled in 2009 and 2013 respectively reached
similar findings as the 1998 and 2006 conclusions.138 This informs a couple of conclusions. One is
that it shows that little or no action was taken on identified needs, hence, the recurrence of the same
needs over a span of about fifteen years. Two, it unmasks as incorrect, the representation that TNAs
are more pivotal to EST transfer than the responsibilities of developed States. Again, like the preEGTT phase, no substantial progress was made to facilitate actual transfer of ESTs during the EGTT
phase. This said, however, one of the phase’s bright spots is the recognition of the need to more
effectively link the technology and financial mechanisms. Hence, it was emphasised in COP 13 in
Bali that the Global Environment Facility (GEF), “as an operating entity of the financial mechanism
of the Convention, should provide financial support for the technology transfer framework”.139
2.2.4 2008 – 2010 Poznan Strategy
While the EGTT was reconstituted for five more years in 2007,140 a more momentous development
that occurred in 2008 was the establishment of the Poznan Strategic Programme in Technology
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Transfer (PSP) by the GEF.141 The PSP was the result of Decision 4/CP.13 reached in Bali requesting
the GEF to, “in consultation with interested Parties … elaborate a strategic programme to scale up the
investment for technology transfer to help developing countries…”142 Further to this mandate, the
GEF designed the PSP where it highlighted “three funding windows” to be supported under the
programme; that is, TNAs; piloting priority technology projects; and “dissemination of GEF
experience and successfully demonstrated technologies”.143 The GEF committed about $50 million to
these windows, with the technology demonstration (pilot) component allocated four-fifth of the
fund.144
In apparent recognition of its limited fund, eligible countries were limited to receiving not more than
$1 – $3 million for a maximum of one project. In 2010, the GEF proposed a Long-Term Program on
Technology Transfer (LTP) to COP 16.145 The LTP added two windows to the PSP: public-private
partnerships (PPPs) for technology transfer and support for climate technology centres and a climate
technology network.146 The PSP and LTP are the closest developing States have gotten to their
clamour for a special fund for technology transfer since the inception of the climate regime. It is worth
noting that the PSP and LTP were also the first deliberate efforts to give effect to the TNA conducted
in or by developing States, as both programmes tailored funding to TNA findings.147 An obvious letdown, however, is the project and funding constraint in the programmes. It appears that the State-byState funding model of the GEF is inefficient considering its limited resources. The prioritization of
regional capacity building projects seems to be a more sustainable pattern. For example, making an
investment in an R&D and manufacturing centre for the West African region seems more effective
than funding one technology per country. This is even particularly so as the UNFCCC’s 1998 survey
showed only minute differences in the technological needs of developing countries.148
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2.2.5 2010 –Technology Mechanism
The EGTT phase came to an end at 2010 COP 16 in Cancun, two years before it was due for
appraisal.149 The premature termination of the EGTT was essentially due to dissatisfaction with its
non-implementation role.150 Hence, in 2008, the G77 & China submitted a proposal to the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) which had
been constituted the year before at Bali, Indonesia. A review of this proposal is key to appreciate its
radical difference from the eventual make-up of the mechanism. In the proposal, the G77 gave the
premise for the mechanism thus:
Currently, access to financing is limited, and should be enhanced to deliver technology
development, deployment, adoption, diffusion and transfer to non-Annex I Parties. Barriers
to technology transfer also inhibit the adoption of environmentally sustainable technologies
in non-Annex 1 Parties, highlighting the urgency for access to these technologies while
balancing rewards for innovators with the common good of humankind, including jointly
developed technology and intellectual property rights (IPR) sharing.151
With this preface, a two-body mechanism made up of an Executive Body on Technology (EBT) and
Multilateral Climate Technology Fund (MCTF) was proposed. The EBT was to be made a subsidiary
body of the Convention and should be supported by: Strategic Planning Committee (SPC), Technical
Panels, Verification Group and Secretariat.152 The MCTF on the other hand was to “provide
technology-related financial requirements as determined by the Executive Body”. The proposal
further envisaged a Technology Action Plan (TAP) which would “include clear actions and dates for
the first three years, and will be updated for successive three-year periods”.153 The TAP was to
“support all stages of the technology cycle” and develop policies on public domain technologies,
patented technologies and future technologies.154 The proposal also identified accessibility,
affordability, appropriateness, adaptability, provision of full incremental costs, adequacy and
predictability of funds and the removal of barriers for EST transfer, as the guiding criteria of the
149
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mechanism.155 It is interesting to note that TNA was not part of this proposal. Given its exclusion, it
is not farfetched to contend that developing States do not give the same pride of place to TNAs as
done by developed States and the UNFCCC.
The G77 and China proposed mechanism was, in the actual sense, not novel, as it only summarised
their position from the ICCTT negotiation phase. It was, therefore, not surprising that developed
countries rejected it. As noted elsewhere, developed countries largely took a more commercial
perspective to EST transfer and were particularly “wary of concessions in the technology discussions
which could adversely impact their competitiveness” in light of China and India’s growing
technological capacity.156 A compromise, in principle, was however reached at COP 15 in
Copenhagen, where parties agreed to a Mechanism consisting of a Technology Executive Committee
(TEC) and a Climate Technology Centre (CTC).157 These two components were essentially a breakup of the G77 proposed EBT, with the MCTF component completely removed. Despite this relative
progress, various vital issues were unresolved in Copenhagen. Chief among these were linkage of the
mechanism to finance158 and intellectual property rights.159 Naturally, while G77 and China wanted
an explicit linkage between the financial and technology mechanisms, and the provision of new and
additional funding to meet the full incremental costs of mitigation and adaptation, developed countries
wanted both regimes to remain distinct.160 Again, while developing States wanted the mechanism to
recognise IPRs as a barrier and sought the creation of initiatives like a “Global Technology Intellectual
Property Rights Pool for Climate Change that promotes and ensures access to Intellectual Property
protected technologies and the associated know-how…”, developed States insisted that no reference
should be made to IPRs in the text, preferring that issues pertaining to IPRs are dealt with in the WTO
context.161 Unsurprisingly, the developed countries prevailed. Neither was there a link between the
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technology and financial mechanisms nor was any reference made to IPRs in the Technology
Mechanism (TM) agreed to at Cancun in 2010.
Although the substance of the TM vis-à-vis the Paris Agreement is the subject of a later chapter, it is
worth noting that the TM marked an almost total break from Chapter 34 of Agenda 21. If there is any
doubt to this break-away, such can be dispelled by referencing the preamble to the TM which merely
stated that “recalling the commitments under the Convention, in particular Article 4, paragraphs 1, 3,
5, 7, 8 and 9”.162 Virtually every other COP decision from 1995 referenced Chapter 34. The content
of the TM shows that the exclusion of Chapter 34 was not indeliberate. As shown later, whereas the
TM was conceived to remedy the bare policy making status of the EGTT, it has only reincarnated and
proliferated the EGTT. Arguably, although the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) is
represented as the implementation arm of the TM, while the TEC is to be the policy making arm, the
CTCN does little or no implementation. As aptly put by Shabalala, “…the CTCN does not have an
implementation mandate and, for the moment, appears limited to providing advisory services to
developing countries”.163 Again, the suggestion that the CTCN represents a novel creation is quickly
negated when it is realised that like the EGTT, the primary preoccupation of the CTCN is the conduct
of TNAs.164
While the above historical analysis might not be exhaustive, it provides a basis for certain conclusions
on the dynamics of the global EST transfer structure. Evidently, despite the different labels, little has
changed between the 1960s when the NIEO was conceived and 2015 when the Paris Agreement was
signed. The positions of developing and developed States have not changed, developed States’
positions still shape and inform the regime, and economic considerations still override existential
concerns. Further, there has been more focus on an appearance of progress than actual progress. This
is about the only explanation for the reiteration of policies which were evidently ineffective and the
willingness of developed States to only consent to proposals which have no concrete impacts. What
defies comprehension, however, is why developing States, have over the years, consented to ‘whiteelephant’ agreements. A similar question was posed by Miller and Davidow when the South agreed
to the Restrictive Business Practices Code, despite it reflecting Northern neo-liberal ideals and
substantially leaving out proposals by developing countries.165 These writers suggested that such an
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agreement represented a shift, however little, from where the countries were and after various
stalemates, it gives an appearance of foreign policy gains to their domestic audience. 166 Another
reason can be gleaned from B.S. Chimni’s work. Chimni argued that transnational capitalist class and
influential segments of the middle class in emerging economies (and other developing States) “have
come to occupy ideological heights” in such States.167 Hence:
…the interest of the transnational capital in the emerging powers broadly coincides with that
of its counterparts in the advanced capitalist world … the TCC has used its economic clout
and ideological primacy to shape the foreign economic policy of emerging powers. This
understanding explains why there is less and less opposition of these powers to structures of
global capitalism and international laws and institutions that support it despite continuing to
be subjected to imperialist exploitation.168
2.3 Lessons from History: UNFCCC Technology Transfer Regime Fault Lines
That the UNFCCC has failed to effectively steward an equitable and efficient global EST transfer
framework is no longer in question. The above analysis provides context for understanding this failure.
A standout observation from the foregoing is the repetition of the same processes and initiatives in
different forms. This is not surprising, as structures and initiatives are products of normative
persuasion. Since parties have maintained the same normative positions, the EST transfer regime has,
in substance, remained the same. Indeed, it is arguable that as far as EST transfer is concerned, the
current Technology Mechanism phase represents a drawback on the gains made in Rio in 1992. The
point must be made that the mutation of the differentiation principle under the Paris Agreement has
no marked impact on EST transfer. If anything, as Ferreira recently pointed out, “the principle of
differentiation in IEL does not fulfill the function of promoting a just global socio-economic and
political order”.169 As noted earlier, CBDRRC-NC only raised the bar for the South while, arguably,
watering down the responsibility of the North. The history of the global EST transfer regime, as traced
above, exposes the false baselines on which it has been built. Falsities of will, motive and
segmentation have characterised this regime. While will and motive go to the normative baseline on
which the regime is framed, falsity of segmentation exposes the weakness in its structural construct.
Both the normative and structural false baselines are considered briefly below.
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2.3.1 The Normative Fault Line(s)
The EST transfer regime reflects the normative clash between the North and the South - the North’s
neo-liberalism and the South’s ‘humanism’. Whereas the North has insisted on the dominance of the
market place, the South has emphasised right to develop, the existential need of their people, and the
liability of the North. But the regime’s history is also the story of Northern victory. The victory of
neoliberalism and commercialism in a realm (climate change) that admittedly threatens life as it is
presently known. Worse still is the pretension that developed States have committed themselves to
the climate change cause for altruistic reasons, or that there is the will to do what needs to be done to
roll back the scourge. The above analysis, from the pre-1992 phase to the current technology
mechanism phase, reveals that developed States neither have the will nor a genuine interest in taking
the required steps in a climate change world. Falsities of will and motive underscore the actions of the
North in the EST regime as to the concessions they make and the proposals they support. The Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol is perhaps one of the most persuasive
pieces of evidence for this assertion. The CDM, which will be considered more closely later in this
work, was a quid pro quo arrangement. In return for climate change mitigation projects, developed
countries are awarded certified emission reductions (CER). As noted elsewhere, although the
‘sustainable development’ of developing States was ‘mouthed’ in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol,
“the … driver of CDM is not technology transfer but the generation of CERs to assist Annex I parties
to close the gaps in Kyoto commitments and in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme”.170 It is therefore
not surprising that of 1000 projects surveyed in 2011, only about 20% of renewable energy projects
conducted under CDM resulted in ‘some level’ of technology transfer.171
It is, indeed, contestable that the climate regime is a product of North – South compromise.172 While
this might have some semblance of truth at the level of one-off initiatives and projects, it appears less
true at the normative level. Aptly rendered elsewhere, “there is a stark difference between cooperation
based on power, and cooperation based on solidarity”.173 What has been at play in the climate regime
is the “cooperation of power”. The norm of the powerful prevails, while the shell-like request of the
not-powerful are consented to. But these ‘consents’ are still defined and operated through the norm of
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the powerful. The neoliberal ideal which underpinned the North’s approach to the failed ICCTT in the
1970s remains the same today. The point was made by the American delegates to UNCED thus: “the
American life-style is not up for negotiation”.174 Whether directly said or subtly implied, this has, to
various degrees, been the position of the North. No doubt, there is an agreement that energy sources
must change, and efficient habits must be cultivated. But this must be done on the existing economic
template. However, as noted by Mickelson, “if the economy is ever-present and its centrality
unquestioned … the environment is almost completely absent”.175 This argument is not that economic
development negates environmental sustainability, but that the latter has primacy over the former. If
the EST regime is re-imagined and refashioned on the basis of the foregoing assertion, a more
effective, efficient and equitable EST transfer regime will no doubt be achieved.
2.3.2 The Structural Fault Lines176
The structure of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime attests to the above normative falsities of will and
motive. As shown above, there is no substantial difference in the actual workings of the various
UNFCCC bodies (SBSTA, EGTT, TEC and CTCN) which have been saddled with EST transfer over
the years. They have on the overall been saddled with the policy making and information gathering
responsibilities. For example, none of these bodies has the responsibility of directly engaging in R&D.
Neither has any of the bodies facilitated a portal containing comprehensive information on EST knowhow. Rather, these bodies have been fixated on the conduct of TNAs, without more. The transition
from one body to another has been shown to largely be transitions in names but not in substance. The
G77 2008 proposal had the potential to reverse the trend, but it was opposed by the North.
In B.S. Chimni’s words, “alienation is … inscribed at the heart of international law”.177 To substantiate
this point, he subjected international law to the crucibles of Karl Marx’s four kinds of ‘alienation’.178
Applying ‘the alienation of human beings from nature’ category to climate change, he stated that:
…the intrinsic and sacred unity between man and nature is subjected to market
fundamentalism, leading to the dysfunctional commodification of nature … (objectification)
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both humans and nature in the pursuit of profit … Unsurprisingly, international
environmental law is unable to seriously respond to the global ecological crisis”.179
This alienation finds expression in the UNFCCC EST Transfer regime. A few examples will suffice.
One is the cosmetic distinction between publicly and privately-owned ESTs, when it has been
established that most developed States have stakes in key ESTs. Another example is the insistence of
developed countries on the separation of the financial and technology mechanisms under the
UNFCCC.180 This segmentation, which was insisted on by developed States under the cloak of the
desire for efficiency and effectiveness, is one major problem for the current technology mechanism.
According to a 2017 independent report to COP 23, “a lack of funding …(is) putting at risk the
CTCN’s operations. Limited financial resources have been a major impediment to the delivery of
targets.”181 Another example is the odd separation of technology transfer from capacity building,
despite that the former is deemed to include the latter. Indeed, the Paris Agreement envisages a
different institutional arrangement to oversee capacity building.182 More is said on this ‘alienation’ in
chapter four.
Mickelson’s satirical reference to the action of Americans in rejecting aerosols at the height of the
global warming consciousness in the 1970s, sums up the findings and arguments made in this chapter.
She noted that: “changing deodorants is a far cry from changing lifestyles, and it is the latter that may
be required if a meaningful response to climate change is to be crafted”.183 So far, what has happened
in respect of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime is akin to ‘changing deodorants’. Different
‘fragrance’, the same ‘system’. After a while, the temporariness of the fragrance wear-off, and the
‘odour’ of ineffectiveness and inequity hits our collective ‘nostrils’. Even after then, we only change
the deodorant, as has been done with the extant EST transfer framework.
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CHAPTER 3: A PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA
While the socio-political history of the UNFCCC EST regime has been considered in chapter two,
this chapter takes a closer look at different transfer pathways within and outside the UNFCCC
framework. Although these pathways are not exhaustive, they represent some of the mainstream
instruments through which ESTs has been or are being transferred. The conclusion reached in chapter
two as per the normative and structural false baselines underpinning the global EST regime is further
accentuated here.
3.1 The International EST Transfer Regime: Complexities and Mapping
The international EST transfer system is complex. Although the UNFCCC occupies an arguably
central role in coordinating transfer initiatives, diverse entities, including State and non-State entities,
are more directly involved in the transfer ‘venture’. This multi-layered transfer system makes it
difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of the transfer regime under the UNFCCC. The complexity
becomes more evident when it is realised that the UNFCCC primarily plays a facilitative rather than
an operational role in the transfer matrix. The 1992 Convention, for instance, mandates “developed
country parties and other developed parties included in Annex II” to “promote, facilitate and finance”
EST transfer, while also admonishing “other parties and organizations in a position to do so” to assist
in facilitating transfer.1
The difficulty in assessing the transfer of ESTs is made more so by the heterogeneity of ESTs and the
unique features and demands of each. As noted in chapter one, ESTs can either be mitigation or
adaptation focused. But this binary categorisation masks the diverse technologies that can be grouped
under each category. For example, while both solar PV and wind turbines are mitigation ESTs, they
have peculiar features, and these greatly impact on their development, use, transfer and diffusion.
Again, although drought resistant seeds and advanced irrigation systems are both agriculturaladaptation ESTs, they have inherent features which make their conditions for transfer diverse. John
Barton, focusing on mitigation ESTs, noted the different market dynamics for solar PV, biofuel and
wind technologies and the implications for transfer.2 Articulating the near-impossibility of appraising
the EST transfer regime, the IPCC stated:
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Measuring technology transfer is difficult given the diverse and complex ways in which
transfer occur. It would be so even if the task were confined to quantifying the transfer of
hardware. When “software” elements such as education and training are included in a broad
definition of technology transfer … the task is further complicated; it becomes almost
impossible if some judgment about effectiveness is also demanded. “How much effective
technology transfer related to climate change mitigation or adaptation takes place between
countries each year?” is an interesting question, but one that cannot be answered with any
confidence.3
The difficulty notwithstanding, appraising the performance of the EST transfer regime is vital, not
just for the determination of the effectiveness or otherwise of the regime, but for perspective on the
reasons such initiatives and/or policies succeeded or failed. To effectively appraise the international
EST transfer regime, it is important to first identify the initiatives or programmes to be reviewed, after
which, performance indicators must be established. The point should be made that what is being
considered in this chapter is not the effectiveness of ESTs per se. Rather, the chapter is focused on
determining how (pre-technology framework) EST transfer initiatives performed and the conditions
responsible for such performance. In later sections, consistent with Article 4(5) of the UNFCCC which
recognised the roles of States and non-State parties in EST transfer, initiatives by such parties will be
reviewed. This review will be done, in part, by considering the national communications submitted
by the United States, European Union and Japan in 2006, 2010 and 2014.4
Under Article 12(1)(3) of the UNFCCC, developed States are obligated to communicate to the
Conference of the Parties (COP), details of measures taken in respect of the promotion and funding
of EST transfer. Further to the UNFCCC Guidelines on reporting, States are required to “distinguish
between activities undertaken by the public sector and … private sector”; “indicate, where feasible,
in what way they have encouraged private sector activities”; include “success and failure stories”;
specify initiatives to finance “access by developing countries to “hard” or “soft”” ESTs; and report
information on steps to “support development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and
technologies of developing countries”.5 Worthy to highlight is the UNFCCC’s expectation that
developed States will make deliberate efforts to ‘encourage’ private sector activities in EST transfer.
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As will be seen underneath, such facilitation of transfer is virtually non-existent in the national
communications considered hereunder, particularly, in respect of African countries.
As noted in chapter two, considering that the global EST industry is considerably dominated, directly
or indirectly, by private firms in developed States (and emerging States like China), the public –
private connection cannot be overemphasised. This said, for a more robust understanding of the state
of EST transfer to Africa, a review of select initiatives by corporate entities and non-governmental
organisations will also be done. While the point has been made that the UNFCCC has generally
performed a facilitative role in the EST transfer regime, it has in few cases been more directly
engaged;6 as done through the clean development mechanism (CDM) and the Poznan Strategy.
The above points to three broad EST transfer pathways: UNFCCC initiatives, developed countries’
programmes and non-State parties’ initiatives. These pathways are, however, not mutually exclusive.
For instance, while the UNFCCC, through the GEF, participates directly in the implementation of
transfer projects under Poznan, it also serves as an ‘implementation platform’ for States and non-state
entities. Outside the UNFCCC’s implementation platforms (CDM and Poznan), however, States and
non-state entities initiate and implement stand-alone transfer programmes. Here, Kyoto and Poznan
are deemed ‘UNFCCC’ oriented pathways because, unlike other State or non-State initiated projects,
initiatives thereunder are controlled and/or regulated by UNFCCC rules and terms of engagement.
In considering each of these pathways, the actual result of the transfer programmes, at the recipientlevel, must, necessarily, be considered. The paucity of scholarly works on transfer at the recipientlevel is, however, not without justification. One is the absence of data in most developing countries,
particularly, African States, on the actual effect of transfer initiatives on mitigating climate change,
aiding adaptation or fostering sustainable development. Another possible justification is that there are
diverse reasons for the effectiveness or, otherwise, of a transfer initiative in a developing State which
are unconnected to the initiative itself.7 These justifications notwithstanding, an on-the-ground
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appreciation of the impacts of claimed transfer initiatives is vital. A possible way of making such an
assessment is through technology needs assessment (TNA), technology action plans (TAP) and
Project Ideas submitted by developing States to the UNFCCC. As noted in chapter two, a common
feature in the phases of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime is the emphasis on State-led TNAs in
developing States.
TNAs and TAPs, potentially, provide a glimpse into the appropriateness and effectiveness of donors’
initiatives and approaches. Although not conclusive, the recurrence of similar needs in different TNAs
over a period of time, could potentially give a hint of the effectiveness or validity of projects. This
approach is, however, riddled with several limitations. One, the UNFCCC TT:CLEAR database only
has few TNAs and TAPs submitted by African States. Two, only few African countries have TNAs,
TAPs and project ideas, and fewer States submitted such documents more than once. Three, a
considerable number of the documents are written in French, without an English translation. These
limitations constrain the scope of the comparative work sought to be done in this research to three
African States: Ghana, Kenya and Mauritius. However, apart from representing different sub-regions
of the continent (West, East, and South-East Africa), the select countries have diverse mitigation and
adaptation needs which relatively mirror situations in other African countries.8 Again, Mauritius’
status as a small island state gives a perspective into the unique challenges of such countries.
Having identified the EST transfer pathways and instruments that will be analysed here, it is necessary
to be clear about the indicators of performance. In other words, what do we look for to conclude that
a pathway or an instrument of transfer was/is effective? It is to this I now turn.
3.2 Developing an Assessment Rubric: Performance Indicators for the EST Transfer Regime
In establishing a body of appraisal criteria for EST transfer, it is worth emphasizing that there are two
broad levels on which transfer can be assessed: the ‘source’ and the ‘recipient’.9 A wholly effective
regime entails competencies at both levels of the transfer construct. The ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘where’,
8
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knowledge). The term ‘recipient’ is however more limited to State entities, specifically developing States. This however
does not mean that developed States are ineligible to be ‘recipients’. Again, often, corporate entities are direct recipients
of technologies through investment. This chapter, however, only focuses on developing States at the ‘recipient’ level.
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‘how’ and ‘why’ of technologies transferred at the ‘source’ level, will of necessity impact how it is
received at the ‘recipient’ level.10 Vice versa, conditions at the ‘recipient’ level can determine how
effective a transferred technology will be. While both levels affect each other, they have different
measures of appraisal.11 It is, however, contended that the position of developed States that sourcelevel effectiveness is mainly incumbent on recipient-level competences is only ‘half-the-truth’. While
the performance of a transfer initiative is, no doubt affected by the local context it is to operate in;
there is a first-level expectation that such a policy be properly designed from start. Primarily, it
behoves ‘transfer sources’ to ensure ‘innate effectiveness’ of transfer programmes both at the design
and implementation phases.12 It is after complying with this, that local conditions at the recipient level
can be referenced as ‘barriers’. In this sense, such barriers cannot strictly be considered as ‘barriers to
transfer’, but ‘barriers to (internal) dissemination’.13
This work focuses on the appraisal of ‘source’ level transfer. The key question sought to be answered
in this section is: how do we determine that a ‘source’ level transfer initiative or programme is
effective? As already established in chapter two, transfer initiatives by developed states are motivated
by a capacity-based conception of ‘obligation’. Hence, as shown later ‘donor’ States determine the
‘recipient’, the parameters of the project and the mode of execution. The determination of a transfer
initiatives’ success is, therefore, often based on the perception of the source-state. This, again, makes
the development of ‘recipient-sensitive’ (assessment) metrics necessary. Few attempts have been

10

In his seminal work on ‘Diffusion of Innovations’, Everett Rogers identified four elements in the diffusion of
innovations: an innovation (what); channel of communication (how); period (time) of communication (when); and a social
system (where). The ‘why’ of diffusion, also, features under Everett’s thoughts on ‘innovation decisions’. See Everett
Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations¸5th edn (New York; Free Press, 2003) 11 – 35. Everett’s work is however more suited to
‘recipient’ level analysis of diffusion (used as a broad term to cover transfer and dissemination of technology). But some
his thoughts are adaptable to source level analysis, as will be attempted here.
11

Samuel Bar-Zakay classifying the transfer process into four stages (search; adaptation; implementation and
maintenance) distinguished between ‘source’ and ‘recipient’ transfer requirements/responsibilities in each of the stages.
See
generally
Samuel,
Bar-Zakay,
“Technology
Transfer
Model”
(1970)
online:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4509.html#download>
12

‘Innate effectiveness’, as used here, means the capacity of a transfer initiative to optimally perform by meeting standards
unconnected to external variables, like local conditions at the recipient level.

13

K, Ramanathan, “An Overview of Technology Transfer and Technology Transfer Models” online: <
http://tto.boun.edu.tr/files/1383812118_An%20overview%20of%20TT%20and%20TT%20Models.pdf > 5
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made to set the metrics with which an EST, in the context of transfer, can be measured.14 The IPCC,
in a 1996 study, provided the following as criteria for the evaluation of ‘technologies and measures’:15
1. GHG and Other Environmental Considerations
• GHG reduction potential: Tons of carbon equivalent; per cent of IS92a baseline and range
(IS92c-e).
• Other environmental considerations: Percentage change in emissions of other
gases/particulates; Biodiversity, soil conservation, watershed management, indoor air
quality, etc.
2. Economic and Social Considerations
• Cost-effectiveness: Average and marginal costs.
• Project-level considerations: Capital and operating costs, opportunity costs, incremental
costs.
• Macro-economic considerations: GDP, jobs created or lost, effects on inflation or
interest rates, implications for long-term development, foreign exchange and trade, other
economic benefits or drawbacks.
• Equity considerations: Differential impacts on countries, income groups or future
generations.
3. Administrative, Institutional and Political Considerations
• Administrative burden: Institutional capabilities to undertake necessary information
collection, monitoring, enforcement, permitting, etc.
• Political considerations: Capacity to pass through political and bureaucratic processes and
sustain political support; Consistency with other public policies.
• Replicability: Adaptability to different geographical and socio-economic-cultural settings.
The above criteria, however, pertain more to the assessment of technologies per se, and not technology
transfer initiatives. The conditions, as well, entail a fusion of requirements at both the source and
recipient ends without making distinctions between both. While similar conditions might apply at both
levels, some are more ‘level-sensitive’. For example, although ‘GHG and other environmental
considerations’ apply more at the ‘source’ level, ‘administrative, institutional and political
considerations’ are more relevant at the ‘recipient’ level. In a later study, the IPCC adapted the above
criteria as metrics to appraise technology transfer, although it appears to (erroneously) use the terms
‘technology transfer’ and ‘technologies that are transferred’ synonymously.16 The more recent report
however included ‘process related criteria’, entailing:17
14
The UNFCCC identified cost effectiveness, environmental sustainability, cultural compatibility and social acceptability
as key EST policy criteria. See UNFCCC, Technologies for Adaptation to Climate Change, (UNFCCC; Bonn, 2006) 11.
See also Agenda 21, para. 4.3, which states that ESTs “should be compatible with nationally determined socio-economic,
cultural and environmental priorities”.
15

Robert T Watson, Marufu C Zinyowera & Richard H Moss, TECHNOLOGIES, POLICIES AND MEASURES FOR
MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE: IPCC Technical Paper I (IPCC, 1996) 11.

16

IPCC, supra note 3 at 64 – 65, 180

17

Ibid at 65, 180.
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1. Market penetration: Rate of indigenisation; geographic extent of penetration and
impacts on other technologies and ancillary benefits.
2. Long term institutional capacity building: flexibility and capacity to adapt technology
to changing circumstances and to sell back to original provider with improvements; capacity
of local staff and long-term financing; improvements in training and management practices.
3. Monitoring and evaluation of continuous delivery of services provided by technology
and adequate financial performance: continuous delivery of services provided by
technology; comparison of actual and intended benefits; performance of technology; quality
of benefits; satisfaction of beneficiaries; distribution of benefits (equity); maintenance and
service of equipment; adequate financial performance; payback period; financial rate of
return; net present value.
Arguably, the ‘process related criteria’ are more tailored as ‘technology transfer’ criteria than the more
generic technology-based criteria established in the IPCC’s 1996 criteria. The ‘process related criteria’
are, however, ‘recipient’ focused, and provides little aid for the assessment of source-level transfer.
This inadequacy necessitates the (re)-construction of metrics for a source level analysis, which will
necessarily draw from the above IPCC criteria. Developing such criteria also entails a re-consideration
of the ‘original’ agreements on technology transfer, particularly, Article 4(5) of the UNFCCC and
Chapter 34 of Agenda 21. Article 4(5) mandates that developed States take “…all practicable steps
… as appropriate” in respect of EST transfer to enable developing States to “implement the provisions
of the Convention”. Whereas the phrase “…all practicable steps … as appropriate” is very nebulous,
it is clear that such ‘steps’ must enable developing States to meet their commitments under Article
4(1)(a) – (j).18 The commitments contained in Article 4(1) can be classified into three: duty to report;
duty to cooperate and duty to develop sustainably.19 A joint reading of Article 4(5) and 4(1) informs
the conclusion that EST transfer ‘steps’ must ultimately aim to enable recipient States to develop the
capacity to report, cooperate and develop sustainably. It is, therefore, arguable that the overarching
criterion of a transfer initiative is whether it is ‘enabling’. An emphasis on ‘enablement’ as proposed
has diverse implications. For one, it substantially shifts the focus from stand-alone ‘hardware transfer’
initiatives, to wholesome projects with emphasis on the software and orgware components of such
transferred technology. Again, an ‘enablement’ driven transfer construct will potentially drive to the

18

Commitments under Article 4(1)(a) – (j) of the UNFCCC applies to “all parties” under the climate regime. Hence,
developing States, are inter alia, obligated to “promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the
conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs”; “take climate change considerations into account
… in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions …” etc.
19

Duty to report – Article 4(1)(a)(b)(j); Duty to cooperate – Article 4(1)(c)(e)(g)(h)(i); Duty to develop sustainably –
Article 4(1)(d)(f).
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surface the imperatives of vertical transfer of ESTs as against the more prominent horizontal transfer.20
Importantly, ‘enablement’ as the primary criterion of transfer will, invariably, facilitate developing
States’ transition from ‘recipients’ to ‘contributors’, as evidently anticipated in Art. 4(1).
‘Enablement’, as the motherlode of EST transfer policy, is reaffirmed in chapter 34 of Agenda 21. It,
for instance, affirms that “the primary goal of improved access to technology information is to enable
informed choices, leading to access to and transfer of such technologies and the strengthening of
countries’ own technological capabilities”.21 A close reading of chapter 34 further provides the subcomponents of the ‘enablement criterion’. These can be summarised as accessibility and
sustainability22. This much can be gleaned from paragraph 34.14 which emphasises access, transfer
of technologies and know-how on favourable terms, promotion of indigenous technologies and
support of endogenous capacity building as the objectives of the EST transfer regime. In summary,
‘accessibility’, as used here, entails availability, affordability and cooperation, while ‘sustainability’
includes compatibility, adaptability and maintenance. Evidently absent from these sub-criteria are
environmental effectiveness, administrative and political considerations, and market penetration. It is
worth repeating that the sub-criterions above proposed are source-level metrics to appraise EST
transfer initiatives. Further, while not exhaustive, they have been developed as a simple and easy-toapply qualitative appraisal model. The sub-criteria are represented more clearly in the table below.

20

Edwin Mansfield distinguished between vertical and horizontal technology transfer thus: “Vertical technology transfer
occurs when information is transmitted from basic research to applied research, from applied research to development,
and from development to production. Such transfers occur in both directions, and the form of the information changes as
it moves along this dimension. Horizontal transfer of technology occurs when technology used in one place, organisation,
or context is transferred and used in another place, organisation, or context”. See Edwin Mansfield, Technology Transfer,
Productivity and Economic Policy (New York; W.W. Norton & Co., 1982) 28 cited in Bojan Pretnar, “Commercialism of
Patents and Know-how: From Academia to Industry” online: < http://www.uil-sipo.si/uploads/media/Pretnar.pdf>. An
example of this kind of vertical transfer is the university – industry transfer. Vertical transfer will potentially allow for the
involvement of developing states at the early stage of EST development. Further, considering the location sensitive nature
of ESTs, early involvement via vertical transfer will likely make an EST more adapted to the peculiarities of a recipient.
21

Agenda 21, para. 34.8.

22

Sustainability is used here to mean ‘sustainable technology transfer’, which has been described as “Technology transfer
that is more than a one-off transfer of equipment, know-how or both to the host developing country but generates
indigenous and lasting embedding of this technology in the host country”. See Gary Cox, “The CDM as a Vehicle for
Technology Transfer and Sustainable Development” (2010) 6 Law, Environment and Development Journal 179 at 196.
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Source-Level EST Transfer Metrics23
ENABLEMENT
Accessibility
Sustainability
Availability x Wholesale availability (hardware Compatibility x Compatibility of source-initiative
+ software + orgware).
and recipient-priorities.
x Assured access.24
x Compatibility with recipient State
policies.
x Observability.
x Social/cultural compatibility.
Affordability x Favourable, concessional and Adaptability x Flexibility and non-complexity.
preferential commercial terms.
x Local technical and managerial
x Macro-economic considerations
capacity development.
(GDP, jobs created or lost, etc).
x Trialability.
x Equity considerations
x Re-invention.
(distributive/differential impacts).
Cooperation x Design to Execution inter-party Maintenance x Monitoring.
consultation.
x Evaluation of intended and actual
x Host-state input and engagement.
benefits.
x Local servicing of equipment.
x Regional
(international)
interconnectivity and partnership.
It is expected that an effective (and equitable) transfer initiative will substantially satisfy the above
requirements. What follows is an appraisal of EST transfer initiatives in the light of the foregoing.
3.3 UNFCCC Facilitated EST Transfer Programmes in Africa
The point has been made that rather than engaging in the direct transfer of ESTs, the UNFCCC
primarily plays a facilitative role. However, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the
Poznan Strategy are two of the very rare instances where the UNFCCC plays a more direct role in
facilitating transfer.
3.3.1 The Clean Development Mechanism
While the 1992 UNFCCC contained broad objectives and provisions on global climate governance,
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol stipulated explicit and measurable emission reduction targets and modes of
23

The metrics are distilled from Chapter 34 of Agenda 21; IPCC metrics (supra notes 15 - 17) Bar-Zakay’s Technology
Transfer Model (supra note 11) and Everett Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations (supra note 10).

24

Paragraph 34.10 and 34.11 of Agenda 21 referenced the concept of “assured access for developing countries to (ESTs)
in its relation to proprietary rights”. The ‘assured access’ concept is more commonly employed in the ‘global commons’
discourse. (See for example, Mark Barrett et al, Assured Access to the Global Commons (Virginia; NATO, 2011)). In that
context, it means that all States, particularly developing States, should have unfettered access to ESTs regardless private
proprietary right claims.
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meeting these targets for annex I countries. To ease the achievement of these targets, the Protocol
provided for multiple pathways, generally called ‘flexible mechanisms’ for developed States: Joint
Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The joint implementation provision
allows Annex 1 parties to transfer to or acquire from themselves emission reduction units “resulting
from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic
removals by sinks”.25 This section, however, focuses on the CDM.
Described as “one of the most innovative tools of the Kyoto Protocol”,26 the CDM is a market driven
mechanism which facilitates undertaking cost-efficient ‘climate enhancing’ projects in developing
countries in exchange for an ‘allowance to emit’ in developed States. As noted elsewhere, the CDM’s
rationale is that “the marginal cost of emissions reduction in developing … countries would be less
than for developed ones”.27 The Kyoto Protocol is, however, subtler in its articulation of the objectives
of the CDM, highlighting28 instead, the assistance of non-annex I Parties to achieve sustainable
development and Annex I parties to achieve compliance with their emission reduction commitments.
Understanding that the CDM is primarily an economic device mainly designed as an assistive tool for
annex I States is crucial to appreciating its overall workings. It is in this context that the CDM’s
sustainable development objective has been described as ‘complementary’.29 Under the CDM, annex
I States earn certified emission reductions (CERs) through projects carried out in developing States,
with which they can meet their emission reduction commitments. To obtain CERs, however, the
project is expected to have involved the voluntary participation of parties, result in “real, measurable,
and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change”, and ensure “reductions in
emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity”
(additionality).30

25

See Kyoto Protocol, art. 6(1).

26

Antoine Dechezlepr et al, “The North-South Transfer of Climate-Friendly Technologies through the Clean Development
Mechanism” (2007) October Int Aff., 8. See also Carsten Warnecke, Thomas Day & Noémie Klein, “Analysing the status
quo of CDM projects: Status and prospects” (2015) May Ger Fed Minist Environ Nat Conserv Build Nucl Saf 140, online:
<http://newclimate.org/2015/05/16/analysing-the-status-quo-of-cdm-projects/>.

27

Michael W Wara, “Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential” (2008) 55:6 UCLA
Law Rev 1759 at 1763.

28

Kyoto Protocol, art. 12(2).

29

UNFCCC, “The Contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to Technology Transfer”
(2010) 10.

30

Kyoto Protocol, art. 12(5).
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Although widely represented as a tool for EST transfer,31 there is no explicit mention of technology
transfer as an incidence of the CDM. Connection has, however, been drawn between the sustainable
development objective and the necessity of EST transfer in operationalizing the CDM.32 In fact,
developed States, like the United States, recognise the CDM as a vehicle and incentive for the transfer
of ESTs.33 A more direct link between CDM and EST transfer was subsequently established by the
COP in 2001 and 2006.34 Outlining the information required in a project design document (PDD) to
be submitted by a CDM project proponent, the 2001 and 2006 decisions require “a description of the
project comprising the project purpose, a technical description of the project, including how
technology will be transferred, if any…”35 While this requirement does not mandate technology
transfer, it admonishes the inclusion of information on technology transfer, if such transfer is intended.
Although it might be argued that since the CDM was not originally designed as an EST transfer
mechanism, source-States, as shown above, consider it as such.
Various studies have been conducted into the performance of CDM as an EST transfer pathway.36 As
noted in several of these studies, not all CDM projects involve the transfer of ESTs. A study, for
example, found that of the 4984 projects in the CDM pipeline in 2010, 2,262 specifically indicated
that there would be no technology transfer, 1,206 PDD had no mention of technology transfer, while
1,516 projects were expected to involve technology transfer.37 Of the 1,516 projects entailing
technology transfer, 515 involved the transfer of equipment alone, 209 projects transferred knowledge
31

Malte Schneider, Andreas Holzer & Volker H Hoffmann, “Understanding the CDM’s contribution to technology
transfer” (2008) 36:8 Energy Policy 2920 at 2936; Heleen De Coninck, Frauke Haake & Nico Van Der Linden,
“Technology transfer in the Clean Development Mechanism” (2007) 7:5 Clim Policy 444.
32

UNFCCC, supra note 29 at 12.

33

See SBSTA, 13th Sess., (2000) Development and Transfer of Technologies – Status of the Consultative Process
(Submission of Parties) online: <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2000/sbsta/misc04.htm>
34

Preamble to Decision 17/CP.7 inter alia states that “…clean development mechanism project activities should lead to
the transfer of environmentally safe and sound technology and know-how in addition to that required under Article 4,
paragraph 5, of the Convention…” See Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism as defined in
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 17/CP.7, UNFCCCOR, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2.

35

See Ibid, Appendix B, para.1a; Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism as defined in Article
12 of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 3/CMP.1, UNFCCCOR, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, Appendix B, para. 2(a).

36

P Karani, “Technology transfer to Africa-Constraints for CDM operations” (2002) 3:3 Refocus 20; Schneider, Holzer
& Hoffmann, supra note 32; Wytze van der Gaast, Katherine Begg & Alexandros Flamos, “Promoting sustainable energy
technology transfers to developing countries through the CDM” (2009) 86:2 Appl Energy 230; Dechezlepr et al, supra
note 26; UNFCCC, supra note 29; Ana Pueyo & Pedro Linares, Renewable Technology Transfer to Developing Countries :
One Size Does Not Fit All (2012); A REISMAN & Stephen Seres, “Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects:
Report for the UNFCCC Registration &Issuance Unit CDM/SDM” (2007) 33:December Omega 189, online:
<http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-11144350508&partnerID=tZOtx3y1>.
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UNFCCC, supra note 29 at 16.
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only, and 792 projects entailed transfer of equipment and knowledge.38 A similar trend is recorded for
studies conducted at other periods.39 Other similar findings in these studies are that: transfer is more
likely in larger projects, unlike unilateral and small-scale projects;40 the frequency of transfer
decreases as the projects of the same type are repeated in the host countries; and projects bordering
on energy efficiency, HFCs, N2O, transportation and wind are more likely to involve technology
transfer.41 Although a considerable number of projects are said to entail the transfer of equipment and
knowledge, the knowledge said to be transferred primarily deal with operation and maintenance, as
against actual capacity building to re-invent and produce technologies.42
Unlike Asian and Latin American countries, Africa has considerably few CDM projects, with most of
existing projects concentrated in South Africa.43 For example, of the 8366 projects in the CDM
pipeline as of May 2018, only 242 (2.9%) are located in Africa.44 Reasons for the paucity of projects
range from the disincentivizing business environment to the absence of institutional capacity.45
Olawuyi46 notes that due to their high emissions, countries like China, India and South Africa boast
of large CDM projects.47 Apart from the paucity of African CDM projects, is their unsustainability.
Warnecke et al.48 found in 2015 that only 46% percent of projects have been fully implemented, while
only 29% of surveyed African projects were in regular operation.49 These Africa-centric studies,
however, focus generally on the performance of CDM on the continent, with ancillary reference to

38

Ibid.

39

See Dechezlepretre, supra note 26 and Schneider et al, supra note 31;

40

Ibid.

41

UNFCCC, supra note 29 at 18.

42

Nicolas Kreibich et al, “An update on the Clean Development Mechanism in Africa in times of market crisis” (2017)
9:2 Clim Dev 178 at 188.

43

Ibid at 178.

44

UNEP DTU Partnership, Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development, “CDM Projects by Host Region”
online: <http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm#1>

45

Ibid; See also Damilola S Olawuyi, “Achieving Sustainable Development in Africa through the Clean Development
Mechanism: Legal and Institutional Issues Considered” (2009) 17:2 African J Int Comp Law 270 at , online:
<http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/E0954889009000401>.

46

Olawuyi, supra note 45 at 284.

47

About 70% of CDM projects are said to be concentrated in China and India. As noted elsewhere, for a project to be
deemed cost effective, it should deliver at least 100,000 CERs per year, and only countries generating about 10,000 –
20,000 metric tons of CO2 are presumed attractive. See Axel Michaelowa & Frank Jotzo, “Transaction costs, institutional
rigidities and the size of the clean development mechanism” (2005) 33:4 Energy Policy 511.
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Warnecke, Day & Klein, supra note 26 at 44.

49

Kreibich et al, supra note 42 at 182.
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the impact on technology transfer to a recipient country. Through a quick review of select PDDs
submitted by proponents and data on the UNEP DTU platform, an attempt will be made to appraise
the trend of CDM projects in Africa and their EST transfer implications. The CDM spreadsheet shows
about 236 CDM projects executed (or being executed) in Africa.50 Although a comprehensive
assessment of the projects is not possible here, a sample review of registered CDM projects in Nigeria,
Kenya, South Africa and Morocco might provide some indicators as to how effective CDM has been
as a tool of transfer.51
As of May 2018, Nigeria had seven registered CDM projects.52 With the exception of the
Asuokpu/Umuti gas recovery project, six of the projects made reference to technology transfer. The
commitments made were, however, generally couched without reference to particular steps to ensure
transfer. The Kwale gas recovery PDD, for instance, referred to “technology transfer and improvement
of local know-how, through the adoption of a reliable state of the art gas engineering technology”.53
The efficient fuel wood stoves project provides more details on its transfer component. The project
entails the SAVE80 system, a firewood efficient stove pre-fabricated in Germany, but shipped to
Nigeria for assemblage.54 The proponent noted its intention to produce the system locally, once there
is a ‘reasonable’ Nigerian market.55 While 5,500 stoves were originally sold at reduced price to

50

Supra note 44.

51

To maintain a manageable scope, the analysis focuses on registered projects and not all projects in the CDM pipeline.
Pipeline projects include both registered and projects in the process of being validated by the Designated operational
entities (DOEs).

52

Associated gas recovery process at Kwale oil-gas processing plant; efficient fuel wood stoves for Nigeria; recovery and
marketing of gas that would otherwise be flared at the Asuokpu/Umuti Marginal Field; LFG Project in Nigeria; Lafarge
WAPCO partial substitution of alternative fuels in cement facilities project in Nigeria; recovery and utilization of
associated gas from the Obodugwa and neighbouring oil fields in Nigeria; and Kainji Hydropower rehabilitation project.
See <https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html>. It is, however, worth noting that the projects are dominated by gas
(flaring) recovery projects. Given that the Nigerian Associated Gas Re-injection Act, CAP A25 LFN 2004, s. 3, prohibits
the flaring of gas in the country, it is doubtful if the projects would have met the condition of additionality, since the law
already compels the non-flaring of gas. Expectedly therefore, without the projects, oil and gas companies are mandated to
do the same thing the project supposedly facilitate(d).
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CDM-PDD, online:

<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/T/2/N/T2N9G73GCSUW91EJUE7BJRW9NGIOLU/Final%20PDDNigeria%20_03_08_06.pdf?t=ZW18cDlrczI4fDBy_RNGHjM1sGG7-BDb40Rk>
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CDM-PDD, online:
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/l/z/23VFX68ADZ9LMN1RU4WPEIOSYGB5H7.pdf/130218_Nigeria_PDD_form02
_v03_PRC_clean.pdf?t=cGZ8cDlrczNvfDCDZ4BK_LnO1aRahYEbZWq6>
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users,56 the high purchase price of the stove57 and the absence of local manufacturing capacity are few
of the challenges which have stifled the project. The SAVE 80 system example provides a window
into the operation of CDM projects in Nigeria. Worth highlighting is the capacity building dimension
of the transfer design of these projects. While 12,500 stoves were projected to be distributed between
2009 and 2015, only 3000 stoves were distributed, due to “custom hitches”.58 However, if
manufactured in-country, ‘custom hitches’ would not have been a challenge. It is apparent that an
assemblage, maintenance or operational ‘capacity’ transfer59 is insufficient to foster actual technology
transfer. While it is difficult to appraise the projects using the earlier designed metrics, it can be safely
concluded that they do not satisfy the requirements of availability, affordability and adaptability.
Kenya presently has nine registered CDM projects.60 While two of the projects explicitly stated that
there will be no technology transfer,61 one project made a tangential reference to the transfer of skills,
but transfer was more directly provided in six projects. Like it was in the Nigerian example, the six
CDM projects with explicit transfer provisions provided for both hardware transfer and capacity
development. Howbeit, the capacity development in view pertained to the operational and
maintenance training of personnel.62 While there is no available data to consider how these projects
56

“The
Stove
80
woodstove
and
wonder
<http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/events/2011/lagos/Save80CDMProjectPart2.pdf>.

box”

online:
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The price of the stove, stainless steel pot and wonderbox is put at about €85 (about N35,000 (Nigerian Naira)). This is
about double the country’s monthly minimum wage (N18,000). See Paul Kramer, “A Highly Efficient Fuel Wood Stove
– The Save 80 in Kaduna, Nigeria” online: <www.l-h-l.org/?download=highly_efficient_%20stove_Save80.pdf>.
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The Partnership for Clean Indoor Air, “The save 80 Efficient Fuelwood Stove for Nigeria”, online: <
http://www.pciaonline.org/projects/save-80-efficient-fuelwood-stove-nigeria>
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Another example is the Obodugwa gas recovery and utilization project, which noted that while the compression
equipment will be built in the USA, Nigerian engineers will be trained in the “installation, operation and maintenance of
this
equipment”.
See
F-CDM-PDD,
online:
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/o/q/LTE4YOD03G6N5CX8HRZUA9SKJP2VMB.pdf/P%20081112%20Final%20O
bodugwa%20PDD%20public%20vers.pdf?t=aDN8cDlrczV0fDA7KGIwt8H3E0gZicDMTnEt>
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The projects are made up of five reforestation projects, and four geothermal, biofuel, energy efficiency and wind
electricity generation projects. See <https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html>.
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Both projects were on the reforestation of Aberdare forest complex and MAU forest complex. The unilateral nature of
the project (as it was internally financed by the Kenyan Ministry of Finance) could account for the absence of transfer, as
transfer is in this context deemed inter-state.
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For example, the 5.1MW Grid connected wind electricity generation at Ngong Hills, Kenya, which stated in its PDD
that “know how transfer is provided by training local personnel to operate the turbines”. See
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/6/0/F605JS3OBCM4TL9QWENA8DGI1PZUX2/Ngong_I__05_03_2014.pdf?t=O
Ud8cDlsYWRvfDBHCDaTWN2cXYAvaAFkcuNW>. Also see the Karan Biofuel CDM project, which provided in its
PDD that “State-of-the art Indian technology has been ordered as new and imported together with dedicated knowhow for
commissioning
and
maintenance”.
See
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/x/u/XWRFESV1D0G6B8YZ7POL4HMIN29Q35.pdf/PDD.pdf?t=Y0R8cDlsYWVkf
DBfPsMJFo1BDzL9-cL9tfy8>.
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satisfy the various metrics of effective transfer initiatives, it can reasonably be contended that the
condition of adaptability is unmet. The Olkaria III Phase 2 Geothermal Expansion Project, perhaps,
indicates this point. While the project has been lauded as a success and an example to other African
countries,63 its transfer impact has received less applause. The project is operated by Orpower 4, Inc,
a Kenyan subsidiary of an American company, Ormat, which began the first phase of the project in
the late 1990s.64 Although it has been suggested that the project has resulted in “technology transfer
from Ormat to its counterparts”, a recent paper in respect of Olkaria IV, operated by Kenya Electricity
Generating Company Limited (KenGen) found otherwise.65 It noted that Olkaria IV’s challenges
include:
Poor knowledge by the client. The client lacks the expertise to carry out design and installation
of the power plant and have to rely on the consultant and the EPC contractor. Knowledge
transfer was inadequate, and this therefore means that the client is still inadequately staffed.66
Twelve of the twenty-two CDM projects registered for South Africa involved foreign partners.67 Only
one project, however, failed to provide for technology transfer.68 Interestingly, a majority of the CDM
projects entailed only transfer of technologies (hard ware) without more.69 In contrast, the Dassieklip
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See Valerio Micale, Chiara Trabacchi & Leonardo Boni, “Using Public Finance to Attract Private Investment in
Geothermal:
Olkaria
III
Case
Study,
Kenya”
(2015)
Climate
Policy
Initiative,
online:
<http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/150601_Final_Olkaria_ForWeb.pdf>
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The project uses Ormat designed and owned organic rankine-cycle turbines (also called Ormat Energy Converter
(OEC)).
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Pharis Mukeu & Reuben Langat, “Olkaria (Kenya) Geothermal Project Case Study” (2016) 40 GRC Transactions 85.
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Ibid at 88.

67

<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/Q/4/K/Q4K589JXEA6SUZYBHDVMPN2O1FL3T7/Final%20PDD.pdf?t=QnN8c
DlseXhzfDCQmeua04NwYHL5mcZcu3ud >
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The inclusion of technology transfer in all but one of the PDDs might be connected the express requirement for
‘appropriate technology transfer’ for the South African DNA project approval process. See, “The South African DNA
Project Approval Process” online: < http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/kyoto/dnaapproval.pdf >. Only the ‘Capture
and Utilization of Methane at the Sibanye Gold owned Beatrix Mine in South Africa’ failed to provide for technology
transfer.
See
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/V/I/8/VI8FSDOYEMJ4KZNB3L6CH52W0A7GQR/2017-0713%20Beatrix%20Updated%20PDD_Clean.pdf?t=WHp8cDlseTNufDAI3WiwEEVSNIiyxcQqmKd4>
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See, “Manufacture and Utilization of Bio-coal Briquettes in Stutterheim, South Africa” online:
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/Q/4/K/Q4K589JXEA6SUZYBHDVMPN2O1FL3T7/Final%20PDD.pdf?t=QnN8cDl
seXhzfDCQmeua04NwYHL5mcZcu3ud>; North west, KwaZulu-Natal & Eastern Cape CFL Replacement Project,
online:
<
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/v/m/LKNG357QMSJYE1DXU9T0V4F8PBCAZ6.pdf/7356PDD_%2011Dec2012.pdf?t=ZTN8cDlseTM1fDBz44g5Y880W8-DSBsB4yNX >; Gauteng, Free State, Mpumalanga,
Limpopo
& Northern
Cape
CFL
Replacement
Project
(1)
in South
Africa,
online:
<
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/k/w/DAHR6T07C5LQGFU83SMWIXJN4YE9P2.pdf/7478%20PDD%20%2027%20S
ep%2012.pdf?t=YmN8cDlseTNpfDAeLz_kUMYtPPf7xyKF5_mv> and “Ekurhuleni Landfill Gas Recovery Project –
South
Africa”
online:
<
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/B/I/1/BI1J2FD6T0PKNW7RLX5HOQGSZAEM8V/EMM%20Revised%20PDD%20
20140814.pdf?t=a1Z8cDlseTN1fDCjHKz4JtuZpmZUdL0W1gxg >.
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wind energy project emphasised “the transfer of skills and (building of) local capacity” rather than
hardware transfer.70 The Bokpoort concentrating solar power (CSP) project, however, broke the trend
of mere transfer of operational and/or maintenance knowledge by providing that “construction and
operational know-how will be transferred to South Africa through the close working relationship
within (the) consortium (three Spanish CSP firms and a South African company) and the experience
gained by local component manufacturers and suppliers”.71 While the provision for construction level
capacity building in Bokpoort’s PDD is laudable, there is little indication that such transfer occurred
at the level of implementation. Although not conclusive, the domination of post-Bokpoort CSP
projects by foreign companies as EPC (engineering, procurement and construction) contractors,
suggests otherwise.72
Egypt has seven registered CDM projects, six of which are in partnership with annex I countries. The
PDDs in respect of Moroccan CDM projects only contain barebone provisions on technology transfer.
While one of the projects made no reference to transfer,73 two of the projects simply referred to the
‘introduction of modern technology in the country’ without specifying whether this means hardware,
software or both.74 Consistent with the trend on capacity development, three PDDs referred to training
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See
Dassieklip
Wind
Energy
Facility
in
South
Africa,
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/y/9/5BTD39216KFPELGAMQO7JZ4YIXCWHR.pdf/8107-PDD2012%2011%2009.pdf?t=TXh8cDlseTM5fDDfKxVuUkYqPvsvRHpOrflf >.
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(Concentrating
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Power)
Project,
South
Africa,
online:
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/8/T/X/8TXDP40YBUWE5RKOJCF2LI16MV3NH9/PA7841_Revised%20PDD_cle
an.pdf?t=R1l8cDlseTNlfDAayJEMoyDU4ld65NsTyQA9>
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According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), six CSP projects have been (or are being) undertaken
post-Bokpoort - Ilanga I, Kathu Solar Park, KaXu Solar One, Khi Solar One, Redstone Solar Thermal Power Plant and
Xina Solar One. The projects have been constructed primarily by Spanish companies like Sener, Acciona, TSK and
Abener-Teyma
See
NREL,
“Concentrating
Solar
Power
Projects
in
South
Africa”
online:
<https://www.nrel.gov/csp/solarpaces/by_country_detail.cfm/country=ZA>
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Gas
Flare
Recovery
at
Suez
Oil
Processing
Company,
Egypt,
online:
<
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/6/g/O9ZBX6LFAPYWQ2I1GN30VJ8ETU75KH.pdf/PDD_ver04.pdf?t=N0t8cDltN2
NvfDAgqlqWUryFEGB90XZm-Tht >
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See N2O and NOX Abatement Project at KIMA Fertilizer Plant in Aswan (Egypt), online: <
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/x/k/C82OWMZGI361NLARBE0XK45JDYQHVP.pdf/8668%20PDD.pdf?t=Tm98cDl
tN2NhfDDdeRsa9o6x-GP-zjQKYJ2x > and N2O and NOX Abatement Project at Delta ASMEDA Fertilizer Plant in Al
Mansoura
(Egypt),
online:
<
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/w/4/PLBNSXO9Q57DI4Y0K8E613CJRHWFM2.pdf/9032%20PDD.pdf?t=NU58cDlt
N2NnfDBLSASiu23GAViYN9BnbdHg >
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for “operation and maintenance purposes”.75 Worth highlighting is the Zarana 8 – wind power plant
project which indicated that since it is “common practice to carry out assembly in the general vicinity
of the actual plant site … Zafarana 8 will thus also be a real and significant transfer of technology”.76
The above survey of the technology transfer dimensions of CDM projects in some of Africa’s most
developed and populated countries cannot be said to be representative. Even so, it provides some
evidence for previously made anecdotal assertions. The survey offers the following insights:
i. Technology transfer is, at best, ancillary to CDM. Thus, it is not a priority for project proponents
in the design and/or execution of projects.
ii. Technology transfer is not consistent with the economic framing of CDM. Companies engage
in CDM primarily to obtain CERs and to make profit. A transfer of technology, particularly,
(actual) capacity is a potential limiter to profit making.
iii. Most projects surveyed referred to technology transfer and, to some extent, capacity
development. But capacity building is generally in the context of operations and /or
maintenance, and rarely in terms of ground-up manufacturing and/or construction.
iv. Claimed technology transfers in PDDs are generally inconsistent with evidence on the ground,
as African countries remain dependent on Annex I countries (companies) several years after
projects with claimed ‘technology transfer’ are completed and handed over.
v. Except for unilateral CDM projects, it is doubtful if projects initiated by multi-national
companies align with host State priorities (needs). For example, projects on fugitive gas
dominate the Nigerian CDM scape. While gas flaring is certainly a problem in the country, it is
not as compelling as the country’s chronic energy poverty.
vi. Except for the maintenance metric, the technology transfer components of surveyed CDM
projects failed to meet the ‘enablement’ metrics listed above.
vii. CDM focused on the transfer of mitigation technologies.77
3.3.2 The Poznan Strategy
The Poznan Strategy (Poznan) was the Global Environment Facility’s (GEF) response to the COP’s
request that, as the operational entity of the UNFCCC financial mechanism, it consults with interested
parties and institutions to “elaborate a strategic programme to scale up the level of investment for
75

See Reduction of N2O emissions from the new nitric acid plant of Egypt Hydrocarbon Corporation at Ain Sokhna,
online:
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/i/u/051G36BO298SLMZNTDFQVWRJUCHY7K.pdf/7606-PDD5%20Oct%2012.pdf?t=VlB8cDltN2M0fDAlYJ2NH4KnHMNQkR1jcz7S>; Zafarana KfW IV Wind Farm Project, Arab
Republic
of
Egypt,
online:
<
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/Q/D/K/QDKWB96Z13XIGJ4V7MLCN5YRH8FASU/PDD_Zafarana%20KfW%20IV
%20Wind%20Farm%20Project_Ver.02.1_clean?t=U0l8cDltN2JyfDDGany_8VsTjlGEh2pIGJxu >; Zafarana 8 – Wind
Power
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Project,
Arab
Republic
of
Egypt,
online:
<
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/n/v/04TRBEU1HCZIJFA27N9O6YMVXKPQSD.pdf/Revised%20PDD%20ver8%20Clean.pdf?t=eEZ8cDltN2J5fDDbg94vsPhz8kcHqhxIfMal >
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See, Zafana 8, Ibid.
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The Kyoto Protocol, however, provides that “…a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to …
assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs
of adaptation”
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technology transfer to help developing countries address their needs for (ESTs)”.78 As noted in chapter
2, this mandate informed the GEF’s long term implementation strategy.79 The point has also been
previously made that while technology needs assessment (TNAs) constitutes a crucial preparatory
phase to effective technology transfer, it does not constitute technology transfer in itself. Hence, in
appraising Poznan, emphasis will be placed on piloted priority technology projects in Africa. Under
Poznan the GEF records three projects undertaken in Africa: the solar refrigeration project in Kenya
and Swaziland (solarchill); municipal solid wastes composting unit in Cote d’Ivoire; and thermal
insulation material production in Senegal.80
Solarchill was conceived by a coalition of multilateral and non-governmental organisations in 2001.81
This was in response to the need for an environment friendly vaccine (and food) solar powered
refrigerator, with hydrocarbon-based compressor. Prior to Solarchill, vaccine refrigerators were
kerosene or propane operated, with their consequent inefficiency, high cost of procurement and
adverse environmental impact.82 Again, the vaccine refrigerators made use of hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) as refrigerant and blowing agents, respectively.83
According to the project’s Project Identification Form (PIF), the project was designed to: determine
technical performance and potential market demand for SolarChill technology; support the
modification and optimization of the technology; attract potential manufacturers; and support
governments in countries with production capacity.84
Given that SolarChill is, largely, an open sourced technology and local adaptation was a central
component of the project design, Swazi owned and staffed company, Palfridge, has been an active
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Development and Transfer of Technologies under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Decision 4/CP.13,
UNFCCCOR, 2007, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add. 1, 3.
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The long-term plan entails, support for climate technology centres and a climate technology network; piloting priority
technology projects to foster innovation and investments; public-private partnerships (PPPs) for technology transfer and
GEF as a catalytic supporting institution for technology transfer. See Chizuru Aoki, et al, Implementing the Poznan
Strategic and Long-Term Programs on Technology Transfer, (GEF, 2012) 6.

80

Evaluation of the Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer: Final Report by the Technology Executive
Committee, 43rd sess., FCCC/SBI/2015, Annex III.
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See “The GEF Solarchill Project” online: < https://www.solarchill.org/english/about/>; SolarChill Development,
Testing and Technology Transfer Outreacg, GEF Project ID 4682, Project Identification Form, online: <
https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/project_documents/SolarChill%2520PIF%2520GEF_28092011_0.pdf>
(SolarChill PIF)
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See, SolarChill PIF, Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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partner in the design, manufacturing and adaptation of the SolarChill technology.85 Palfridge is
reputed to have adapted the technology to suit the “higher ambient temperature found in tropical
climates”.86 These positives notwithstanding, the huge capital cost of the solarChill technology has
been identified as its major challenge.87 More fundamentally, it is doubtful if SolarChill align with the
African States priority technology needs. For example, it is difficult to place the project under any of
the needs identified in Kenya’s 2005 and 2013 mitigation TNAs.88 Again, Swaziland’s 2016 TNA
only pertains to adaptation needs.89 This concern mirrors the observation of the Technology Executive
Committee (TEC) in its 2015 evaluation of Poznan. It stated that rather than demand-tailored Poznan
initiatives, some projects “had taken more of a technology-push approach, resulting in weakened
relevance for country stakeholders and a difficulty in finding partners willing to invest in the
technology”.90
Similar trends as the SolarChill projects can be observed in the Poznan facilitated projects in Senegal
and Cote d’Ivoire.91 To varying extents, the projects actively engaged and involved local companies
from the manufacturing/construction stage.92 The issue of whether the projects are prioritised needs,
however, surfaces again. If TNAs are indicators of prioritized EST needs of countries, the nonreference to the countries’ TNAs in the projects’ PIF are indicative of the non-priority status of these
projects.
Overall, when appraised with the metrics set out above, the Poznan strategy, as evidenced by the
reviewed projects, ticks most of the criteria less compatibility, particularly, projects’ compatibility
85

Ibid.

86

Ibid.

87

Ibid.
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See generally, Kenya’s Climate Change Technology Needs and Needs Assessment Report Under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (National Environment Management Authority, 2005) 56 – 64; Technology
Needs Assessment and Technology Action Plans for Climate Change Mitigation (National Environment Management
Authority, 2013) 31 – 32.
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Deepa Pullanikkatil, Swaziland Technology Needs Assessment Report 1 – Climate Change Adaptation (CANGO,
2016)
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Supra note 80, para. 66.
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See Technology Transfer: Typha-based Thermal Insulation Material Production in Senegal, GEF Project ID 4055,
online:<
https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/project_documents/4055-2009-0928%2520PIF%2520Senegal%2520resubmitted%2520on%25202509-09_1.docx>; Construction of 1000 T per Day
Municipal
Solid
Wastes
Industrial
Composting
Unit
Akouedo-Abidjan,
online:
<
https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/project_documents/9-24-2009%2520ID4071Revised%2520PIF.pdf>.
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This is, however, less so in the case of the Ivorian composting unit projects which was developed by Chinese company,
Tianjin Universal Machinery Import & Export Corporation as a turn-key project.
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with host states’ priorities. Compared to the CDM, Poznan provides a relatively better template for
EST transfer initiatives. It also makes evident the difference between a programme specifically
designed for technology transfer (Poznan) and an economic concept with an ancillary transfer
component (CDM). The point must be made that Poznan projects were not without commercial returns
to the private entities involved in them. The difference, however, was that the transfer requirement
was made an essential requirement, and not a waivable component like it was with CDM. Importantly,
Poznan’s location within the financial mechanism, allows for a coordinated approach to project design
and finance.
3.4 A ‘Recipient’ and ‘Source’ Review of Transfer Initiatives
A recurrent theme in the above analysis is the subject of compatibility of implemented projects under
the CDM and Poznan. The effectiveness of a transfer project is firstly a question of compatibility: Is
the project aligned to the prioritized need(s) of the recipient State? The tables below provide some
informed response to this query. The first table contains the technological needs, project ideas and
barriers identified by Ghana, Mauritius and Kenya between 2003/2005 (1st TNA) and 2012/2013 (2nd
TNA) as contained in their TNAs and Project ideas. The second table contains the technology transfer
initiatives of the European Union, the USA and Japan within the same timeframe. Reference is also
made to the 1st (2006), 2nd (2009) and 3rd (2013) TNA synthesis reports of the UNFCCC. The use of
TNA as analytical tool should not be taken as a wholesale endorsement. It, however, represents an
appropriate mechanism for the analysis done in this chapter.
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Recipients’ Needs93 (Table 1)
Country

1st TNA

2nd TNA

Ghana

Mitigation: Energy efficient
lighting
using
compact
fluorescent
lamps
(CFL);
Industrial energy efficiency;
Landfill Methane Gas Recovery.

Adaptation:
Integrated x Provision of 100 run-off
Monitoring
and
Early
storage facilities (1 million
Warning System; Integrated
m3 each) for 100 rural
Nutrient
Management;
communities
community-based extension x Capacity building in post
agents.
construction support for
community managed water
systems
Mitigation: wind turbines x Desalination plant with
(utility scale); PV (˃ 1 MW);
production capacity of
EE Boilers
300m3/day, treating either
seawater
with
salinity
Adaptation: Desalination;
greater than 10,000ppm or
rainwater
harvesting;
brackish water with salinity
hydrological
model;
of 1000 – 10,000ppm.
upscaling local integrated x Simply designed roof top
pest
management
rainwater harvestor with
technologies;
micro
complete piping, 600 L
irrigation (gravity fed drip &
capacity
tanks
and
mini and micro sprinkler
absorption pit.
irrigation);
decentralized x Implement
hydrological
pest and disease diagnosis
model technology within 5
service; restoring coastal
years.
vegetation;
wetland
protection; dune restoration;
rock revetment

Mauritius Mitigation:
Demand
side
Management; bi-fuel vehicles
and traffic lights coordination;
landfills, treatment plans and
composting/recycling;
79

Adaptation:
Extension
of
irrigation facilities; adoption of
new agricultural techniques;
composting and trash blanketing;
setback distance enforcement,
coral reef protection artificial
growth; water recycling…

Project Ideas

93

Barriers
Economic and financial barriers;
inadequate technical capacity;
institutional barrier (lack of
community ownership; conflicting
sectoral policies)

Economic and financial (High cost
capital; inappropriate financial
incentives and disincentives);
legislations; lack of skilled
technical staff.

The information contained here are synopsis of the contents of TNAs, TAPs, project ideas and barriers submitted by Ghana, Mauritius and Kenya between
2003/2004 and 2012/2013. While an attempt is made to capture vital contents, the table is not a comprehensive representation of all the documents submitted by
the countries.
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Country
Kenya

1st TNA
Mitigation:
Power
plant
efficiency improvement; fuel
switching;
energy efficient
appliances; improved livestock
management; improved rice
cultivation; water recycling and
composting
Adaptation: Human capacity
development and advanced
technologies
in
Global
Atmosphere and Carbon Cycle
Observation;

80

2nd TNA
Project Ideas
Mitigation: Solar Home x Diffuse 165,000 SHS units
Systems (SHS) and Solar
by 2017; target 83,000
Dryers; Methane capture
households annually in 24
from bio-digesters and waste
counties; reach 332,000
paper recycling.
households by 2018 and
provide access to 1.5 million
Adaptation:
drought
households by 2030.
resistant sorghum; drip x At least 120,000 households
irrigation; hay preservation;
should have access to biogas
roof rain water harvesting;
by 2030.
surface
runoff
water x Introduction of 10,000
harvesting;
and
solar
surface
runoff
water
powered desalination.
harvesting systems, 50,000
roof rainwater harvesting
units and 500,000 drip
irrigation for agriculture and
household use.
x Introduction of drought
tolerant sorghum varieties to
100,000 farmers in 10
selected Arid and Semi Arid
Land (ASAL) counties by
2017.

Barriers
Economic and financial (high
initial investment; lack of
subsidies; high interest rates);
inadequate
information
and
awareness; lack of research and
development; weak regulatory
framework; inadequate skilled
personnel;
inadequate
legal
framework; lack of market links.

Sources’ Initiatives (Table 2)
Source
EU

1st NC
2nd NC
3rd NC
x The Regional solar programme (phase x Development support for generating x Chololo Eco-Village (Integrated Approach
II) (drinking water systems) – Sahelian
biomass from household waste – Rwanda
to Adaptation and Resilience) – Tanzania.
countries
x Community-based Natural Resource x Improving livelihoods and food security in
rural Uganda
x Capacity Building of Developing
Management Enterprise Support NGOs to implement Principle 10 –
Namibia
80

USA
81

Japan

Cameroon, Malawi, South Africa,
Uganda, Zimbabwe
x Framework
for
designing
afforestation,
reforestation
and
revegetation projects in the CDM –
Kenya, Uganda
x Clean Air Initiative – Sub-Saharan
Africa
x Tropical forests and climate change
adaptation (criteria and indicators) –
Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana

x Village Tree Enterprise Project – West x Mainstreaming of climate change into
Africa
national systems and policies –
Mozambique
x Mobilization and reinforcement of the
capacity of SMEs involved in forest
related products – Central Africa
x Installation of a steam engine powered
generation set at Charter Sawmill –
Zimbabwe
x Hydro, Biopower projects - Ethiopia
x The Regional Solar Programme –
Sahelian countries

x Famine Early Warning System
Network (assessment of vulnerability
to food insecurity) – Kenya, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
x Methane recovery and use as a clean
energy source (framework for
encouraging investment in carbon
capture) - Nigeria
x Group training course to develop
National Inventories and Strategies
against Climate Change – Senegal,
Cote d’Ivoire and Sao Tome and
Principe

x Establishment of SERVIR (a regional x Increased capacity to utilize geospatial
visualization and monitoring system)
information – East Africa.
regional operational facility for East x Famine Early Warning System Network
Africa – Kenya
(assessment of vulnerability to food
x Construction of Coalbed Methane power
insecurity) – West, East and South African
plant – Botswana
countries.
x Geothermal Power Generation - Ethiopia x Forest carbon monitoring and measurement
– Gabon, Congo.
x Community-based
flood
disaster x Desalination plan of groundwater – Tunisia
management to adapt in the Nyando River x System of measures against illegal logging
Basin – Kenya
of tropical forest – Togo
x Zafarana Wind Power Plant Project – x Promoting sustainable forest management
Egypt
– Africa
x Developing counter-measures against
landslide – Ethiopia
x Ground water development – Tanzania
x Strengthening capacity of electric power
pool – Eastern and Southern Africa.
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The following can be deduced from the above tables:
i. There is a marked difference between the technological needs of the recipient states surveyed
under TNA 1 and TNA 2. While the first emphasised demand side mitigation technologies, the
latter contains more supply side technologies.
ii. Recipient States’ technological needs primarily entailed community initiatives and/or simple
(local) technologies. With the exception of few African States, like South Africa, highlighted
needs were mostly ‘subsistent’ rather than ‘developmental’.
iii. Economic/financial and technical barriers were identified by all the recipient States.94
iv. Most of the proposed projects by surveyed recipients were decentralised and often village or
household based.
v. Water and agriculture were identified as the priority adaptation areas by the surveyed recipients.
vi. Most of the initiatives by source-States, focused on (soft) capacity building, as against transfer
of hardware technologies or technology development know-how.
vii. It is unclear in the national communications, whether the TNAs or proposed project ideas by
recipient States played any role in the project undertaken by source-States.
viii. Taking Kenya as an example, while all the surveyed source-States initiated transfer projects in
the country, only the need on geospatial observation and information seem to have been
responded to.
ix. While identifying lack of capacity as a barrier, none of the sampled recipients listed
collaborative research and development centres in their project ideas.
x. Despite their posturing at the international level, none of the sampled recipients identified patent
or IPRs as a barrier.
xi. Although source-States referenced collaborative R&D projects in Asian and Latin American
States, no such project was referred to in respect of the recipients sampled.
Two striking findings from the foregoing are: the prevalence of locally accessible technologies in
the project ideas of recipient-States and the non-identification of ‘patent’ as a barrier. There are
few likely reasons for the prevalent reference to locally accessible technologies. One is the TNA
process which is structured to guide recipient-States to prioritise sectors and technologies from a
pool.95 Sub-Saharan African States generally prioritise water and agricultural sectors, which reflect
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Same finding was made by the UNFCCC in its 1st, 2nd and 3rd synthesis reports. See SBSTA, “Synthesis Report on
Technology Needs Identified by Parties not Included in Annex I to the Convention” 24 th Sess., 18 – 26 May, 2006,
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/INF.1 at 24; SBSTA, “Second Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties not
Included in Annex I to the Convention” 30th Sess., 1 – 10 June 2009, FCCC/SBSTA/2009/INF.1 at 29; SBSTA, “
Third Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties not Included in Annex I to the Convention” 39 TH
Sess., 11 – 16 November 2013, FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.7 at 25
95

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Handbook for Conducting Technology Needs Assessment for
Climate Change” (2010).
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their immediate needs.96 The relevant technologies in respect of these sectors are largely available
in the recipient-States, whether by reason of traditional practices (e.g. rain water conservation) or
the commonality of the technology (e.g. water desalination). The main barrier faced by the States
is lack of financial resources to provide the available technologies to their citizenry. Consequently,
it is doubtful if the scenario described above constitutes ‘technology transfer’ in its strict sense.
International technology transfer essentially entails a home country, host country and transaction
component (transferred technology hitherto unavailable in the host State).97 At best, what happens
intra-State is technology diffusion.
The non-recognition of IPRs/patent as a transfer barrier is also tied to the foregoing analysis. Since
the technologies are largely available in-State, the issue of patent/IPRs as a barrier is unlikely. This
is however different for South Africa, which prioritised ESTs like solar power, clean coal
technologies, wind power, new crop species and cultivars, information technology, vulnerability
research, water efficiency technology and climate-sensitive building design.98 Thus, though
referencing the need for in-State capacity and “creation of an enabling environment and supporting
systems” as crucial, ‘intellectual property issues’ were ranked as a major barrier.99 South Africa,
in its TNA, noted that:
In brief, the position is that balanced partnership arrangements, in which the technology
needs are determined by the receiving partner, and where, if possible, the receiving
partner is involved over a long period of time in the co-development and local
adaptation of the technology, are preferable to donor-driven, hit-and-run, technology
dumping exercises … The acceptance of open-source solutions in architecture and
software development is one way of addressing IPR constraints. However, these and
other approaches do not fully remove the barrier. Critical mitigation and adaptation
technologies need to be treated as global public goods.100
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As well, it appears that the more sophisticated the technological needs, the higher the possibility
of patent and other market incidences constituting a barrier to transfer. This conclusion mirrors
John Barton’s finding that while basic approaches to solving ‘technological problems’ have long
been off-patent, improvements on or new features of such technologies are often patented. 101
Another essential point identified by South Africa is the need to co-develop technologies to aid
more effective transfer. This is a subject not contained in the previous TNAs surveyed. Again, this
can be attributed to the kind of technologies prioritised by recipient-States. Again, the preference
of source-States for training on ‘soft’ skills must be highlighted. It is argued that though such soft
skills are necessary, they cannot substitute ‘hard ware’ know-how transfer.
Since TNAs are a core part of the UNFCCC transfer system, an inquiry into UNFCCC post-TNA
process is relevant. Such an inquiry is more fitting for a separate research, but it is briefly
considered here. TNAs pre-existed Poznan, but they became more structured under the Poznan
regime. Poznan considers TNA as “a country-driven activity to assist in identifying and analyzing
priority technology needs for mitigating and adapting to climate change, particularly in developing
countries”.102 TNAs, amongst other instruments, provide the GEF with a pool of projects for which
it deploys its (limited) funding under what it calls ‘piloting priority technology projects’.103 The
priority technology component was designed to address the weak link between GEF’s prior
technology transfer projects and the TNAs/national communications of countries.104 In shortlisting
a project as priority, the GEF considers whether the country has been previously funded and the
project’s “multiple local and global benefits that contribute to private sector investment in, and
financing of, technology transfer in developing countries”. It appears that in identifying the projects
to fund, GEF organises a ‘call for proposals’ distinct from the TNA process.105 Further, GEF party
States are only eligible for only one project of between $1 - $3 million.106 These terms are
immensely limiting as to the kind and scope of projects for which recipient-States can receive
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support. Potentially, and as has been shown above, this post-TNA structure leaves a lot of TNAs
unattended.
3.5 A Review of Non-UNFCCC International Platforms for EST Transfer: Corporate
Entities and Non-Governmental Organizations.
So far, examples of State – State transfer initiatives have been reviewed through the lenses of direct
transfers by States or through specific UNFCCC programmes. Two other pathways are transfers
through corporate endeavours and NGOs. It has long been noted that corporate pathways – foreign
direct investment, commercial lending and equity investment – have become the most engaged
pathways of EST transfers.107 This finding has, at best, been anecdotal. This is because it is difficult
to track the level of technology transfer in the normal course of a company’s business.
Nevertheless, in analyzing the transition from official development assistance (ODA) to corporate
pathways as dominant tools of transfer, the IPCC identified three concerns:
First …, private sector investment has been very selective. While almost all countries
have benefited to some degree, a handful of countries (East Asia and Latin America)
have received most of the attention … Second, ODA is still important for those sectors
where private sector flows are comparatively low, like agriculture, forestry, human
health and coastal zone management … Third, private investment, most notably foreign
portfolio equity investment and commercial lending, is volatile. Many developing
countries have found to their distress that private investment can quickly dry up if
investors perceive more attractive – or less risky – opportunities elsewhere.108
About two decades after the above findings, little has changed. The preference of EST companies
for BASIC States, particularly China and India, is undisputed.109 The table below gives an idea of
this disparity between 2000 – 2006:110
Table 3 (Billions of USD.)
Region
Developing Asia
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and
Caribbean
Middle East and North
America
Sub-Saharan Africa

Total Capital Inflows
145.53
108.50
69.41

Total Equity Inflows
116.33
49.43
68.90

Total Debt Inflows
27.20
59.07
0.51

10.78

10.35

0.43

16.81

16.91

-0.3
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Clearly, in some ways, it is not farfetched to, attribute the low level of EST transfers to Africa to
the level of private investment, since such investment is the dominant pathway for technology
transfer. The second concern raised in the IPCC research is the prioritized needs of developing
States, most of which do not often attract investment. For example, it has been shown above that
African countries surveyed under the recipient – source review, prioritise water and agriculture
technologies. Even when African countries prioritise energy related technologies, like solar, the
need to adapt the technology to suit the unique terrain of such countries, vis-à-vis the financial
incapacity or market prospects of these countries, do not incentivize investment.111 The third valid
concern is that political instability and regulatory gaps in many African countries disincentivize
investment.
The foregoing concerns reaffirm one of the central hypotheses of this work, that is, the anomaly of
subjecting ESTs to the vagaries of the market place. It brings to the fore the dangers of a marketized
EST regime on (lower tier) developing States, particularly African countries. Due to demographic
and economic factors, these countries might never provide markets as attractive as China, India
and Brazil, and their political terrain might remain unstable, though the needs of their people
remain. The claim of TWAIL II that the ‘State’ should be considered as a distinct entity from its
‘people’,112 comes into play here. When the needs of the third world people, rather than the
economic and regulatory structures of the recipient-State become the chief driver of EST
‘investment’ decision, the level of investment in third world countries will rise. But the question
remains how such a need-driven investment model will yield returns for the investing company.
This subject will be considered more closely in chapter five through the formulation of a ‘normative
payment’ concept and adaptation of the social enterprise model.
Notwithstanding the above, corporate entities, have in the recent past, initiated non-marketoriented technology transfer stand-alone projects. Anna Davies appraised such transfer
initiatives.113 But given the notoriety of the subject of patent and EST transfer, the increasing
111
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inclination of corporate organisations towards a patent commons or patent pledges is worth
commenting on.114 A stand-out example of this is the eco-patent commons. A brain child of IBM,
eco-patent was launched in 2008.115 Before its demise in 2016, it had in its ranks, about eleven
multi-national companies116 which contributed about one hundred patents.117 The objectives of the
initiative included: providing an avenue through which environment-protective innovations and
solutions can be shared easily and lead to other innovation and the promotion of collaboration
between “businesses that pledge patents and potential users to foster further joint innovations”.118
As stated elsewhere, a patent pledging initiative, like eco-patent, while curtailing the offensive use
of pledged patents, stops short of “abandoning or contributing them to the public domain”.119
Importantly, participating companies are only expected to contribute patents that are not “central
to the firm’s commercial interests… or represent an essential source of business advantage”. 120
Inevitably, this resulted in the contribution of low quality patents by the companies.121 In
conducting a post-mortem of the eco-patent initiative, Contreras et al, found inter alia, that the
initiative failed to meet its technology transfer objective.122 They note that:
Another issue raised by several respondents was that the EcoPC sought to promote the
dissemination of green technologies through patents alone. Yet, complex technologies
often cannot be understood and implemented, especially by non-experts working in the
developing world, exclusively through patent disclosures… Some form of technology
assistance or transfer is generally required to enable local users to take advantage of
patented technologies, or even to realize that such technologies are available and
applicable to local problems.123
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The above finding has immense implications for the patent-barrier debate in the global EST transfer
discourse. As noted in chapter two, developed States had hitherto represented that since most
technologies are not patented in developing States, there is no supply-level barrier to the transfer
of such technologies. However, the above empirical finding has shown that this contention is not
accurate. The mere non-patenting of an invention in a developing State or the availability of such
technology in ‘the public space’ does not qualify as effective technology transfer. Complementing
the conclusion reached elsewhere in this chapter, the study by Contreras et al of the eco-patent
initiative found that “the EcoPC was conceived and implemented by the suppliers of technology
without consulting the demand side (potential users of those patents/technologies)”.124 Therefore,
whereas the eco-patent initiative might be said to meet the availability and affordability
requirements of an effective transfer project, it fails to meet the conditions of cooperation,
compatibility, and adaptability.
The involvement of not-for-profit organizations in the transfer of ESTs to Africa is worthy of
mention. For instance, Greenpeace (with UNEP) originally conceived the Solarchill project, and
the NGO “secured the initial $150,000 start-up funds for research and development”.125 Again,
Shell Foundation was established in 2002 “to increase the provision of energy to the poor through
the innovation and scale-up of decentralized energy solutions, such as solar lighting, biogas,
biomass gasification…”126 They seek to achieve this by supporting start-ups like Envirofit and
d.light.127 Collaborating with the U.N. Foundation, the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves was
established in 2010 to facilitate the distribution of clean stoves to one hundred million households
by 2020.128 According to Shell, their initiatives have benefited fifty-four million people, created
40,000 jobs and saved 8.2 million tonnes of carbon.129 With a presence in Sudan and Uganda,
Potential Energy is another example of a not-for-profit set-up with the mission to “improve access
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to efficient stoves to improve lives”.130 Its Berkeley-Darfur Stove, claimed to have been “designed
by engineers at Lawrence Berkeley National Lab using the knowledge and input of Local Darfuri
women”, 270,000 people hitherto exposed to toxic carbon monoxide are said to have been
impacted.131
While NGO led initiatives are diverse, they share some common features. First, projects generally
engage third world people directly. This is contrary to other transfer pathways which primarily
focus on an agency of government for the execution of centralized projects. This feature also speaks
to the kind of technologies dealt with by these NGOs, i.e., decentralized technologies like solar
panels and improved seedlings. This appears to be an apt approach, particularly for the sub-Saharan
Africa energy sector.132 Second, most projects are designed, and the technologies are manufactured
outside recipient States.133 Hence, these initiatives primarily entail the transfer of hardware. Third,
entities involved in such transfer projects are styled ‘social enterprises or entrepreneurship’.134
These ventures have been described as combining the “characteristics represented by Richard
Branson and Mother Teresa”, focusing “first and foremost on the social and/or ecological value
creation”.135 In all, affordability and limited availability (hardware) are the strengths of NGO-led
transfer initiatives. But the projects have inherent sustainability limitations. For example, while
provision of environment-friendly stoves at low cost is laudable, it is not sustainable in itself.
Sustainability of such a project can only be ensured if the capacity to reproduce and/or re-invent it
exists in the community and country. The eco-patent commons example instructs that even the
most well-intentioned and supported non-profit initiative can go extinct, as can NGO-led
initiatives. Taking the case of Potential Energy in Sudan as an example, Sudanese have only been
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trained on how to assemble the stoves. The survival of the initiative, in the event Potential Energy
ceases operation in Sudan, is doubtful.
3.6 South – South Technology Transfer: The Journey So Far
South – south transfer136 is not often discussed as an EST transfer pathway. However, with the
continued economic growth of the BASIC States, particularly, China and India, attention is being
increasingly paid to this genre of transfer. More so as these ‘southern’ States (China and India)
have become dominant in the EST industry. This is especially true for China which is said to now
have technology leadership in the hydropower, solar and wind energy industries.137 The question
to answer in this section is if there is any difference in the approach of (advanced) ‘southern’ States
to technology transfer, compared to their northern counterparts. This inquiry is important given
that States like China and India had previously been in the vanguard of the G77 clamour for a more
accessible and enabling EST transfer regime. Further, this inquiry flows directly from the argument
made in chapter one that rather than the term ‘third world’ being a geographic, economic or
historical descriptor, it should be a brand for an alternative agenda to a neo-liberally organised
international system. It was argued that, the decisive question on determining whether BASIC
States are ‘third world’ is if they have “kept faith with the alternative agenda of the South or (if
they) are reproducing and reinforcing the hegemonic and imperialistic agenda of the North”. As
will be seen from the few examples below, it appears emerging States have, so far, re-enacted
processes and structures they hitherto condemned.
In recent years, various research has been conducted into varying aspects of South – South
technology transfer.138 Their findings provide support for the above conclusion that there is no
136
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difference between south – south transfer and north – south transfer. First, like other transfer
pathways, Africa benefits the least from south-south transfer initiatives. Asia and Latin America
benefit the most from this.139 Second, identified barriers to the transfer of ‘northern’ technologies
are the same as the barriers to transfer in the south – south context. For example, TEC identifies
limited knowledge, lack or inadequate access to financial resources, inadequate legal and
regulatory frameworks, insufficient technical capacity and intellectual property concerns, as
barriers to south – south transfer.140 Third, ‘southern’ technologies are also extensively protected
by patents. For example, China led other countries in the registration of patents, trademarks,
industrial designs and utility models in 2015 and 2016.141 As noted elsewhere, “Chinese firms like
Trina, Yingli, JA Solar and Inter Solar hold a comparable number of key patents compared with
international competitors”.142 It is also recorded that Chinese firms hold about 95% of solar water
heater technologies worldwide.143
Further, following the same trend as the ‘north’, while R&D in ESTs are initially funded by the
southern States, they are subsequently commercialised through privatization. China, again,
exemplifies this through its solar water heater technology which was developed by scientists at
Tsinghua University through government funding, and was subsequently commercialized in
1998.144 Lastly, source southern countries, in most cases, transfer hardware technologies without
software and orgware. Urban gave the example of the Kamchay Dam project built by China in
Cambodia, noting that while capital goods and equipment were transferred, “there was very limited
evidence of the transfer of skills, know-how and expertise for operation and maintenance and for
developing domestic production or innovation”.145 It was further noted that the build, operate and
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transfer agreement put the transfer date of the dam at 2050, and training of Cambodians will only
occur in 2050.146
While only China’s engagement with other southern countries has been focused on in this analysis,
the above observations would well apply to other emerging developing States like India and
Brazil.147 This leads to the conclusion that there is no marked difference between North-led transfer
initiatives and South – South transfer. Rajagopal had suggested that:
It is not automatically the case that the rise of (BASIC) States would lead to progressive
or regressive international law …It is also not clear if (BASIC) countries behave
significantly differently towards weaker, smaller countries, compared to powerful
Northern States.148
The conclusion reached in respect of the EST transfer regime shows that BASIC States have not
behaved ‘significantly differently towards weaker, smaller countries’. The same market orientation
and capitalistic drive which motivates the Northern EST industry is the same for the emerging
southern EST industry. Chimni made this same assertion, noting that “the emerging economies no
longer pursue their traditional anti-imperialist policies … (they) are carrying out neoliberal
reforms”.149
3.7 Summary of Findings
This chapter has considered select examples under five different pathways through which EST
transfer occurs – the CDM, Poznan strategy, Corporate entities, not-for-profit organizations and
south – south cooperation. While the initiatives considered are by no means exhaustive,150 they
provide understanding of the dominant trends in the global EST transfer construct. One of the crosscutting themes in the pathways considered, apart from Poznan, is the absence of top-level (research,
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development and manufacturing) know-how transfer to African countries. Another is the
disconnect between initiatives and actual needs of these countries. Similar to the first finding, it
was found in a recent mapping of transfer initiatives that “relatively few programmes support
national networks and innovation systems in a significant manner”.151 The table below summarises
the above findings using the assessment metrics earlier developed.
Table 4
ENABLEMENT
Accessibility
Availability

CDM: Partial(hardware)
Poznan Strategy: Full
Corporate Initiatives: Partial
Not-for-profit: Partial
South-South: Partial

Sustainability
Compatibility

Accessibility

CDM: Partial or Nil
Poznan Strategy: Partial
Corporate Initiatives: Partial or Nil
Not-for-profit: Partial
South-South: Partial
Sustainability

Affordability CDM: Partial
Poznan Strategy: Partial
Corporate Initiatives: Nil
Not-for-profit: Full
South-South: Nil
Cooperation CDM: Partial
Poznan Strategy: Full
Corporate Initiatives: Nil
Not-for-profit: Partial
South-South: Partial

Adaptability

Maintenance

CDM: Partial or Nil
Poznan Strategy: Partial
Corporate Initiatives: Nil or Partial
Not-for-profit: Partial
South-South: Partial or Nil
CDM: Partial
Poznan Strategy: Partial
Corporate Initiatives: Partial
Not-for-profit: Partial
South-South: Partial

The summary assessment here draws from the specific examples considered in this chapter which,
admittedly, are limited. A more comprehensive study of initiatives is necessary for a more
authoritative conclusion on the various international EST transfer pathways. Tentatively, however,
while the Poznan Strategy appears to be the most ‘enabling’ transfer policy, corporate initiatives
rank the least. Overall, it can be concluded that, as this work postulated, a market-controlled EST
transfer regime is inappropriate, especially for African developing and least developed states.
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CHAPTER 4: THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM - PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES
The diverseness and complexity of the global EST transfer regime, as exemplified by the UNFCCC,
are evident from the foregoing chapters. Also evident, however, are the flaws of the regime. Some of
these flaws (already identified in chapters two and three) include: absence of coordination of the
various multilateral, country-led, private and not-for profit transfer initiatives; lopsided concentration
of initiatives; failure to transfer ‘actual’ technological know-how; absence of, or limited collaborative
research and development projects; dominance of one-off-projects as against sustained and
sustainable initiatives; non-implementation of Technology Need Assessments (TNAs); non-alignment
of transfer projects with the developmental needs of a recipient-State; and shortage of finance. In
initially conceiving of the technology mechanism, the G77 and China considered many of these
flaws.1
The technology mechanism, as endorsed in Article 10 of the Paris Agreement (PA), is a far-cry from
what was originally proposed by the G77 in 2008. However, it has been suggested elsewhere that it
marks an improvement from what was previously obtainable.2 But to what extent is the technology
mechanism different from previous technology transfer initiatives? To what extent has the present
structure reiterated past structures and/or flaws? What are the prospects of African States benefiting
more from the current structure than they did under the previous initiatives? These questions will be
considered in subsequent sections of this chapter, but the obvious must be noted prefatorily. The
technology mechanism (TM) is the first stand-alone wholesome institutional set-up for EST transfer
under the UNFCCC.3 Again, the characterization of the set-up as ‘technology mechanism’, as against
‘technology transfer mechanism’ by the G77, highlights a key inspiration for its original design. That
inspiration is the desire of the developing states to transit from being mere recipients of technologies
to collaborators in innovation.4 The objective of the proposed TM reads:
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An enhanced institutional mechanism will address all aspects of cooperation on technology
research, development, diffusion and transfer in accordance with Articles 4.1(c), 4.3, 4.5 and
other relevant articles of the Convention, in order to enable mitigation and adaptation under
the relevant paragraphs of decision 1/CP.13.5
This affirms the position taken in chapter three that the ultimate criterion through which any transfer
programme should be measured is how ‘enabling’ such a programme is. Although this objective was
neither reproduced in the 2010 Cancun Agreement through which the TM was established, nor in
Article 10 of the PA, it is contended that the objective of ‘enablement’ remains the key criterion for
the EST transfer regime. As argued in chapter two, regardless of Article 10 of the PA, Article 4(5) of
the Convention (which grounds the ‘enablement’ objective) remains a vital subsisting pillar on which
the present EST regime rests.6 In subsequent sections, Article 10 of the PA will be considered
critically, the essential components of the technology mechanism and framework will be reviewed,
and the intersect of the mechanism with affiliate mechanisms – capacity building and finance – will
be appraised. The chapter will conclude with a comparison of TM, CDM and the Poznan Strategy.
4.1 Understanding the Technology Mechanism and Framework
The TM was established in 2010 in Cancun. Five years later, the Technology Framework (TF) was
established to “provide overarching guidance to the work of the Technology Mechanism … in order
to support the implementation of the Agreement”.7 The Framework is to be elaborated upon by the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).8 As the process to elaborate is
still ongoing, the most current draft of the TF will be considered in this work.9 A line should, however,
be drawn between the TF and the pre-existing Technology Transfer Framework (TTF) which was
established at COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001.10 It is worth recalling that five themes were identified for
“meaningful and effective actions” under the TTF: TNAs; technology information; enabling
environments; capacity building; and mechanisms for technology transfer.11 It has been suggested that
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the TF “should add value to the TFF” and should “continue to act as a lighthouse to the” TM.12 This
represents that the TTF remains a stand-alone Framework. Perhaps, a better way to represent the status
of the TTF is to recognise it not as a ‘Framework’, but as part of the terms of reference of the
Technology Executive Committee (TEC).13 It is important to further clarify that the TF is not expected
to be another institution, but a ‘document’ providing ‘overarching guidance’ in the bid to implement
the TM.14 Both the mechanism and Framework (in draft) will be considered later in this work. It is,
however, imperative to consider carefully Article 10 of the Paris Agreement, through which the TM
was adopted, and the TF was created. More so as the PA provides perspective on how far the world
has come in respect to technology development and transfer, compared to the 1992 UNFCCC.
4.1.1 Article 10 of the Paris Agreement: A Critique
Without prejudice to the argument made in chapter two that applying the systematic integration
principle, both Article 4(5) of the Convention and Article 10 of the PA should be read together, it is
worth probing the implications of Article 10, particularly for African States, when read alone. Two
points are particularly worthy of highlight: the absence of clear designation of obligation and lack of
specificity on the source of funding. While the seeming breakaway from the traditional developeddeveloping State divide has been applauded in some quarters as positive,15 the underpinning rationale
is fundamentally flawed. One writer described the political atmosphere in which the TM qua PA
(article 10) was negotiated thus:
…industrialized countries, particularly the US, became wary of concessions in the
technology discussions which could adversely impact their competitiveness. These concerns,
in particular regarding China’s growing technological capacities and ‘indigenous innovation’
policies, cast a shadow over the global negotiations on the transfer of clean energy
technologies in the run up to Cancun.16
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Considering that only a handful of developing States can claim similar strong economic status like
China, India and Brazil and, consequently, that most developing States lack the ability to compete
with developed States and their already established companies, it is difficult to see the merit in the
argument of developed States.17 In a market-controlled global EST industry, it can hardly be argued
that the apprehension of developed States is unjustified. But it is improper to make this a basis for
complete abrogation of responsibilities. The point being made here should not be confused for being
oppositional to the more nuanced approach to differentiation pertaining to emission reduction
commitments under Articles 2(2) and 3 of the PA. On the contrary, the point is that with such
heightened responsibilities for developing states should come increased support. The failure to specify
such support in Article 10 hardly affirms this level of support. It is interesting to point out that although
there is no clear link between their responsibility vis-à-vis developed States’ obligation of
technological support like it was under the Convention, virtually all African States have proceeded to
premise their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) on effective technology support and
transfer.18 For instance, Egypt noted in its NDC “locally-appropriate technology transfer and financial
flows from industrialized countries (Annex 1 countries) to support carbon emission abatement
according to the UNFCCC principles, which acknowledges that developed countries should provide
required support to developing countries in this regard”.19 What this suggests is that although
developed states’ might have successfully avoided the explicit inclusion of the transfer commitment
in the Paris Agreement, African and other developing States presume the existence of such
responsibility.20 Article 10 of the PA regardless, it appears the UNFCCC EST transfer regime is in a
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state of flux. This is a confusing state where developed States construe themselves as having no
mandatory obligation to transfer, while developing States presume otherwise.
A direct corollary from the foregoing fluid situation is the lack of specificity of the source of funding
for technology transfer. Article 10(6) of the PA provides that “support, including financial support,
shall be provided to developing country parties for the implementation of this Article…” But by whom
and through what means will such provision be made? It is arguable that a joint reading of Article
10(6) with Article 9(1) of the PA answers this question. However, this, again, is doubtful. Article 9(1)
provides that “developed country parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country
parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations
under the Convention”. It has been suggested that with the qualifying phrase – “…in continuation of
their existing obligations…”, Article 9(1) does not create additional responsibilities for developed
States.21 More concretely, it can be assumed that the reference to ‘existing obligations’ means the
previously agreed ‘USD 100 billion per year by 2020’ agreed to by developed States at COP 15 in
2009.22 The ‘additional’ expectation set in paragraph 53 of Dec 1/CP.21 is for the COP to set “a new
collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year” prior to 2025. Unsurprisingly, the
agreement did not state whether developed states (as presently understood) or a broader category as
recognised in Article 9(2) will be responsible for this ‘new goal’. This might be the next frontier of
dispute between developed and developing States in the coming years.
In any case, it is doubtful if Article 9(1) can be read into Article 10(6). It should be noted that the
latter is pigeonholed to “…the implementation of this Article…” Hence, the financial support in
Article 10(6) is limited to technology transfer simpliciter, unlike the generic nature of Article 9(1).
While this distinction might have been insignificant in another context, it is consequential in the
climate change discourse. It is noteworthy that, traditionally, developed States do not consider the
financial mechanism as a ‘special purpose vehicle’ for technology transfer. This point was made
elsewhere thus:
…how technology transfer mechanisms under the UNFCCC ought to be funded is a matter
of continued disagreement. While developing countries generally argue for a stable funding
situation, preferably through a hard link between the UNFCCC’s FM … developed countries
have been resisting their calls for this. They feel that the GCF should be autonomous in
21
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spending its funds efficiently on those actions that the experts within the GCF feel will
generate most mitigation and adaptation benefits.23
However, grouping technology transfer alongside other initiatives competing for general funding from
the FM is inconsistent with the critical position occupied by ESTs in the climate change fight. The
point is that while there is provision for finance under Article 10, no one is obligated to provide such
funding. This should be contrasted with the original proposal by the G-77 for the establishment of a
Multilateral Climate Technology Fund (MCTF) to be financed by “assessed contributions from Annex
II parties”.24 This proposal was made further to the dissatisfaction of developing states with the
ineffectiveness of the FM doubling as the funding platform of the TM. As shown in chapter three,
lack of or inadequate finance has been identified consistently by developing States in their TNAs over
the years. There is, however, no marked difference under Article 10. As pointed out by Coninck and
Sagar in their analysis of Article 10, “more than anything, it will require providing adequate support
to developing countries to implement their plans for a climate-compatible future. Yet such support is
not being provided through the UNFCCC, either in financial terms or in terms of implementation
support”.25
The decapacitating implications of the foregoing two points is already being felt by the institutions
established under the TM – the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology
Centre and Network (CTCN). A 2017 independent review of the CTCN finds that:
…the voluntary-based funding model of the CTCN is not appropriate as it limits the
implementation and fulfilment of its mandate. A lack of funding was reported as putting at
risk the CTCN’s operations … The voluntary aspect of the funding model results in a lack of
predictability for the CTCN over the medium and even short term, thereby limiting its
capacity to plan ahead for the expected levels of activity”.26
More substantively, Article 10 introduces concepts that were previously not part of the Convention.
Article 10(1) refers to parties sharing “long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing
technology development and transfer”. In Article 10(4), the pursuit of ‘the long-term vision’ was made
the objective of the technology mechanism and framework. The vision is, however, less than clear
and inelegantly drafted. To be more coherent, the intervening phrase ‘on the importance’ needs to be
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expunged, leaving “long term vision of fully realizing technology development and transfer”. But this
is still unhelpful. Aside that the qualifier ‘long-term’ is non-descript, what is meant by ‘fully realizing
technology development and transfer’ is also vague.27 Also worth noting is the copious reference that
the draft technology framework makes to this vague ‘long-term vision’.28 Presumably, while ‘longterm’ speaks to ‘timeline’, full realization refers to ‘level’ of transfer. Clarifying both the level of
transfer aimed for and the timeline within which such should be done is crucial, firstly for
measurability, and secondly, as will be shown later, because of the connection between EST
development and transfer and the overall objective of the PA.
One way to interpret the phrase ‘long-term’ in Article 10 is to align its usage to the application of the
term elsewhere in the Agreement. Article 2(2)(a) puts the global average temperature aspiration at
“well below 2oC above pre-industrial levels” with further commitment to pursue a 1.5oC temperature
increase limit. Article 4(1) refers to these targets as ‘long-term temperature goal’, and further projects
that “the balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases” should be achieved “in the second half of this century”. Read together, these provisions speak
to both timeline (2050) and emission limit (1.5oC – 2oC). Since ESTs are, essentially, instrumental to
the attainment of Article 2(2)(a) within the timeline contained in Article 4(1), it is not farfetched to
argue that the provision ‘long term vision (of)…fully realizing technology development and transfer’
refers to the development and transfer of technology adequate to meet the 1.5oC – 2oC target before
2050.29
Support for the above argument can be gleaned from the EGTT strategy paper for the long-term
perspective beyond 2012 on technology development and transfer under the Convention.30 The
27
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Strategy Paper drew from the Stern Review, which was based on a technology-based analysis, and
concluded that for total GHG emission to be stabilised at 550 parts per million (ppm) (necessary to
keep the globe within the 1.5oC – 2oC range) by 2050, a total of $1 trillion, which equals to about “1
± 2½ % of annual GDP”, will be needed.

31

While technologies needed transcend mitigation

technologies – the focus of the Stern review, the EGTT’s reference to long-term technology transfer
vision in the context of 2050 emission reduction targets provides clarity to how the phrase ‘long term
vision … (of) fully realizing technology development and transfer’ can be reasonably interpreted. Put
together, ‘full realization of development and transfer’, in the context of Article 10(1), can be said to
have been attained when the long-term emission reduction target set in Article 2 of the Agreement is
achieved and the unmitigable effects of reaching that benchmark are addressed. This aspiration, while
lofty and measurable, should be considered a base target. Ultimately, ‘full realization of development
and transfer’ should be determined by an accessible and affordable global EST regime, where all
States, particularly least developed countries, have access to ESTs necessary for their sustainable
development and to facilitate their response to the adverse impacts of climate change.
Another point worth highlighting in Article 10 is the recognition of “cooperative approaches to
research and development, and facilitating access to technology, in particular for early stages of the
technology cycle, to developing country parties”.32 While it will be incorrect to classify this provision
as novel since Chapter 34 of Agenda 21 admonished collaborative R&D, 33 this provision represents
the first time such is stated in a binding MEA. Noticeably, specific reference was made to the ‘early
stages of the technology cycle’. Such transfer has the prospects of involving developing states at the
early stages of EST innovation, improving their technological capacities and their ability to develop
locally relevant technologies. However, Article 10(5) is, at best, admonitory and non-mandatory. It
imposes no obligation.34 In effect, it is unclear if it is substantially different from the non-binding
provisions of Chapter 34 of Agenda 21 which, arguably, contains more progressive provisions than
Article 10. But the point must also be made that although it is desirable for parties to couch obligations
in a manner that attests to their readiness to be bound, an agreement framed to be binding does not, in
31
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itself, assure implementation. Article 4(5) of the UNFCCC, which is mandatorily couched but barely
given effect to, evidences this.
Importantly, Article 10(6) of the Agreement, inter alia, provides that “the global stocktake … shall
take into account available information on efforts related to support on technology development and
transfer for developing country parties”. No doubt, as hinted in chapter three, the unavailability of
detailed account of transferred technology makes it difficult to measure technology transfer initiatives
and ascertain claims of transfers. But this is not for want of provisions mandating such report. The
problem has more to do with the compliance of States.35 For example, of the national communications
considered in chapter three (United States, European Union and Japan), virtually none of them
contained all the components required by the UNFCCC Guidelines on reporting. 36 Again, as already
being displayed in the ongoing negotiation on the periodic assessment of the TF, developed States
prefer appraisal at the level of input indicators (i.e. transfer projects they claim to have embarked on),
rather than the actual on-the field results of such projects.37 However, if properly implemented, it is
expected that the transparency framework and compliance mechanism under articles 13 and 15 of the
PA, has the potential of correcting some of the flaws identified above. Further, it is anticipated that as
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) develops the modalities for the global
stock take, the inadequacies of the previous set-up under the Convention will be addressed.
In all, while Article 10 of the Paris Agreement has an appearance of being a break from the status
quo, it does not appear to have made any substantial addition to the climate regime on technology
development and transfer. Article 10 is a drawback from the more compelling (though not perfect)
provision of Article 4(5) of the Convention. Hence, it is reiterated that Article 10 of the PA must not
be seen or taken as a substitute for Article 4(5) of the UNFCCC. At the very least, both provisions
should be read and applied together. Nevertheless, whether read alone or together, the institutional
arrangement for technology development and transfer under the climate regime remains the TM. It is
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therefore necessary to look closer at the constitution and workings of the TM and the ongoing attempt
to generate a framework to serve as its ‘overarching guide’. It is to this I now turn.
4.2 The Technology Mechanism and Framework: Institutions and Components
In the earlier parts of this thesis, various institutional arrangements for EST transfer under the
UNFCCC were considered. These arrangements were, however, mostly ad-hoc. Considering that the
EGTT anchored the technology transfer agenda of the UNFCCC prior to the establishment of the
technology mechanism, a comparison of its make-up and the constituents of the TM could be helpful
to better appreciate whether the TM, in truth, heralds a new phase in the UNFCCC transfer regime. It
should be recalled that one of the hypotheses of this work (discussed in chapter two) is that the
UNFCCC technology regime has essentially recycled the same institutional and operational designs
from over the years. This, in part, accounts for the absence of substantial progress. Before this
comparison, however, the institutional arrangements, successes and challenges of TEC and CTCN,
which were established to “facilitate the effective implementation of the technology mechanism,
under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties”,38 are considered in the succeeding sub-sections.
In the meantime, it bears recalling that the TM was established in 2010, but the TEC became
operational in 2011, while the CTCN did not come onstream until 2013.39 The reviews below cover
TEC’s operations between 2011 – 2017 and CTCN’s operation between 2013 – 2017.
It is also noteworthy that the COP emphasised support for “action on mitigation and adaptation in
order to achieve the full implementation of the Convention”. This is the objective of the enhanced
action on technology development and transfer.40 It is unclear if the “enhanced action” refers to the
TM, such that the stated objective can be deemed the objective of the mechanism. The objective,
however, refers to “the full implementation of the Convention”. Its reference to the Convention is
understandable since its establishment predates the PA. But it can also be read as meaning the ‘full
implementation of the Paris Agreement’, since the Agreement is meant to enhance “the
implementation of the Convention”41 This view accords with the interpretation earlier given to Article
10(1) of the PA. In pursuit of the objective, the COP further stressed that “technology needs must be
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nationally determined, based on national circumstances and priorities”. 42 As shown in previous
chapters, the local determination of technological needs has been on the UNFCCC ‘radar’ since
1992.43 Despite this, the non-alignment of transfer initiatives with actual local needs, as demonstrated
in chapter three, has been recurrent in the different transfer pathways. A closer look at the structural
arrangement of the TEC and the CTCN might provide clarity on whether this trend will recur under
the mechanism. Further, the development of endogenous capacities; deployment and diffusion of
ESTs and know-how; increased public and private investment; deployment of soft and hard
technologies; improved climate change observation systems; strengthening of national systems of
innovation; and development and implementation of technology plans, were identified as some of the
TM’s priority areas.44 Again, these are some of the areas identified in chapter 34 of Agenda 21. For
example, the TM completely leaves out recommendations on transfer of publicly owned ESTs and the
provision of incentives to stimulate companies to transfer ESTs.45
4.2.1 The Technology Executive Council
The TEC is popularly described as the policy arm of the TM. It “focuses on identifying policies that
can accelerate the development and transfer” of ESTs.46 This is, however, only part of its terms of
reference. While providing assistance on climate friendly policies is a key part of TEC’s mandate, it
also has the responsibilities of promoting collaborations between governments, the private sector, nonprofit organizations and academic and research communities; cooperate with other technology
initiatives, stakeholders and organizations, “and promote coherence and cooperation across
technology activities, including activities under and outside of the Convention”; and “catalyse the
development and use of technology road maps or action plans”.47 The mandate of the TEC (and
CTCN) was further enlarged in 2015 to include: technology research, development and demonstration,
and “the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies”. 48 This list
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borders more on implementation than policy making. As will be shown later, the CTCN has similar
responsibilities. To an extent, this raises questions on the necessity of a dual structured TM.
Importantly, TEC’s mandate to “promote coherence … across technology activities under and outside
the Convention” is commendable given the disarray and uncoordinated state of the current global EST
structure.
The TEC is comprised of twenty expert members elected by the COP, made up of nine Annex I parties,
three members apiece from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and
one member apiece from small island developing states and least developed countries. 49 Unlike the
EGTT, the TEC has no position for non-state parties.50 This seems inconsistent with the recognition
of the vital role played by private companies, NGOs and other multilateral bodies in EST transfer. It
appears more efficient to involve these non-state parties at the policy crafting stage, rather than merely
seeking their participation to enforce such policies. It should, however, be noted that a new inclusion,
as per the TEC, is the opening of TEC meetings to attendance by accredited observer organizations.51
It also allows the TEC to seek input from “intergovernmental and international organizations and the
private sector and may seek input from civil society”.52 While this is undoubtedly laudable, it falls
short of the level of participation that will give these non-state parties an actual stake in the decision
making process. More so, it is the prerogative of the TEC whether to allow the attendance of observers
or the participation of non-State parties. The point here is the likelihood that if non-state parties,
particularly private entities, are actively involved with the TEC in its policy works, it is more likely
that they will be more open to complying.53 There is, however, the risk that the involvement of private
entities, which are more interested in profit-making, might be antithetical to the interest and position
of developing States.
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Although it had its first meeting in 2011, the first two years of the TEC’s existence were focused on
operationalization of the committee. In 2012, among other initiatives, the TEC published its modalities
on linkages with other EST institutions and rolling workplan for 2012 - 2013.54 The preference for a
‘rolling workplan’ is to “allow for flexibility and adjustments in response to guidance from the
COP”.55 With the exception of relatively new issues like south-south and triangular cooperation and
loss and damage which were referenced in its 2016 and 2017 reports to the COP,56 the TEC’s activities
in the past years focused on organization of workshops, collaborative meetings and publication of
briefs on issues bordering on TNAs, climate finance and national systems of innovation (NSI). In
detailing its ‘performance activities’ in 2017, the TEC referred to the number of users and views of
the TT:CLEAR (online) platform; its social media presence; stakeholders engaged in its events;
countries receiving TNA assistance and number of publications.57
What is apparent from TEC’s list of achievement is that they are input-based (i.e., they deal with
transfer initiatives and projects as designed and/or implemented). None of these indicate the actual
impact in target countries. It is also difficult to appraise which countries benefited from TEC’s
advisories and programmes, as none of its reports to the COP contains this information. Again, TEC’s
workshops and publications are largely on generic subjects, with the implication of non-consideration
of regional and national distinctness.58 The relevance of local realities in policy formation can hardly
be overemphasised. While it may be near impossible to conduct a state-by-state analysis of technology
policy needs, there are cross-cutting themes and common realities in African countries that could
validly inform region specific reviews. As it stands, it can be fairly concluded that the TEC’s activities
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are too general to be effective for States that need its (supposed) policy-making ‘expertise’ the most.
Again, notably missing from TEC’s collaborative attempts is the involvement of the private sector.
While collaboration has been referenced in all its reports since 2011, they have been in relation to
UNFCCC bodies (CTCN, GEF, GCF, etc.) and a handful of multilateral institutions and NGOs. In
none of the reports was an active engagement of the private sector referenced.
Again, although the provision of coherence in EST RD&D initiative is one of its mandates, there is
nothing to indicate TEC’s progress in this aspect. As the lopsidedness of transfer initiatives to the
detriment of African States will show, a coherent structure for transfer initiatives is crucial. This has
the potential to provide a map of where initiatives are being implemented and where they are lacking.
With such a map, State and non-State parties can work together to effectively and efficiently deploy
transfer programmes.
After about six years of operation, the TEC, for the first time in 2017, reported its challenges to the
COP. Some of these include the above identified flaws. It noted, in part, that it “recognises that a key
challenge it faces is how to monitor and evaluate the impacts of its work”, and that “a key challenge
remains in reaching out effectively to its target audiences, including policymakers, the private sector
and international organizations”.59 As hinted above, the TEC’s challenges are more deeply rooted than
it has identified. It is important that its fairly long list of activities is not mistaken for actual impact.
Despite its self-confessed shortcomings, it is unclear why the independent review conducted in 2017
was limited to the CTCN.
It is worth recalling that, at the very least, the standard through which TEC’s performance must be
measured is whether it is fulfilling its mandate of “enhancing the implementation of Article 4
paragraph 5 of the Convention” and, by extension, Article 10 of the PA.60 With TEC’s current
modalities, it is difficult to answer this question in the positive. More so as it has no database showing
how its initiatives have improved the policy making capacity of target countries.
4.2.2 The Climate Technology Centre and Network
The CTCN was established to “facilitate a network of national, regional, sectoral and international
technology networks, organizations and initiatives with a view to engaging the participants of the
Network effectively” to, at the request of developing States, provide support in identifying support
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needs, facilitate the provision of information, training and support for capacity building programmes
to “make technology choices and operate, maintain and adapt technology”, and to facilitate prompt
deployment of existing technology.61 Another key function of the CTCN is the facilitation and
stimulation of the development and transfer of “existing and emerging” ESTs through collaboration
with the “private sector, public institutions, academia and research institutions”.62 It is also established
to provide in-country technical assistance and training, stimulate “the establishment of twinning centre
arrangements to promote North-South, South-South and triangular partnerships” to encourage
collaborative R&D, and help with the design of analytical tools and best practices for the
dissemination of ESTs.63 In a way, save for the non-reference of facilitation of transfer of publicly
owned technologies, the CTCN’s terms of reference are the closest the UNFCCC has come to the
Agenda 21 standard. In its design, the CTCN substantially responds to developing States’ previous
complaints about the non-implementational role played by previous arrangements, particularly, the
EGTT. However, beyond the terms of reference are the actual operations of the CTCN.
The CTCN is made up of a centre (CTC) and a network of organizations through which it provides
technical assistance.64 The centre is hosted by United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in
partnership with United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) with experts drawn
from eleven consortium partners making up a technical resource pool (TRP).65 The CTCN is
accountable to the COP through an Advisory Board.66 Importantly, the CTCN operates on the request
of developing States. Developing States are expected to make their requests through National
Designated Entities (NDEs).67 By its five year (2013 - 2017) rolling plan released in 2013, the CTCN
projects, by 2017, to have facilitated the investment of $0.6 billion in ESTs, assisted with 50 – 75
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national and sectoral technology plans, and facilitated 100 new country-driven technology projects.68
To achieve this target, the Centre identifies the following as success factors: sufficient long-term
funding for the CTCN, sufficient demand for CTCN’s services, ability of NDEs to carry out their
functions and cooperation within the CTCN.69 The process of the centre entails: a request to the centre;
determination whether the request is consistent with (prioritization) criteria approved by the Board;70
determination of whether request can be handled by the CTC staff or requires elaborate support
through a ‘quick support’ by the TRP or ‘larger response’ by a network member. 71 After response is
delivered, a review of the assistance and its impacts is conducted and analysis and sharing of the
experience is done and communicated through the Knowledge Management System (KMS).72
The consideration of the CTCN’s organization and operation bring to the fore the comprehensiveness
and complexity of its set-up. While the establishment of the CTCN is laudable, there are a few
downsides. One is that the sophistication of the organization could potentially discourage LDCs, most
of which are in Africa. The prioritization criteria also, aside from being unclear whether they are to
be taken conjunctively or disjunctively, might also potentially either discourage LDCs (and many
developing States) or make their proposals ineligible for support, or eligible but unprioritized. For
example, some of the criteria are that the project must demonstrate ‘project readiness’ and potential
for replication or scaling up, promote multi-country approach and leverage public and/or private
financing.73 While ‘Project readiness’ is undefined, it is not unlikely that prioritized projects for some
States are not considered priorities in other States, and LDCs are not financially viable to leverage
public funds or attract private financing.
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Between 2014 and September 2017, the requests for technical assistance to the CTCN skyrocketed
from 24 to 190.74 Eighty-three of these requests were from African countries.75 However, of the 190
requests, 24 were successfully completed, 48 were under implementation, 31 were being designed.76
These leaves about 87 projects under review or inactive. However, the distribution of successfully
completed or projects under implementation is unknown; the CTCN has not included the information
in its report to the COP. The technology transfer impact of its initiatives is also unclear from the report.
Nevertheless, considering its financial limitations, the CTCN’s performance, thus far, is generally
commendable.
If ‘enablement’ of developing States is the key performance criterion for transfer initiatives, as argued
in this work, the CTCN institutional and operational structure is questionable. It is worth recalling that
both by its original mandate and COP 21’s reiteration, collaborative RD & D and “the development
and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies”, are key responsibilities of the CTCN.
The current set-up, however, emphasises a project-by-project implementation approach. Neither in its
programmes of work or its reports to the COP, did the CTCN refer to any actual or proposed
collaborative RD & D initiative. This, again, reflects in the CTCN’s Network concept. As designed,
network members are existing organizations with “demonstrated capability in initiatives aimed at
development, transfer and deployment of climate technologies applicable for developing countries”.77
Clearly, while such an arrangement favours developed States with private and public institutions that
have the required competencies, it disfavours developing States, particularly in Africa, with limited
technical capacities. It is, therefore, not surprising that of the 425 network members, only 38 are in
Africa. The CTCN noted this imbalance in its 2015 report to the COP, but it concluded by stating that
“…the reach of the Network in Africa was comparable with other regions since many institutions,
although not based in Africa, were providing their services to African countries”. 78 This conclusion
misses the mark. Ultimately, the technology mechanism is not about provision of project-level
services but enabling States to provide their own solutions. It is interesting that the CTCN’s Network
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is dominated by private sector organizations.79 While the involvement of private entities is positive,
the risk of the over-commercialization of CTCN’s services is not farfetched.80 As noted in the CTCN’s
independent review, “some Network members are dissatisfied with the commercial opportunities and
networking activities provided by the CTCN. During the review, several interviewees questioned the
sustainability of and value added by the Network if its level of engagement is not increased”.81
Whether the TEC and CTCN should not be just one body under the TM is a question that has not been
answered. From the foregoing appraisal, the need for this institutional split is doubtful. The CTCN
appears to do all that the TEC does, and more. For example, both bodies are involved in TNAs and in
providing support for policy making. Invariably, this raises the possibility of initiative duplication. An
example is the TT:CLEAR platform run by the TEC, and the Knowledge Management System run by
the CTCN which, like the TT:CLEAR “disseminates and captures information on technologies and
best practices”.82 It should be recalled that when initially proposed, the G77 conceived of a TM made
up of two bodies – the Executive Body on Technology (ECB) and the Multilateral Climate Technology
Fund (MCTF).83 The ECB would have, to some extent, played the joint role being played by the TEC
and CTCN.84
While the TEC clearly imitates the EGTT, there are clear structural and operational distinctions
between the EGTT and the CTCN. When considered from the perspective of how enabling both the
EGTT and CTCN are, however, there seems to not be much difference between them.
4.2.3 The Technology Framework
As noted earlier, the TF emanates directly from the Paris Agreement, and it is expected to provide
“overarching guidance” to the TM.85. In 2017, the SBSTA agreed that the guiding principles of the
TF are “coherence, inclusiveness, result-oriented approach, transformational approach and
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transparency”.86 It had previously agreed that innovation; implementation; enabling environments and
capacity-building; collaboration and stakeholder engagement; and support, should be the framework’s
key themes.87 Principles worthy of highlight are result oriented and transformational approaches, and
the thematic areas of innovation and implementation. These are consistent with the ‘enablement’
concept advanced in chapter three of this work. The initial draft of the TF considers the result-oriented
approach “in terms of output, outcome and impact”.88 Implementation was also described by the
Framework’s co-facilitators as meaning “to carry out work on the ground, helping economic growth,
and sustainable energy pathway, not focusing on barriers, capacity building etc.”89 It is worth noting
that the draft TF does not contain this far-reaching definition of ‘implementation’.90 Given that
successive transfer pathways have been more input oriented, and that preceding programmes had
emphasised barriers and capacity building with little effect, the exclusion of this understanding of
‘implementation’ from the Framework is a potential drawback, and only rehashes recurrent trends.
It is unclear what would be the status of the TF vis-à-vis the original mandates of the TEC and CTCN
and their current operating modalities. This is more so as the thematic areas focused on by both bodies
are not same as the focal themes in the TF.91 To give effect to the proposed TF’s thematic areas, the
organizational and operational structure of both the TEC and CTCN must necessarily be altered. For
instance, it was argued above that the current CTCN arrangement, while effective in conceiving and
implementing one-off projects, is not designed to facilitate collaborative RD&D and actual
‘enablement’ of developing States. A likely resolution of any conflict between the initial mandates of
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the TEC and CTCN, and the provisions of the TF, will likely be in favour of the latter. This position
seems supported by the use of the term ‘overarching guidance’ in Article 10(4) of the PA.92
It is also important to note the TF’s requirement that TNAs should be aligned to NDCs and national
adaptation plans (NAPs) “to ensure coherence between the implementation of these national plans and
strategies to achieve climate-resilient and low-emission development”. In what appears to be a first
since Agenda 21, the TF, under the enabling environment theme, recognises the need to enable access
to ESTs in the private sector through incentives to technology providers.93 But unlike Agenda 21,
there is no specific mention of the party responsible for the provision of such incentives.94
Further, in expounding on Article 10(6) of the PA, the draft TF notes that “the understanding of
support under this key theme (support) is broader than just financial support, as it may include all
aspects of support to implement Article 10 of the Paris Agreement”.95 Such support is expected to be
“new and additional, adequate and predictable in a transparent manner and provided (sic) for all the
key themes of (the) framework, taking into account national circumstances, gender perspective and
endogenous and indigenous aspects”.96 While the requirement for ‘predictable’ support is, possibly, a
response to the CTCN’s complaint on lack of predictable source of funding, the terms ‘new, additional
and adequate’ are not defined. Particularly, the concept of ‘adequate’ support is devoid of meaning,
except if read in the context in which Article 10(1) has been interpreted above.
Despite the valid point made in the TF that support transcends ‘financial support’, funding still
represents the most essential form of support needed for the success of the TM. Developing States
have, therefore, unsuccessfully clamoured for a hard link between the TM and FM over time. For
instance, India, in its submission to the SBSTA on the TF, contended that “access (IPR) and
affordability (finance) are the two key issues limiting transfer of technology … addressing the access
and affordability challenge requires establishment of a strong linkage between the financial
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mechanism and technology mechanism”.97 While the draft TF referred to the “enhancement of the
linkages” between the TM and FM, it gave no direction on how this knotty issue can be resolved.
In all, while the draft TF still has several weak points, it will, no doubt, make up for some of the gaps
in the TM. If properly effected, the TF has the prospect of making the TM more ‘enabling’.
4.3 Capacity Building and Technology Transfer under the Paris Agreement
In chapter two, the argument was made that the EST transfer regime has false structural baselines,
which attest to the normative falsities of will and motive. One of the examples of these false baselines
are the division and duplication of functions under the climate regime. Worse still, the divided bodies
often operate in silos. The different operational structures for capacity building and technology
transfer under the Paris Agreement further evidences this. Under the Agreement, capacity building is
separately provided in Article 11. According to the PA, “capacity building under the Agreement
should enhance the capacity and ability of developing country parties … to take effective climate
change actions, including, inter alia, to implement adaptation and mitigation actions, and should
facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment…”.98 The difference between
Article 10 (technology transfer) and Article 11 (capacity building) are, at best, superficial. In intent
and purpose, they are the same. Strangely, they were negotiated by different negotiating groups at the
Paris Conference. It should, however, be recalled that although the separate handling of capacity
building precedes the PA,99 it was considered jointly with technology transfer under the
Convention.100
Though two bodies were created under the TM – the TEC and CTCN - COP 21 established a new
body, the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB) to “address gaps and needs, both current
and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing country parties and further enhancing
capacity-building efforts”.101 It should also be pointed out that the PA further provided separately for
‘education, training, public awareness, participation and access to information’ under Article 12,
although without an explicit institutional arrangement. As noted elsewhere, parties had not agreed on
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the need for a separate institutional arrangement for capacity-building; in fact, some preferred that it
be carried out under the existing institutional arrangements.102 The PCCB was proposed by the African
Group (AG) in 2014 arguing that capacity building is “cross-cutting in nature, as such requires a more
coordinated approach with a view of strengthening both the ability and effectiveness of specific
adaptation and mitigation actions”.103 One possible explanation for insistence on a separate
institutional arrangement is the disillusionment of the AG (and G77) with the watering down of the
proposed TM. Another explanation is the expressed need for the early and heightened capacity
development the developing States seek before the operational phase of the PA in 2020, so that
“capacity gaps … do not become a barrier”.104 It is, however, doubtful if the PCCB is fulfilling this
mandate, or if it is even positioned to do so. In its 2017 report to the SBI, the Committee pointed out
that “the challenge is that the PCCB is not in a position to work at the country level and is therefore
limited to desk-based work”.105 This, again, exposes a recurrent trend in the climate regime,
particularly in North – South engagement; concessions to South-proposed initiatives by the North are
not, in themselves, proof of support.
At the core of the concept of technology transfer is capacity-building. When technology transfer is
appreciated as a blend of hardware, software and orgware, its sameness as capacity-building becomes
evident.106 A cursory review of the operations of both the TEC and the CTCN shows that they are
capacity-building driven. Particularly, there is virtually no difference between the operations of the
PCCB and that of the TEC. Apart from the duplicative implication of this split, is the inefficient
application of limited funds.
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4.4 The Technology and Financial Mechanisms
A common denominator in the various phases and programmes of the UNFCCC EST development
and transfer regime is the challenge of adequate funding. It was for this reason that the G77 proposed
the establishment of the MCTF as part of the TM. This proposal was, however, not conceded by
developed States. Neither was the proposal for a hard link between the TM and the financial
mechanism (FM) welcomed.107 Despite the absence of this link, the GEF indicates that it has a
“mandate with significant guidance from the COP related to financing the transfer of ESTs in the
context of both mitigation and adaptation”.108
Although not established as a technology transfer specific fund, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was
established at Cancun in 2010 (same year as the TM) as an operating entity of the FM.109 The GCF
was established to “support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country
Parties using thematic funding windows”.110 Considering the several entities under the FM, with each
having a direct or indirect EST development and transfer implication, the refusal of developed states
to agree to a new entity is explicable. However, the failure to agree to a ‘hard link’ between the TM
and FM is inexplicable. While the phrase ‘hard link’ is not defined, it can be construed as a formal
and long-term allocation of a proportion of the resources available to the various operating
mechanisms of the FM for the purpose of technology RD & D, transfer and diffusion in developing
States.111 As the Poznan strategy instructs, the link has both institutional and functional dimensions.
This is further considered in chapter five.
The multiple entities under the FM and the creation of the GCF regardless, the need for a hard link
between the FM and TM remains. The 2017 independent review of the CTCN evidences this. The
report notes:
Financial resources provided by the GEF for CTCN operations have been based on ad hoc
projects rather than sustained funding and therefore rather limited (USD 1.8 million). The
GEF has developed and finances a network of regional climate technology centres hosted by
MDBs … and provide similar services … the majority of interviewees indicated that the
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voluntary-based funding model of the CTCN is not appropriate as it limits the
implementation and fulfilment of its mandate. A lack of funding was reported as putting at
risk the CTCN’s operations … The voluntary aspect of the funding model results in a lack of
predictability for the CTCN over the medium and even short term, thereby limiting its
capacity to plan ahead for the expected levels of activity.112
The Poznan Strategy, and the relative success it has recorded in facilitating technology transfer, proves
how essential a hard link between the TM and FM is. Arguably, the achievement of Poznan is partly
attributable to the location of the programme within the FM. The TEC has, since inception, made the
attempt to re-enact a Poznan-like connection between technology planning and finance.
At COP 18, it was agreed that the linkage between the TM and FM would be elaborated on at COP
20 in 2014.113 At COP 20, the TEC submitted a paper on the subject of the linkage between the TM
and FM.114 Here, the TEC recommended different ways it can make inputs into the decision-making
process of the FM’s operating entities and vice versa.115 In part, the TEC suggested that the operating
entities of both mechanisms participate in the meetings, workshops and events of respective bodies;116
that the TEC evaluate the Poznan Strategic Programme “with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness
of the Technology Mechanism”;117 that it provides “policy advice on measures to create enabling
environments for technology development and transfer in developing countries and an analysis of the
barriers that hamper project/programme implementation”.118 The TEC’s recommendations were
reflected in the provisions considered to be included in the PA. For example, the option below was
considered:
The Technology Mechanism shall enhance cooperation and synergy with other institutional
arrangements under and outside the Convention and stakeholders, as well as the coherence
and effectiveness of technology action and initiatives under the Convention:
x Establish linkages between the Technology Mechanism, the Financial Mechanism and
capacity-building institutions;
x The Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer to be linked to and/or guided by
the Technology Mechanism…119
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None of the above, however, made it into the Paris Agreement. The only reference to the FM in Article
10 is to support collaborative approaches to research and development. At COP 21, however, a
decision recognising “the importance of and the need of defined, mutually beneficial and functional
linkages between the technology mechanism and the financial mechanism” and inviting the Board of
the GCF to “consider ways to provide support … for facilitating access to environmentally sound
technologies, and for undertaking collaborative research and development” was agreed to by
parties.120 At COP 23, some of the strides made in respect of the proposed link were highlighted,
including the annual meetings between the GCF, TEC, CTCN and other constituted bodies under the
Convention, and the invitation of the chairs of the TEC and Advisory Board of the CTCN to a meeting
of the Board of the GCF “on issues of common interest in order to strengthen the existing linkages
between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism”.121 In specific reference to the
CTCN, its “increased engagement” with the GCF by utilizing the GCF’s Readiness and Preparatory
Support Programme and the Project Preparation Facility”, was noted.122
While progress has been made in aligning the operations of the TM and FM, the initiatives taken have
fallen short of the hard link needed between both mechanisms. The initiatives are not only ad hoc but,
as in the case of the CTCN, the core issues in respect of finance are unresolved. The CTCN’s core
need, according to its 2017 independent review, for instance, is a predictable and properly structured
mode of funding which will allow for medium- and long-term planning.
Another matter to highlight is the seeming duplication of functions between the operating entities of
both the TM and FM. A pointed example of this is the still subsisting Poznan Strategy under the GEF.
Although it was proposed in 2014 that Poznan should be linked to the TM, the proposal failed. As a
result, TNAs are conducted under the auspices of both the GEF, TEC and the CTCN. Again, while
the CTCN is a core component of the TM, Poznan has distinctly established Climate Technology
Centres and a Climate Technology Network.123 Further, while the CTCN operates at the national level
through National Designated Entities, the GCF has its own distinct National Designated Authorities
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121

Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, COP, 22nd Sess, Dec
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(NDAs) in party states. It should be noted that one of the functions of the NDAs is to design, develop
and propose projects to the GCF.124 Among other things, this leads to a situation where the NDE under
the CTCN set-up scopes for a ‘technology transfer’ project and proposes it to the CTCN, while the
NDAs also design ‘climate friendly’ projects and recommend them to the GCF. The difference,
however, is that NDA proposed projects are more likely to be implemented than NDE proposed
projects due to ‘proximity’ to funds, although the NDA projects will likely be without deliberate
technology transfer objectives.
The foregoing raises the question on whether a stand-alone TM was necessary, considering the relative
success of the Poznan model and its continued existence under the FM. It should be recalled, again,
that the 1992 Convention did not consider ‘finance’ and ‘technology transfer’ as two distinct
subjects.125 It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of a project financed by the UNFCCC which has no
technology transfer prospect, even if it is only in its most basic form (hard ware transfer). The point
here is that, it seems inefficient and ineffective to have a detached TM from the FM. While projects
can be specifically designed for the purposes of transferring technology, a more effective appreciation
of technology transfer is to engage it as a principle that underscores every project under the climate
regime. In other words, ‘wholesome’ technology transfer should be considered as a fundamental
objective for every project financed by the operating entities of the FM. Rather than proposing a standalone TM or accepting a TM without a financial component, developing States should have pressed
for the consolidation of Poznan into a technology development and transfer component or submechanism under the FM. Considering that the GCF is the key FM operating entity under the Paris
Agreement regime, a consolidated Poznan would have been more efficiently situated under the GCF.
By doing this, inefficient and ineffective proliferation of bodies under the UNFCCC would be done
away with, and a pragmatic and concerted technology development and transfer mechanism would
have been achieved. Again, as suggested in chapter three, an essential factor in allocating funds by
the FM for projects should be how ‘enabling’ such project is. Proposed projects should be approved
on how much they improve the capacity of the recipient State to further research, develop and adapt
technologies. This is a vital lesson from China’s engagement with EST multinational companies that
must be integrated into the FM funding processes.
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4.5 The Technology Mechanism, Clean Development Mechanism and Poznan Strategy: A
Comparison
Regardless of its defects and limited achievements, the TM (superficially) represents a marked
departure from the previous ad hoc arrangements under the UNFCCC. However, the question that
remains is whether the TM is more enabling than the transfer pathways considered in chapter three,
particularly the CDM and the Poznan Strategy. As no specific project under the TM arrangement has
been considered in this chapter, it is difficult to appraise the TM using the metrics employed in chapter
three. Nevertheless, it is reiterated that the ultimate objective of any technology transfer programme
must be to enable the recipient. The comparison attempted underneath is done with this ‘enablement’
objective in mind.
Table 5.
S/N

Technology Mechanism

1. Technology development and
transfer specific.

Poznan Strategy

CDM

Technology transfer specific.

Incidental technology transfer
objective.

2. Considerable market involvement. Minimum market involvement.
S/N

Technology Mechanism

Major market involvement.

Poznan Strategy

CDM

Relative connection between
technology
needs
and
implemented projects.
Relatively adequate funding.

Weak
connection
between
technology
needs
and
implemented projects.
Relatively adequate funding.

5. Relative connection between Strong connection between design
design and implementation.
and implementation.

Strong connection between
design and implementation.

6. Even distribution of projects.

Lopsided distribution of projects.

3. Strong
connection
between
recipient’s technology needs and
implemented projects.
4. Inadequate funding.

Lopsided distribution of projects.

7. Substantial involvement of local Partial involvement
entities.
entities.

of

local Low involvement
entities.

of

In conclusion, the TM introduces a different institutional construct than what has been experienced
under the UNFCCC. About eight years after the establishment of the mechanism and after over five
years of its full operationalization, however, trends experienced under preceding transfer initiatives
persist. Apart from the new institutional arrangement, in terms of implementation and results, the TM
is not substantially different from previous arrangements. From the above table, for instance, it is
obvious that there is no major difference between the TM and Poznan. If anything, although inhibited
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local

by finance, Poznan represents a more concerted approach than the TM. However, the proposed
Technology Framework under the PA, if endorsed and implemented by party States as currently
designed, has the potential to drive positive advancement in the UNFCCC EST development and
transfer regime.
Altogether, it is clear that the need of the global climate regime transcends merely establishing
mechanisms or decisions by the COP or CMA. Primarily, there is an absence of will. The core needs
of developing States in respect of ESTs are obvious, namely, the development of their national systems
of innovations, particularly, their R&D infrastructure;126 and the provision of adequate finance. While
Article 10(5) of the PA admonishes support for collaborative RD&D initiatives, neither the TEC nor
CTCN seem structured, equipped or funded to facilitate the implementation of this mandate. There is
a ‘gap of will’ in the UNFCCC EST development and transfer regime. And this, more than anything
else, is the most limiting flaw of the UNFCCC EST regime. As concluded elsewhere:
In the end, while the Paris Agreement takes a welcome step forward on the technology front,
the enormous magnitude and timeframe of the challenge requires much more. However, the
limited nature of the technology provisions is a reflection of a deeper undercurrent – the
continuing lack of political will to support climate technology actions adequately and the
lack of consensus on how to do it best. It is not enough to insert obligations into the text –
their effectiveness and utility will depend on how seriously the parties translate them into
action and build on these in the future.127
The concluding chapter of this work will sketch an agenda for bridging the ‘gap of will’ which afflicts
not just the UNFCCC EST regime, but also the global EST development and transfer regime.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
…Let’s not change the climate, let’s change the system … Let’s talk about the cause, let’s not
evade responsibilities, and let’s not evade the depth of this problem. The cause, undoubtedly, …
is the destructive metabolic system of capital and its embodied model: Capitalism.1
The evolution of the UNFCCC EST regime, previous initiatives and pathways for EST transfer, and
the current technology development and transfer regime as recognised under the Paris Agreement,
have been considered in the preceding chapters of this thesis. As noted in chapter four, while there are
visible distinctions between the present structure and previous programmes, there has been no marked
difference at the core of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime. The regime has been replete with
negotiations, resolutions and agreements. Yet the output has been largely the same. This was attributed
to a ‘gap of will’ in chapter four. As argued all through this work, the concessions and consensus
which have birthed the various phases of the UNFCCC EST regime have been at the super-structural
level. Sub-structural issues pertaining to the normative core have not been dealt with: issues like what
principles undergird the UNFCCC EST regime; what role human rights considerations play in EST
development and transfer; and the modalities for treating ESTs as global public goods. Yet, these are
the issues that have potential to determine the success or failure of the EST transfer initiatives.
Rendered differently, negotiations can hold, and agreements can be reached on super-structural issues,
but the effective performance of agreements reached depend on sub-structural normative concerns. It
is by no means suggested that reaching a consensus on sub-structural issues will be easy. But
discussing them is vital.
What is clear is that a dominant market (neoliberal) approach to ESTs is antithetical to the nature of
climate change; it leaves third world people disempowered and disadvantaged.2 But does this mean
an outright and complete switch from a neoliberal approach? Considering that private entities, which
are primarily profit driven, are the major innovators, developers, manufacturers and right-holders of
ESTs, how can their interest be safeguarded in a non-neo-liberal dominant set-up? Should all ESTs
1

Hugo-Chavez Frias, “Speech Delivered at COP 15, United Nations Climate Summit, Copenhagen” on 16 December
2009, online: <http://www.voltairenet.org/article163361.html>.

2

In opposing what she described as ‘climate capitalism’, Adrian Parr stated that “I am fully aware of how it (climate
capitalism) is gaining popularity among scholars and policymakers who hope to put the mechanisms of capitalism to work
in the service of decarbonizing the economy, but I disagree with them … Capitalism appropriates limits to capital by
placing them in the service of capital; in the process, it obscures the inequities, socioeconomic distortions, and violence
that these limits expose, thereby continuing the cycle of endless economic growth that is achieved at the expense of more
vulnerable entities and groups … Climate capitalism neutralizes the politics of climate and environmental change because
it advances, reproduces, and reinforces the oppressive material economic conditions and structures endemic to commodity
culture and the free-market economy – the selfsame system that produced climate warming”. See Adrian Parr, The Wrath
of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013) 10, 21.
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be engaged similarly or distinctly? If there should be a departure from the market-approach in respect
of certain ESTs and/or for certain categories of people or States, what factors should be considered in
making such distinctions? These are knotty sub-structural questions that must be dealt with to have
an equitable and effective global EST development and transfer regime. But even if these questions
are answered, there remains the question of what is the best platform through which they can be
advanced. Should it be embedded in a treaty, a resolution or a non-binding instrument? Or, giving the
central role played by companies in EST development and transfer, should it be engaged like the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights? An attempt is made here to engage some of these
questions, although not comprehensively. A five-step research agenda is proposed below.
5.1 Reframing the Debate: Reconceiving the South – North Relationship
Developing States insist that developed states’ obligations in the international climate regime arise
from historical responsibility and not merely hinged on capacity.3 In contrast, developed States
continue to engage the subject of financial and/or technological contributions outside the context of
‘history’. They focus on capacity and future emissions.4 In fact, for the distinct provision on ‘loss and
damage’ to make it into the Paris Agreement, a qualifying text on it, not amounting to acceptance of

3

See for example India’s 2017 submission on further guidance for the NDC where it stated that “while the developed
country Parties have to take the lead, arising out of historical responsibility, a differentiated guidance framework will
ensure the developing country Parties retain the space necessary to pursue their sustainable development goals” See
“India’s Submission on Further Guidance for the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris
Agreement”
(2017)
online:
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/176_356_131503559958877314India%20Submission%20APA%20Agenda%203%20NDC.pdf> See also G77 Statement to the Paris Climate Change
Conference where it was noted that “…Annex I country Parties and other developed countries in Annex II have the
principal responsibility in providing support”. See “Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Ambassador
Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko from South Africa, at the Opening Plenary of the 21 st COP to the UNFCCC (Paris, France, 30
November 2015)” online: <http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=151130b>.
4

See for example the U.S. submission on the Paris Agreement, where they noted that “we would not support a bifurcated
approach to the new agreement, particularly one based on groupings that may have made sense in 1992 but that are clearly
not rational or workable in the post-2020 era. There have been, and will continue to be, dramatic and dynamic shifts in
countries’ emissions and economic profiles that make such an approach untenable, environmentally and otherwise”. See
“U.S.
Submission
on
Elements
of
the
2015
Agreement”
online:
<https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/u.s._submission_on_elements_of_
the_2105_agreement.pdf>. The descriptor ‘developed States’ employed in this chapter recognises that ‘developed states’,
borrowing Obiora Okafor’s phrasing, are not ‘monolithic collegiums’. Within developed States are entities which bear the
brunt of climate change and fossil economy. For instance, the source of livelihood and culture of indigenous people in
Canada have been threatened by oil exploration for years. See Centre for Indigenous Environmental Resources, “How
Climate Change Uniquely Impacts the Physical, Social and Cultural Aspects of First Nations” (2006)
<https://www.afn.ca/uploads/files/env/report_2_cc_uniquely_impacts_physical_social_and_cultural_aspects_final_001.
pdf>.
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‘liability or compensation’ had to be inserted in the accompanying decision.5 It is argued here that the
contentions of both developing and developed States need not be considered in isolation. While it is
undeniable that the historical emission of developed States is responsible for the present global
climatic conditions, it is also non-contestable that if not stopped, emissions from developing States,
especially BRICS States, will make the global climatic condition grimmer.6 There is also a case to be
made for ‘capacity’ both in determining the ability of a ‘developed’ state to contribute and which
‘developing’ state qualifies as a beneficiary. In other words, instead of construing the arguments as
distinct matters of historical culpability, capacity and prospective liability, they can be put across as a
single narrative, one that acknowledges the past, caters for the present and considers the future. A
more holistic narrative, therefore, is that the present capacity of developed states is, in part, attributable
to past climate damaging activities; therefore, they bear an obligation to deploy their capacities to
make it unnecessary for developing States to develop unsustainably - unsustainable patterns of
development which will make them also culpable in the future.
The validity and acceptability of the future responsibility argument rest on the recognition of historical
responsibility.7 A refusal to accept and give effect to the historical responsibility of developed states,
is a negative template for engaging emerging economies regarding the future. There is simply no
justification for insisting that China and India should rein in emissions because of futuristic culpability
if past emissions leading to the current climate condition is not redressed. The acceptance of historical
responsibility has both precedential and deterrence values. It provides a justifiable ground to contest
the claim of developing States to the ‘right to emit’ and makes clear the likely liability they will bear
for current emissions.
As noted in chapter two, historical responsibility is not a stand-alone concept; it shares the same
rationale with the Polluter Pays principle, a principle recognised and applied in most developed

5

See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 1/CP. 21, UNFCCCOR, 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev. 1, para 51. See also
Linda Siegele, “Loss and Damage (Article 8)” in Daniel Klein et al eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis
and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 224 at 228.

6

Kennedy Liti Mbeva & Pieter Pauw, “Self-Differentiation of Countries’ Responsibilities: Addressing Climate Change
through Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” (2016) 4 Discussion Paper, German Development Institute, 19 –
21.
7

As argued by Adrian Parr, “…it is inconsistent to argue in favour of erasing historical responsibility in order to achieve
historical responsibility – the responsibility for future lives. This is like having your cake and eating it. Supra note 2 at 10.
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States.8 Ingrained in the Polluter Pays principle (PPP) are ‘past unsustainable acts’, ‘present adverse
repercussions’ and the ‘necessity of indemnity’.9 While the view advocated in this work draws on the
PPP, it does so recognising the validity of the capacity and future responsibility claims. Few existing
works have attempted a similar fused approach. Relevant to this work are Simon Caney’s hybrid
approach,10 Carl Knight’s pluralistic approach,11 and the beneficiary pays approach.12 These views
are considered and critiqued below. The review is followed by what is described as the holistic
narrative which blends the views of both developing and developed states, and a ‘normative payment’
concept. As will be shown, this approach has the advantages of being more inclusive and politically
acceptable than existing approaches.
Simon Caney derived his hybrid approach from the ability to pay principle (APP) which he suggested
makes up for three inadequacies of the PPP: the inability of earlier generations who emitted to pay
(since most are dead); excusably ignorant emitters who should not be expected to pay; and noncompliant emitters who will not pay.13 To Caney, APP obligates the “most advantaged” to either
reduce their GHG emissions in proportion to the harm caused by previous generations, excusably
ignorant emitters or non-compliant emitters, or “address the (resultant) ill-effects”.14 Worth noting is
that the APP is deemed forward looking, and takes no cognizance of historical emissions. The problem
with this approach is that it cannot be deemed ‘obligatory’ or construed as a justice claim. APP
allocates liability through current affluence, regardless whether the wealth is gained via a ‘nonclimatically wrong’ way. In attempting to justify APP, Caney argued:
It is true that they (advantaged) may not have caused the problem but this does not mean that
they have no duty to help solve this problem. Peter Singer’s well-known example of a child
drowning in a puddle brings this point out nicely. Suppose that one encounters a child face
8

See generally Eric Thomas Larson, “Why Environmental Liability Regimes in the United States, the European
Community and Japan have grown Synonymously with the Polluter Pays Principle” (2005) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law 541 – 575.

9

As noted by Simon Caney, “the polluter pays principle is … a backward looking or historical principle … it follows that
those who contribute to climate change … should make amends for it…” See Simon Caney, “Climate Change and the
Duties of the Advantaged” (2010) 13:1 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 203 at 205.

10

Ibid.

11

Carl Knight, “Climate Change and the Duties of the Disadvantaged: Reply to Caney” (2011) 14:4 Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy 531 – 542.

12

See Edward Page, “Give it up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle” (2012) 4:2 International
Theory 300 – 330; Daniel Butt, “‘A Doctrine Quite New and Altogether Untenable’: Defending the Beneficiary Pays
Principle” (2014)

13

Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of
International Law 747 at 766 – 767.
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Ibid at 769.
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down in a puddle. The fact that one did not push the child in obviously does not mean that
one does not have a duty to aid the child.15
Notably, Caney’s reference to the ‘advantaged’ refers to ‘affluent people’ rather than ‘affluent
countries’.16 It is suggested that the focus on ‘people’ rather than ‘States’ is the core flaw of both
Caney’s criticism of PPP, and by extension, his conception of APP. To start with, in the global climate
regime, the computation of historical emission is country-based. To make a case for ‘individual’
computation of emissions is simply unrealistic. If accepted that the computation of historical
emissions is country based, then Caney’s suggested limitation of PPP, i.e., that earlier generations are
unable to pay because they are dead, is not tenable. This is because, except in extraordinary situations,
States are continuous. Indeed, developed States which are beneficiaries of the industrial revolution
and its resultant climate-decimating emissions are still in existence. Taking a cue from its Statefocused analysis, Caney’s second alleged limitation of the PPP is also questionable, because an
absence of knowledge does not, in itself, suffice as justification for past climate-damaging emissions.
This is more so as these States persisted in unsustainable practices even in the 20th century, when
scientific findings had emerged regarding anthropogenic contributions to climate change.17 There is
also the strict liability argument in response to this second criticism.18 Caney’s third limitation on the
inability of emitters to make good their liability due to lack of capacity is, however, a justifiable
criticism of the PPP. The argument here is not that climate change liability is solely ‘State-based’, but
that in the ‘historical responsibility’ context, the traditional ‘State’ is the most practical and useful
focal point. But as has been (and will be) shown, the unpacked State is constituted by ‘persons’
15

Ibid at 769 – 770.
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Ibid at 770.
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As noted elsewhere, “roughly half of all the CO2 released into the atmosphere from human activity since 1750 (over
600 billion tonnes) was emitted between 1980 and 2008”. See Page, supra note 12 at 320.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana, for example, applied the strict liability doctrine, in a case where a tree which looked
healthy, although rotted out and hollow beneath, fell on a car. The court held that ‘ignorance’ of the unhealthy state of the
tree did not absolve the defendant of liability. See Loescher v. Parr 324 So. 2d 441, 1975 La. LEXIS 4205. Although this
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rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 which states that a person who puts a land into a non-natural use, is liable for
the consequence of doing so, if “in the course of their doing it, the evil arose … namely, the escape of the water…” The
House of Lords in the later case of Cambridge Water Co Ltd v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc [1993] ABC LR 12/09,
however, held that, “knowledge, or at least foreseeability of the risk, is a prerequisite of the recovery of damages under
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that he has exercised all due care to prevent the escape from occurring”. In the climate change context, it has been argued
elsewhere that “Just reparation … should also take into account the fact that people in developed countries were for a long
time ignorant of the effects on the climate of emissions. Ignorance is no reason for refusing to make reparation, but it may
be a reason for reducing demands”. See Janna Thompson, “Historical Responsibility and Climate Change” in Lukas Meyer
& Pranay Sanklecha, eds, Climate Justice and Historical Emissions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 46
at 58 – 59. See also Daniel Butt, Historical Emissions: Does Ignorance Matter? Ibid at 61 – 79.
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(humans and corporations). Hence, responsibilities or benefits appropriated to ‘States’ invariably
pertains to the ‘persons’.19
In a more recent work, Caney finetuned his position on APP, by positing a hybrid approach comprising
two principles:
Principle 1: Persons should bear the burden of climate change that they have caused so long
as doing so does not push them beneath a decent standard of living (the Poverty-Sensitive
Polluter Pays Principle).
Principle 2: The duties to bear the Remainder should be borne by the wealthy but we should
distinguish between two groups – (i) those whose wealth came about in unjust ways, and
(ii) those whose wealth did not come in unjust ways – and we should apportion greater
responsibility to (i) than to (ii). (the History-Sensitive Ability to Pay Principle)20
Caney’s hybrid approach is close to the position sought to be advanced in this work. It is, however,
doubtful if in a real sense, Caney’s approach can be considered ‘hybrid’. This is because both
principles apply disjunctively, not conjunctively. For example, the use of ‘unjust ways’ in principle 2
refers to non-climate related issues.21 The holistic narrative developed in this work, while recognising
principle 1 of Caney’s proposition, does not embed principle 2. Reasons for excluding principle 2
include the non-definiteness of subjects which constitute ‘unjust acts’ and the less likely political
acceptability of such principle. Again, ‘unjust acts’ are people centric and the redress for them is the
responsibility of a defined group, unlike climate change which effect is borderless and, therefore,
creates obligations for the ‘whole world’. The approach advanced here is also distinct from Caney’s
approach in following ways: the bearers of duties under the holistic narrative concept are essentially
19

This is exemplified by the implementation of international agreements. For instance, States submitted NDCs under the
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approaches to climate change, or the approaches adopted are clearly inadequate?” See Sara Seck, “Business
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and
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the
International
Law
Association”
(2017)
online:
<
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2974768 >. An example of this is the United States’ decision to opt
out of the Paris Agreement. In such a scenario where the ‘State’ has refused to taken responsibility, individuals and
corporate entities should “take up the gauntlet”. But this does not necessarily mean that this is distinct and apart from the
‘State’s’ fulfilment of its obligation. For example, following the United States failure to meet its financial commitment,
Michael Bloomberg offered to pay. In his words, “America made a commitment and, as an American, if the government’s
not going to do it then we all have a responsibility”. See “Climate Change: Michael Bloomberg Pledges $4.5m for Paris
Deal”, BBC News (23 April 2018) online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43860590>. The argument here
is that seeming gulf between ‘private entities’ and ‘the State’ is not unbridgeable.
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States (and by extension their people and companies),22 and unlike Caney’s approach which supports
the ecological space argument, the holistic narrative account considers the ecological space argument
as antithetical to the sustainable development agenda of developing States and the EST transfer cause.
We will come back to these points shortly.
Caney’s hybrid approach has also been criticized elsewhere. In identifying three objections to it – the
disadvantaged polluter, the disadvantaged saint, and the license to pollute - Carl Knight argued that:
Its (the hybrid approach) treatment of disadvantaged persons and their duties is especially
problematic. The hybrid view’s indifference to the circumstances polluters face and only
partial reference to wider justice issues leaves some polluters unduly disadvantaged by
harsh duties. Perhaps the biggest problem is that the very disadvantaged – the global poor
– have very limited duties of climate justice or the hybrid view.23
Further to this, Knight suggested a ‘pluralistic account’.24 This account advocates that the cost of
climate change should be allocated in a way that “best promote(s) advantage levels”, in a manner
which benefits the worst-off which has made better choices more than the better-off which has made
the worse choices.25 Practically, the account argues for the recognition of polluters which were
circumstantially forced to emit, the joint consideration of climate injustice and other kinds of injustice,
and that although the poor should be given preference, they should not be given the license to pollute.
As noted previously, the expansion of ‘justice’ in the climate regime to cover non-climate related
justice issues is not endorsed in this work. While the point on ‘survival emissions’ of certain developed
States is credible, it might be difficult to determine the quantum of such emissions from their
‘luxurious emissions’. Again, the distinction between ‘survival’ and ‘luxurious’ emissions is not

22
Caney made non-state entities – individuals, firms, sub-state political entities and international financial institutions –
has the primary duty bearers. See Ibid at 219. While the influence of these entities as players in the climate regime cannot
be disputed, it seems inefficient to make them the core duty bearers. While there are now ground-breaking works on carbon
majors tracing emissions to corporate entities (see Richard Heede, Carbon Majors: Accounting for Carbon and Methane
Emissions 1854 – 2010 Methods and Results Report (Colorado: Climate Mitigation Services, 2014) and Paul Griffin, “The
Carbon Major Database CDP Carbon Majors Report 2017” (2017) CDP Report), responsibilities have been historically
attached to States in the climate regime. Even with this new research, it is difficult to divorce oil majors from their home
States. As shown in chapter two, it is historically proven that in international negotiations, States represent the positions
of their business entities. Another view is the remittances of these companies to their home States, which drive the States’
development. Further, elsewhere the preference for a state-centric approach was justified because States are “the
ontological units at the heart of existing domestic and international environmental law on climate change” and “given the
intergenerational and international character of the climate problem … States … are currently the only entities operating
internationally that possess sufficient longevity, financial resources, and physical capacity to bear the required burdens”.
See Page, supra note 12 at 302.
23

Supra note 11 at 2.

24

Ibid.

25

Ibid at 14.
128

always clear, since what is ‘luxurious’ to some might be ‘survival’ to others.26 The third point on the
inappropriateness of the ‘license to pollute’ for developing States accords with the position earlier
advanced here. In this regard, Knight advances Caney’s hybrid approach
While the hybrid approach emphasised the capacity of the duty bearer, and the pluralistic account
took stock of an unduly broad historical responsibility concept, the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP)
posits that “States should shoulder burdens associated with responding to climate change according
to the extent that they have derived economic benefits from activities”.27 Unlike the PPP which centers
on cause, and APP which focuses on capacity, the BPP is cause-blind and capacity insensitive. As
explained elsewhere, BPP’s argument to a state is “you should pay because you are much better off
than others as a result of exploiting benefits linked to the creation of climate change”. The connection
of liability and capacity to climate change is an advantage BPP has over APP, and by extension,
Caney’s hybrid approach. Again, as noted by Page, unlike the APP and the hybrid approach which
give reasons why States could pay, BPP justifies why States should pay.28 In Page’s unjust enrichment
strain of BPP, States which have obtained ‘unjust benefits’ are obligated to ‘give up’ rather than ‘pay
back’ such benefits.29 ‘Wrongdoing’ only arises when states “refuse to surrender the benefits
necessary for the effective management of climate change”.30
Again, the BPP, while qualifying as a ‘justice claim’, has questionable deterrence worth, and seems
impracticable. While ‘climate wrongdoers’ often double as ‘beneficiaries’, not all ‘beneficiaries’ are
wrongdoers and it is not unlikely that certain wrongdoers are not beneficiaries. A focus on
‘beneficiaries’ therefore makes the ‘wrong’ the benefit derived, rather than the harmful act. This is of
limited deterrence value to the ‘harmful act’ itself. More importantly is the problem of tracing
‘benefits’ - to what extent should the ‘benefit’ be traced? An example would be coal mined in State
26
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A, exported to State B, used to power plants that produce machines exported to States C, D and E,
which also produce materials for further export. Which of the States will be deemed the beneficiary
or beneficiaries? Or, how far should the benefit derived from the coal mining be traced? Further, since
the focus is on benefit, do profits made from loan or aids provided to other States, from States which
unsustainably developed, qualify as ‘benefits’? Again, is there a quantum for measuring benefits
derived and/or required to be given up? In what appears to be an attempt to respond to these objections,
Page referred to BPP’s ‘net benefit’ and ‘no debilitating cost’ provisos.31 While the first suggests that
benefits to be ‘given up’ are what remain after benefits obtained via positive industrial structures are
deducted, the second states that “states can only be asked to surrender benefits that they actually
possess and can be surrendered without significant harm to their citizens”.32 Neither of these provisos
speaks to the objection of tracing raised above. But assuming they do, they raise further problems.
One, the net benefit proviso presumes, wrongly, that there can, in all situations, be a distinction
between ‘wrongly’ and ‘rightly’ derived benefits. Two, the phrase ‘without significant harm’ is bereft
of precise meaning, as what constitutes ‘significant harm’ is relative.
Although the holistic narrative draws from the three approaches/principles considered above, it
attempts to sidestep the objections levelled against them. Importantly, this narrative emphasises
practicality and political acceptability. The narrative states that:
i.

States responsible for historical emissions are obligated to make available resources to
States without capacity to mitigate or adapt to climate change, to the extent to which such
responsible States are capable.

ii.

Emerging economies are liable for emissions made beyond their ‘survival emissions’ or
resources for sustainable development, either possessed by them and/or made available to
them by developed states.

iii.

States not responsible for historical emissions, are developing sustainably, and have
capacity to assist less advantaged States, should endeavour to make available resources to
less advantaged States.

iv.

Less advantaged States should be prioritised in the order in which they are prone to climate
change implications (in respect of adaptation interventions) and/or they have sustainably
developed (in respect of mitigation interventions).

The 4-layered narrative proposed here takes into account the positions of both developed and
developing States, recognises the past and caters for the future, incentivizes sustainable practices in
developing States, gives a role to every party in the climate regime although with differentiated
31
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obligation-levels, and generally centres the ‘environment’ as against the ‘economy’. It is believed that
this narrative can be more easily operationalised than the BPP, as there are existing data on historical
and current emissions. The most contentious of these propositions is likely (iv) as developing States
might contend that being responsible for the current climate condition, developed States are in no
position to impose terms. However, to develop unsustainably blunts the justification for any
accusation levelled against developed states which have allegedly developed unsustainably.
Proposition (iv) gives due recognition to States which, despite their economic conditions, have striven
to sustainably develop. Simultaneously, it discourages other developing states from using their
economic conditions as an excuse for unsustainable practices. It should be noted that all the above
propositions take their cue from proposition (i). If proposition (i) is not operationalized, parties
responsible for propositions (ii) – (iv) will lack the impetus to act.
However, an objection by Caney to the Polluter Pays Principle is that to apply the PPP, “we need to
be able to specify the harm done and trace it back to the causal factors and where either the nature of
the harm is uncertain or unpredictable … or the link between the climate change and the harm is
uncertain then this cannot be done”.33 Proposition (i) which ascribes duties on the basis of harm caused
is also affected by this objection. It is, however, contestable that for a duty to be ascribed, specific
harm needs to be attached to a specific wrongdoer. Indeed, this is impossible in respect of climate
change. As there is only one global climate and, in the atmosphere, the source of emission becomes
irrelevant. A more valid concern emanating from this objection seems to be whether there is an
endpoint to the ‘reparation’ to be done by historical emitters. At what point can they be said to have
settled their climate ‘debt’? While there is no easy answer to this question, it is suggested that
underpinning the question is the presumption that payback can only be done through ‘tangible
reparation’, whether in terms of ‘money’ or ‘technology’ (which can also be measured in money).
Hence, the focus of developing States has been financial contributions by developed states by reason
of their historical responsibility. It is, however, proposed that one way historical emitters can ‘close’
their liability account is by making what is described here as ‘normative payment’.
Normative payment requires that the cost to be paid for past emissions should be behaviour based and
norm related. While it is farfetched (although desirable) to expect the North to jettison neoliberalism,
normative payment demands that as far as ESTs go, the market should play a very minimal role, and
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profit-making should not be the dominant objective. The currency of the normative payment in the
climate change context is a normative shift from neoliberalism to humanism. India, in its NDC to the
UNFCCC, highlighted this kind of shift, contending that:
There is a need to evolve a set of precepts, a kind of commandments, especially for the
youth of the world, that help in developing a unified global perspective to economic growth
so that the disparity in the thinking of the 'developed' and 'developing' countries could be
bridged. The removal of such barriers of thought and the creation of a regime where
facilitative technology transfer replaces an exploitative market driven mechanism could
pave the way for a common understanding of universal progress. If climate change is a
calamity that mankind must adapt to while taking mitigation action withal, it should not be
used as a commercial opportunity. It is time that a mechanism is set up which will turn
technology and innovation into an effective instrument for global public good, not just
private returns.34
Indeed, the operation of neoliberalism and its trappings of private ownership and commercialism are
by no means unqualified, even in developed States. For example, issues pertaining to health care and
national security are not simply left to the vagaries of the market.35 A nexus has been drawn elsewhere
on the link between climate change and national qua transnational security.36 The relationship between
climate change and health has also been established.37 These connections, in part, provide
justifications for a normative payment viz a shift from a market-centric approach to ESTs, to a more
open and humanized framework. One way this can be operationalized is to incentivize norm shifts by
EST developing and producing companies. Home countries can award credits or give tax reliefs to
companies with initiatives to facilitate EST development and transfer in less advantaged States. Such
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initiative must, however, entail wholesome transfer of hardware, software and orgware, and not just
barebone.
In a way, the normative payment concept bears semblance to the CDM. However, what will be
rewarded here is norm-shift: a shift from a market centric approach to a human centred approach.
Indices through which this can be appraised include: disclosures and release of previously protected
know-how and rights at concessional and affordable costs; the establishment and/or support for
research institutions in less advantaged States; joint RD&D with research institutions in less
advantaged States; and in-country manufacturing of ESTs in host States. While the norm shift must
necessarily start from ‘industrialized States’, it is expected to trickle to emerging and developing
economies. Ultimately, this ‘human-centric’ approach can (and should) become the template for EST
development and transfer both internationally and domestically. This way, the underprivileged in both
developing and developed States, stand a better chance to access ESTs. A justification for normative
payment is that at the root of climate change is a ‘wrong norm’; that of prioritising profit making over
sustenance of the environment.38 Therefore, a corresponding ‘payment’ should be a reversal of the
same norm which created the problem. Further, ‘normative payment’, while it does not completely
rule out financial aid or transfer of specific technologies, deemphasises them. Instead, it focuses on
‘enabling’ less advantaged States to conduct their own research and develop their own technologies.
Again, the criticism against the PPP that the full impact of climate change is unknown, hence, ‘cost’
is uncertain is circumvented by the normative payment concept. While further work will subsequently
be done on the ‘normative payment’ concept, views expressed below on a human right approach to
EST transfer, consideration of ESTs as public goods and the development of an international/national
systems of innovation, further consolidate the idea of ‘normative payment’ suggested here.
5.2 Humanizing the Global EST Development and Transfer Regime
Distillable from Karl Marx’s commodity fetishism theory is the idea of the objectivation of
commodity and the subjectivation of humanity.39 To bestow value on a commodity outside its
response and usefulness to a human need is another expression of this fetishism. This is what the
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global EST ‘market’ has done. The value of ESTs is detached from its human impact. It is one thing
to see solar technology and improvements thereon as prospects for making trillions of dollars. It is
another thing to construe it in the light of the life, health and subsistence needs of disadvantaged
States.40 For example, the World Health Organization notes that “between 2030 and 2050, climate
change is expected to cause approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year, from malnutrition,
malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress”.41 The World Food Programme also notes that “the number of
people at risk of hunger will increase by 10 – 20% due to climate change, with 65% of this population
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of malnourished children could increase up to 21% … with the
majority being in Africa”.42 In Nigeria, thousands have died in 2018 alone from conflict between
herdsmen and farmers in what the government has attributed in part to the “drying up of the Chad
Basin” which has forced herdsmen to move further in-country.43 These are examples of the ‘human’
context of climate change.
It has been argued elsewhere that rather than the oppositional stances between developing and
developed States on the transfer of ESTs, human rights provide “a language on which broad agreement
already exists over minimal standards for action” on transfer of technologies.44 This argument is
premised on the assertion that:
…climate change is already undermining the realisation of a broad range of internationally
protected human rights: rights to health and even life; rights to food, water, shelter and
property; rights associated with livelihood and culture; with migration and resettlement;
and with personal security in the event of conflict.45
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Focusing on the rights to life, health and basic means of subsistence, Simon Caney made a case for a
‘right to technology transfer’, anchoring it on what he described as the adaptation-based, mitigationbased and restitution-based arguments.46 While the restitution-based argument borders on the polluter
pays principle already discussed above, he framed the adaptation-based argument as the necessity for
the transfer of adaptation ESTs “to allow individuals to enjoy their human rights despite experiencing
climate harms”; and he premised the mitigation-based argument on the need to “allow people to
continue to enjoy their human rights without thereby contributing to climate change”.47
The human rights approach to EST transfer further rests on the fact that there are international
instruments already agreed to by countries on the rights threatened by climate change. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights48 is particularly worth noting. The
ICESCR, inter alia, provides that States parties must recognize the right of everyone to “an adequate
standard of living … adequate food, clothing and housing, and the continuous improvement of living
conditions” and “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”. 49 Perhaps, the most
relevant provision in the ICESCR on EST transfer is Article 15(1)(b) which provides for “the right of
everyone … to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”. The Covenant further
points out that “steps to be taken … to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those
necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science”. 50 Arguably, the rights
contained in the ICESCR are binding on States not only internally, but transnationally. 51 It is,
therefore, contestable that market barriers to ESTs are in breach of the ICESCR, particularly Article
15(1)(b), (2), (3) and (4). This, however, leaves the issue of Article 15(1)(c) which recognises the
right of an innovator (author) to “the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production”.
One of the novel inclusions in the Paris Agreement is the admonition that “Parties should, when taking
action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations to human
46
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rights…”52 This recognition was made only in the preamble of the Agreement which does not
constitute a substantive binding provision. However, in international law, treaties contain what Liav
Orgad describes as interpretive preambles.53 The interpretive role of preambles is recognised by the
Law of Treaties which provides that in interpreting a treaty in their context, such context shall
comprise of, inter alia, its preamble.54 Arguably, therefore, provisions of the Paris Agreement,
including Article 10, must be interpreted in accordance with the preamble. Hence, the reference to
‘respective obligations to human rights’ in the preamble easily admits of international human right
obligations like those earlier considered under the ICESCR.
The above is, however, less than half of the story. Importantly, the implications of the climate change
– human rights linkage on private corporations, given their central role in the global EST matrix, must
be considered. Rendered differently, do corporate entities have a duty to consider human rights in
their development, management and distribution of ESTs? More contextually, do EST developing and
manufacturing companies have the ‘right’ to set market terms which make ESTs vital to the life, health
and subsistence of the disadvantaged inaccessible? The subject of corporations’ human rights
obligations, particularly, in the environmental context, has received some attention.55 This should,
however, be distinguished from the question raised here. While the environmentally degrading actions
of multinational companies in developing States can more directly be linked to the breach of the rights
of people living in those countries, it is more difficult to draw such a connection in respect to the
unwillingness or unreadiness of corporations to transfer ESTs or hoarding of know-how.
One way to approach this issue is to argue that although international obligations cannot be directly
and ‘internationally’ imposed on private entities, States which have ratified agreements are duty bound
to ensure compliance by their corporations. In a way, this argument aligns with the second guiding
principle contained in the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’56 which recognises
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“the role of business enterprises … to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights”.57
The Guiding Principles further provide that businesses have the responsibility to “avoid causing or
contributing to adverse human rights impacts…; seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights
impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services…”58 The human rights
obligation of private businesses is made even more forceful in the ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations’. It is recognized here that:
…Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and
other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect,
ensure respect of and promote human rights recognized in international as well as national
law, including the rights and interests of indigenous people and vulnerable groups.59
Except for the opposition of businesses to the norms on corporate responsibilities and subsequent
tacit jettisoning,60 the above provision could have been stretched to suggest that companies involved
in EST development and production have the obligation to secure the fulfilment of, and to promote
human rights in the way they manage technologies. It is, indeed, doubtful if companies will be
positively disposed to a reading and/or interpretation of the Guiding Principles which encroaches on
or limits their proprietary control or management of their products (technologies).
The ‘Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to Access to Medicines’61
(the Hunt Guidelines) is instructive as to how the human rights obligations of EST companies in
respect of access to ESTs can be developed and operationalized. The international EST and
pharmaceutical regimes share diverse commonalities. One is their connection to health and life. Again,
both regimes face similar access challenges. As noted by Paul Hunt, the Guidelines was published
further to the complaint of developing States about “the policies and practices of some pharmaceutical
companies … for example, excessively high prices, inadequate attention to research and development
57
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concerning diseases that disproportionately impact people in developing countries … and problematic
clinic trials”.62 As noted in previous chapters, these also constitutes the core challenges of the EST
regime. The Hunt Guidelines can, therefore, be conveniently adopted, as much as practicable, in
respect of access to ESTs.
In its preamble, the Hunt Guidelines endorses clearly that “pharmaceutical companies … have human
rights responsibilities in relation to access to medicines”.63 However, it balanced this with a
recognition of the companies’ “responsibility to enhance shareholder value”. 64 Substantively, the
Guidelines admonish companies to “adopt a human rights policy statement which expressly
recognises the importance of human rights”, and that the companies should “integrate human rights
… into (their) strategies, policies, programmes, projects and activities”.65 Worth highlighting are the
Guidelines’ provisions on disadvantaged populations,66 disclosure of accessibility initiatives,67
publicly available policy on access,68 “public commitment to contribute to research and development
for neglected diseases”,69 allowing developing states to fully employ flexibility provisions under
TRIPS and “not to lobby for more demanding protection of intellectual property interests…”,70
issuance of non-exclusive voluntary licences,71 not patenting “trivial modifications on existing
medicines”,72 and differential pricing between and within countries and simplicity of discount
schemes.73
The above highlighted provisions, if adopted into the EST regime, will go a long way to improve
access for developing States to ESTs. However, given the hostile reception of the Hunt Guidelines by
pharmaceutical companies,74 despite the deliberate effort to be non-peremptory and the attempt to
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consult widely with companies in the preparation of the Hunt Guidelines,75 it is unlikely that
multinational EST companies will positively receive a Human Rights Guidelines for Access to ESTs.
Yet, this is important, and, again, the normative payment concept might be helpful in this regard. The
presumption is that companies, in the end, are concerned about their bottom line. So, the question is
how to ‘guarantee’ this bottom line while holding the companies to a responsibility to mainstream
human rights in their management of EST innovations and products? Alongside the normative
payment suggestions, the concept of differential pricing contained in the Hunt Guidelines are ways to
strike this balance. The cooperation of developed States (and emerging economies) will be crucial for
a differential pricing scheme to succeed. Further research is, however, needed on this subject.
5.3 Reconceiving ESTs as Global Public Goods
ESTs as technologies essential to life, health and subsistence, raise the question of how they should
be treated – as purely private commodities or global public goods (GPGs)? It is proposed here that
ESTs are best engaged and dealt with as GPGs. Maskus and Reichman define GPGs as “goods
(including policies and infrastructure) that are systematically underprovided by private market forces
and for which such under-provision has important international externality effects”.76 They construe
‘externality effect’ to arise when “a failure to provide the public good imposes costs on third parties”.77
GPGs are described elsewhere as “resources, services and systems of rules or policy regimes that
generate non-excludable benefits and that are non-rival in use”.78 Given the inability of the market to
provide GPGs, their provision becomes the responsibility of the collective.79 According to Adam
Smith, “goods of general benefit to a society would have to be funded by means of a general
contribution”.80 As noted by Maskus and Reichman, environmental protection provides a classic
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example of a situation giving rise to GPGs.81 Essentially, the GPG concept negates the idea of private
proprietary rights in ESTs, and the exclusivity they enjoy in law. Rather, the sheer demand for ESTs
and the fact that the benefits of their deployment (especially mitigation ESTs) are global, demands a
public approach to their development, funding and overall management.82 The phrase ‘public
approach’ is used in both the national and international contexts.
As noted in previous chapters, in recent times there has been a drop in public R&D funding, resulting
in private entities taking the lead in such investments.83 The increasing dominance of corporate
organisations in R&D portends greater protectionism and private proprietary rights claims on ESTs.
Beyond this is the influence corporate organisations have over their home States and the ripple effect
this has in framing global technology transfer policies. This situation was described by Maskus and
Reichman as “private capture”, a situation where “knowledge cartel(s)” which “control the
distribution of a disproportionately large share of existing technologies … push their governments to
regulate the global market in ways that lock in temporary competitive advantages without necessarily
advancing global public interest”.84 Private ownership notwithstanding, developed States have the
capacity, whether through incentives or regulatory tools to influence corporate entities to make their
innovations accessible. Paragraph 34.18(e) of Agenda 21 provides options for doing this, including
purchasing “patents on commercial terms for their transfer to developing countries on non-commercial
terms”. This, in part, attends to the demand of Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR to ensure that innovators
derive material benefits from their innovation.
Again, the GPG concept is diametrically opposite to the central contention of developed States that
market tools, like the protection of IPRs and patents, must foster innovation and transfer of ESTs.
Recent studies have made this conclusion questionable.85 In a historical study of patent’s impact on
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innovation, Petra Moser found that a “large majority of historical innovations occurred outside of the
patent system” and that “countries without patent laws … were at least as innovative as countries with
patent laws”.86 It was also found that where applied, IPRs were more beneficial when “narrow and
short-lived”, and IPRs that circumvent options like “compulsory licencing” encouraged innovation.87
Using what he described as a patent game which simulated patent and non-patent systems, Andrew
Torrance also found that “there is no statistically significant difference in rates of innovation among
a pure patent system, a patent/open source system and a commons system”. He noted, however, that:
There are statistically significant differences in rates of productivity and social utility among
all three systems, with both productivity and social utility lowest in a pure patent system,
higher in a patent/open source system, and highest in a pure commons system.88
The point here is that neither the private ownership nor patent arguments are valid enough to prevent
the engagement of ESTs as GPGs. But there are other concerns. A major one is the ‘free-rider’
problem. As pointed out elsewhere, “as no-one can be excluded from their use once public goods are
provided, there is no incentive to pay for them”.89 How can free-riding be guarded against in a GPG
– EST international regime (a regime where EST innovations are disclosed, knowledge is freely
shared, and adaptation of technologies is not restricted)? Further, since global collectivity is central to
such GPG regime, how can it be ensured that every country contributes to such a regime? One way
around the first question is the establishment of an international registry for EST innovations, which
can also serve as a common pool for such innovations. To correct the mistakes of the eco-patent
commons initiative, this international registry should involve all technologies or essential technologies
held by an entity. This point is made without disregard for the observation in chapter three that a
commons registry, as proposed here, in itself does not guarantee the availability of ESTs in developing
States. Regardless, it is an important piece of the puzzle. The subject of collective contribution is
considered under the next recommendation.
5.4 Transnational System(s) of Innovation
One of the findings highlighted in the preceding chapters is the lack of market stimulus for EST
companies to specifically research into climate change challenges specific to African States.
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Consequently, existing technologies are often ill-suited to the peculiar needs or conditions of these
States. This, among other reasons, make an integrated global system of innovation critical.
Transnational system(s) of innovation (TSI) can be construed as an expression of the ‘collective
contribution’ imperative of the GPG concept. TSI was described elsewhere as “the result of an
integration process between two or more adjacent regional innovation systems across national borders
of two or more neighboring systems of innovation”.90 In other words, TSI is an aggregate of systems
of innovation. A system of innovation (SI), construed broadly, entails “parts and aspects of the
economic structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning as well as searching and
exploring”.91 TSI presents a different model to the extant donor – recipient approach to EST transfer.
It allows for the involvement of developing states in R & D and fosters the development of their
innovative capacities. But a challenge here is that for TSI to be optimal, constituting national SIs must
possess mutually beneficial and complementary capacities. Chaminade & Nielson refer to this as
cognitive proximity; that is, “the differences or similarities between individuals and organizations in
their level of competences and knowledge”.92 While they note that there should not be too much
proximity, they emphasise that when there is too much distance, “the absorption capacity and the
benefits of such interaction are … low”.93 This same point was highlighted in a 2010 study of the
SBSTA on collaborative EST R&D thus:
…entities with similarities in size, financial resources and technical endowments are more
likely to pursue collaborative R&D than when the balance of expertise in a collaboration is
more one-sided. Brokering developed – developing country partnerships clearly needs to
overcome this bias…94
For the cognitive distance between African States and developed States to be reduced, African States’
SIs, particularly their universities and other research organs, must be focused on. While the CTCN
would have been in an ideal position to do this, the point was made in chapter four, that it has not, and
neither does its design seem to support such an initiative. Making a similar point, Ockwell and Bryne
note that “CTCN’s activities do not explicitly recognize the need to nurture NSIs as part of the
technology transfer, development, and diffusion process, although elements of innovation system
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building are implicit within two of the CTCN’s core services”.95 It is, therefore, not surprising that
none of CTCN’s initiatives so far entails any R&D capacity development project with universities in
African States. This must change. Taking a cue from the university-R&D reliant EST industries in
developed States and China, African States must turn their searchlight inwards and invest considerably
in their research institutions. Rather than focusing on financial or hardware handouts from developed
States, African States must begin to insist on collaborative programmes that will improve the capacity
of their research institutions. It is only with such improved capacity that they can capably engage in
TSIs. Again, the development of SIs by African States is important as “it will assist and accelerate the
uptake of technologies … and help ensure that these technologies become more central to the
underpinning development processes”.96 While research institutions have been emphasised, they do
not constitute an SI in themselves. Other actors, including firms, financial and investment institutions
and public agencies must also be integrated to ensure funding, uptake and diffusion of innovations.
Still on the subject of the contributory capacity of African States in a TSI, without prejudice to the
earlier point on the necessity of African States to focus on their SIs, it is argued that African States’
rich repository of traditional knowledge, particularly in respect of climate change adaptation,
constitutes tangible contribution to an EST TSI. As noted by the IPCC, “indigenous and traditional
knowledge may prove useful for understanding the potential for certain adaptation strategies that are
cost-effective, participatory and sustainable”.97 A recent publication on indigenous knowledge
systems in Africa refers to traditional knowledge on seasonal climate prediction and weather forecast,
underutilised crops and animal species, and adaptive farming systems like Lesotho’s Machobane
farming system.98 The need for co-production of knowledge between “community based knowledge
holders and natural and social scientists” has therefore been advocated.99 It is, however, necessary that
western researchers are open-minded, and recognise and respect this traditional knowledge as not less
than ‘orthodox science’. In formally recognising traditional knowledge and integrating it into
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mainstream R&D, the tendency of multinational companies to patent such will be reduced.100 When
duly recognised, the contributory potential of African States in a TSI set-up becomes more apparent.
An EST-TSI arrangement should entail both international and continental/sub-continental
components.101 At the international level, institutions like the CTCN and the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA), should serve as a ‘melting pot’ of EST innovators from around the world.
Such an arrangement provides an environment of peer interaction, which is said to facilitate
innovation.102 Referencing the U.S. led Manhattan project through which nuclear technology was
developed, it was stated elsewhere that a collaborative approach to EST development will engender
“accumulation of international resources (to) target issues that are beyond the innovative capacity of
the individual nation-states”.103 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR) is an example of such an R&D collaborative effort. The designated international institution
should prioritise the most difficult and/or essential climate change problems for research. While it can
be centralised like the European Council for Nuclear Research (CERN), it is preferable that the
designated institution has regional research centers following the CGIAR model.104
In Africa, it is proposed that EST R&D centres should be established in each of the five sub-regions
of the continent. Each center should involve research institutions from sub-regional States and relevant
developed countries. Aside the research institutions, collaboration should extend to partnership among
manufacturing firms, financial institutions and markets for an effective uptake of developed
technologies. Sub-regional R&D centres should focus on the most pressing needs of the countries
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within the sub-region. This arrangement will not only ensure the integration of SIs at the subcontinental level. It will also help States to pull resources together efficiently to foster the development
of relevant and necessary technologies. Research centres based at the sub-continental level could also
complement conventional scientific knowledge with indigenous know-how.
The question of how both the international and sub-continental TSIs will be funded remains. While
their funding should be prioritised by both the GCF and GEF, more innovative funding mechanisms
should be evolved. One way is to levy multinational fossil fuel (oil, gas and coal) companies.
Particularly, the companies operating in Africa can be required to pay a specific percentage into an
innovation fund for the sub-continental research centers. France is also said to have proposed a
“solidarity contribution levied on plane tickets … to … finance global sustainable development”.105
This contribution can be extended to international shipping lines. Other MNCs can also be encouraged
and incentivized to set-up green funds for African States.106
5.5 Breaking Silos: Integrating Institutions
The operationalization of the preceding normative recommendations mandates a rethinking and
rearrangement of the international institutional structure on climate change, their EST development
and transfer objectives, and the focus of party states. Importantly, the diverse international institutions
involved in EST transfer should be integrated. There are three aspects to the issue of institutional
integration. The first is intra-UNFCCC; the second is between UNFCCC and EST transfer related
institutions; while the third involves the UNFCCC and other international institutions. The point was
made in chapter four as to the existence of different institutional arrangements pertaining to EST
transfer within the UNFCCC (the TM, FM and the PCCB). While it is unlikely that there will be a
merger of these bodies, they can share ‘common sub-bodies’. For example, instead of the existence
of a distinct CTCN under the TM, and separate Climate Technology Centres (CTC) under the GEF
qua Poznan, a common CTCN can operate under both the TM and the FM. The same applies to the
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existence of Nationally Designated Entities (NDEs) under the TEC and Nationally Designated
Authorities (NDAs) under the GCF. Both should be integrated and controlled by the TEC and the
GCF. Such integration will, to an extent, help resolve the financial challenge(s) of the TEC and the
CTCN, and also spur the efficiency of these institutions. Without prejudice to the argument in chapter
four on the non-necessity of the PCCB, if it must exist, then it should operate through the integrated
sub-institutions under the TM and FM. The diagram below helps explain this sub-level integration
concept.

TEC

CTCN
PCCB

NDAs/
NDEs

CTCs
GEF

GCF

Another level of integration is among international institutions and the UNFCCC. The operations of
different institutions, while not directly related to climate change or ESTs, impact indirectly on EST
development and transfer. Two such institutions are the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Bank. As noted in chapter two, the question of the most appropriate place to deal with the
intellectual property concern remains one divisive issue between developing and developed States.
While developing States argue that this subject should be dealt with under the UNFCCC, developed
States have insisted it is an issue suited for the WTO. In aligning with the position of developing
States, the ICHRP has advocated the making of an International Declaration on Climate Change and
Intellectual Property Rights (DCCIPR) under the umbrella of the UNFCCC.107 According to the
organization:
As a matter of strategy, discussion of any proposed declaration need not, and probably
should not, take place in the forum of the WTO. It may be more appropriate to seek such a
declaration in the context of the broader mandate of the UNFCCC rather than the relatively
narrow focus of the WTO TRIPS Agreement.108
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While the ICHRP proposal is desirable, it seems impractical, considering the current entrenched
positions of parties. A sub-institutional integration model, as earlier proposed, although of a less
formal and intensive scope, is one way to approach this subject. The TEC, the WTO Committee on
Trade and Environment (CTE), and other relevant international agencies like the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), can establish a joint working and facilitation group to develop a
declaration similar to what has been proposed by the ICHRP.109 A similar pattern of sub-level
integration can also be explored with the World Bank Group’s climate finance initiatives, particularly
the Climate Investment Funds (CIF).
The actual level of integration is the creation of a platform, coordinated by the TEC, involving the
diverse organizations directly involved in EST development and transfer. These organizations, as
indicated in chapter three, include social entrepreneurs, NGOs, regional organizations, international
financial and corporate institutions and (national) public agencies. In a report by the UNFCCC
Secretariat, although the growth in international transfer platforms were indicated, the non-existence
of a comprehensive data on actors in the EST transfer sphere and the non-availability of “information
on collaborative R&D activities and initiatives” were identified as challenges.110 The creation of an
inter-institutional platform will help build a comprehensive database on transfer initiatives, map the
location and distribution of projects and correct the existing lopsidedness in the siting of EST projects.
Such a platform will also facilitate partnerships, assist the coordination of EST transfer initiatives and
inform an efficient deployment of scarce resources. If the TEC must exist apart from the CTCN, then
the coordination of this inter-institutional platform should be one of its key responsibilities.
The undergirding supposition of the above proposal on integration is that a global challenge like
climate change is best approached in an integrated manner. Such integration, however, differs in
scope. It entails ‘hard integration’ like what is proposed for the UNFCCC institutional mechanisms,
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‘quasi integration’ like in the case of UNFCCC institutions and international State-based institutions,
and ‘loose integration’ like between the UNFCCC and other technology transfer platforms. In a real
sense, just as there is one global climate affected by one climate change challenge, there is no such
thing as financial, technological, human rights or proprietary rights components of climate change;
they are all pieces of the same complex whole. It is, therefore, critical that the international
institutional arrangement reflects this reality. Again, more will need to be done on this subject of
‘integration’ in subsequent research.
5.6 Conclusion
The central objective of this thesis is to attempt a normative rethink of the global EST regime, taking
its starting point from the UNFCCC. For this exercise, this work adopted a TWAIL approach to
analysing the global qua UNFCCC EST structure. Rather than an overly antagonistic genre of
TWAIL, TWAIL has been engaged here as a counter-hegemonic narrative tool which provides
another viewpoint to the present market-dominant approach to EST development and management.
In other words, the focus of this work is not to perpetuate the hitherto divisive brand of the South –
North dichotomy. Rather, it is to represent such dichotomy as an opportunity to reconsider how the
present EST construct is structured. This more conciliatory approach, while not jettisoning historical
reality, allows for an open-mindedness to other realities and shows that these realities are not
necessarily contradictory, and that they can be fused into one holistic narrative. However, to properly
articulate this counter-hegemonic agenda, elements of which have been advanced in this chapter, it
was necessary to look closely at both the historical and present structure and operations of the global
and UNFCCC EST regime. The socio-political history of the regime over five distinct eras (pre-1992
era to the current technology mechanism era) was considered closely in chapter two. Chapter three
reviewed specific programmes of the EST regime, particularly in select African States, and chapter
four focused on the design and operation of the technology mechanism as recognised under the 2015
Paris Agreement. Some of the key findings from these chapters are:
i. There is no major difference in the negotiating positions of parties. Issues relating to intellectual
property rights, public – private institution dichotomy, peremptoriness or voluntariness of
commitments, commitments as issues of responsibility or ability, the separation of allied
institutions, have characterized the various phases of the international EST transfer regime.
ii. Over its various phases, EST transfer has largely been negotiated by parties on sub-structural
subjects of either actual transfer of technology/know-how or financial support. There has been
no concerted and comprehensive consideration of the core normative issues which underpin and
define the EST transfer sphere.
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iii. While there have been different initiatives over the years, transfer programmes are mostly
dogged by the same challenges, chief among which are lack of funds, dominance of one-off
projects, and the absence of composite enabling technology transfer schemes. While parties do
not mind coming to the ‘table’ and documenting agreements, there has been no commensurate
proof of willingness to give full effect to agreements reached. This has been described in this
work as the ‘gap of will’.
iv. Added to the absence of a comprehensive account of global transfer initiatives or a coordinating
platform, there is a lopsided distribution of transfer projects among the regions of the world,
with Africa being one of the least of the beneficiaries.
v. The global EST industry is mostly dominated by private firms, resulting in a heavy
commercialization of the market to the detriment of African States. African States represent
unattractive markets either to incentivize purpose-made ESTs, or even to attract the transfer of
existing products.
vi. The ecological space argument, hitherto emphasised by the global South, is both antithetical to
its developmental agenda and to EST transfer.
vii. Given its immense human rights implications and the historical causation element of climate
change, a market approach to climate change is both inappropriate and unjust. Such an approach
also perpetuates the undeveloped state of developing States and fosters the hegemony of the
global north.
The normative agenda sketched out in this chapter attempts to address some of the findings
summarised above. But as noted earlier, a comprehensive discussion of each of the proposals cannot
be accommodated here. They serve as ‘fodders’ for future research. Particularly, a question yet to be
answered is whether ESTs should be generally considered as public goods, or whether specific ESTs
qualify as such. Further, if all ESTs do not qualify as public goods, what are the modalities for
distinguishing between the ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ ones. Importantly, the ‘normative payment’
concept suggested here as a more availing alternative to ‘hard payment’ (finance and technology)
needs to be further articulated and its potentials for operationalization considered.
While not a complete analysis of the EST regime, what is clear from this thesis is that a market
dominant approach to ESTs will leave poor countries holding the shorter end of the climate change
‘stick’. The conversation must change at its very normative core. ESTs must be ‘humanized’ to be
relevant to the persons most affected by climate change. Until a consensus is reached at this normative
level, agreements will continually be reached at the international level and initiatives will be churned
out, but there will be no actual impact where it really matters!
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